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Banks communicate their regulatory risk exposures through disclosure 
reports to market participants. These reports are based on the Basel III Pillar 3 
guidelines, implemented in the European Union in form of the Capital 
Requirements Directive and Regulation (CRD IV/CRR).  
Agency theory views such disclosures as one viable option to reduce the 
information asymmetry between the banks’ managers and investors. Also, high-
quality risk disclosures can strengthen the competitive position of banks through 
lower cost of capital and higher stock liquidity. It is therefore in the interest of 
banks to prepare high-quality disclosures and evaluate current disclosure 
practices.  
This thesis proposes a scoring model that measures the quality of bank 
regulatory risk disclosures and thereby supports banks and their stakeholders in 
their decision-making process on risk communication. The model builds on a two-
dimensional framework including 1) a risk dimension comprising credit risk, 
market risk, operational risk, other risks including liquidity risk, and risk 
management in general; and 2) a quality dimension covering the criteria 
readability, comprehensiveness, meaningfulness, time comparability, and sector 
comparability. The quality criteria are operationalised and applied to the risk 
categories to facilitate the calculation of composite disclosure scores for 
regulatory risk disclosure reports of a sample of thirty large European-
headquartered banks for the period 2016 to 2018.  
Prior research shows that disclosure quality depends on both qualitative 
and quantitative elements. Therefore, a multi-methods approach is applied in this 
thesis to build the scoring model based on a pragmatic research philosophy. In 
the research design, qualitative elements are captured with semantic content 
analysis, while quantitative elements are explored using factor analysis.  
The calculation of composite disclosure scores results in an average 
composite disclosure score of 3.86 (out of a maximum of 5) with a spread of about 
20% to both sides. The analysis finds that reading difficulty across individual 
disclosure reports is generally very high, disclosure quantity varies substantially, 
banks are reluctant to provide forward-looking information, and only few 
information on time and sector comparability is included. This, therefore, makes 
it difficult for different stakeholders to benefit from bank disclosure reports and 
leaves ample space for banks to improve on their risk communication. 
The main academic contribution of this thesis is the development of a 
scoring model that captures the quality of regulatory risk disclosures in the EU 
banking industry. Such a practice-based model does not yet exist and has long 
been called for in prior literature. This research also introduces a comprehensive 
word-based approach that is an adequate proxy for measuring disclosure quality. 
Finally, the thesis adds to the understanding of how the term “information content” 





For the professional contribution, the proposed scoring model enables 
banks to analyse their current disclosure practices and points them to areas for 
improvements. Supervisory authorities and analyst houses also benefit from the 
scoring model through a more efficient and effective analysis of disclosure 
reports. Finally, consultancies and software firms can benefit from such a model 
to expand their offerings on business intelligence.  
 
JEL classification: M48 (Government Policy and Regulation) 
Keywords: Banking risk reporting; Regulation; Disclosure; Basel III Pillar 3; CRD 
IV/CRR; Quality scoring model.  
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1 Chapter One: Thesis Background, Research Question and Objectives 
1.1 Introduction and Significance 
A good quality of risk disclosure offers benefits to banks, their stakeholders 
and the wider economies, while poor quality is costly to all (Enhanced Disclosure 
Task Force, 2012). Previous research identifies potential benefits as lower cost 
of capital (Cheynel, 2013; Verrecchia & Clinch, 2015) or higher stock price 
liquidity (Ajina et al., 2015; Schoenfeld, 2017). Active communication also 
supports banks in managing their relationships with stakeholders and contributes 
to sustainable economic performance and resilience in the financial sector (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2015). Therefore, banks have a vital and 
significant interest in disclosing appropriate information to their stakeholders. 
Managing disclosure levels effectively, however, requires methods that support 
the evaluation of disclosure quality (Berger, 2011; Beyer et al., 2010). This thesis 
addresses the measurement of the quality of regulatory risk disclosure in the 
banking industry with the development of a disclosure scoring model, and thereby 
supports banks and their stakeholders in improving their overall performance.  
Regulatory risk disclosure gained importance during the financial crisis of 
2008 and the years thereafter when high quality risk information was not available 
in a timely manner. Trust among market participants fell to low levels, resulting in 
a liquidity crisis on a global basis (Draghi, 2011). Over the last decade, several 
regulatory initiatives such as the introduction of the Basel III guidelines have been 
taken to improve the risk communication of banks (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2017b). Still, the banking industry is vulnerable to adverse shocks 
in the external environment as for instance the increase in non-performing loans 
during the recent COVID-19 pandemic shows (Ari et al., 2020).  
Firms regularly communicate their risk profile and assessment through the 
risk section in their annual reports. However, due to their specific risk-taking 
nature, banks are required by law to disclose additional risk information through 
regulatory risk disclosure reports (European Parliament, 2013b). The Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the leading policymaker for banking 




“…to promote market discipline by providing meaningful regulatory 
information to investors and other interested parties on a consistent and 
comparable basis”. (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2015, p. 3)  
 
While resilient financial markets are the overall goal of the BCBS, the 
immediate addressees of disclosure are the external stakeholders of banks with 
a focus on investors. The tools to achieve this goal are the disclosure reports 
whose quantitative and qualitative regulatory content must be meaningful to 
stakeholders. This is the case if reports include sufficient and consistent 
information on a bank’s risk profile such as risk policies, risk measurement and 
exposures, and the management of credit, market, and operational risks. 
Banks comply with these disclosure requirements in many different ways. 
Some banks restrict their disclosures to providing a minimum level of information, 
while others prepare disclosure reports that comprehensively discuss their risk 
profiles and outlook. Overall, banks must decide on the quantity and content of 
their disclosures, and investors must determine what quantity and content to 
expect from banks’ disclosures. These decision-making processes require 
empirical evidence as a basis for making meaningful disclosures. The quote “if 
you cannot measure it, you cannot manage it”, attributed to management 
consultant Peter Drucker, summarises the significance of the thesis well. The 
main aim of this research is to develop a scoring model with which the quality of 
risk disclosures can reliably be assessed in order to support banks and investors 
in preparing and analysing high-quality disclosure reports to the benefit of their 
investment decisions and for the overall good of society.  
 
1.2 Thesis Background  
Stakeholders such as investors, creditors and governments have a variety 
of sources available to obtain financial and risk information on a firm. They range 
from financial statements to analysts’ reports and corporate filings. Traditionally, 
annual reports have been important sources on firms’ financial position, 
performance, and risk. IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standards) 
Practice Statement 1 provides a content outline for the management discussion 
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and analysis (MD&A) section of an annual report. It includes suggestions for 
disclosure on risk exposures and management: 
 
“Management should disclose an entity’s principal risk exposures and 
changes in those risks, together with its plans and strategies for bearing 
or mitigating those risks, as well as disclosure of the effectiveness of its 
risk management strategies.” (International Accounting Standards Board, 
2010, p. B836) 
 
More recently, IFRS 7 on Financial Instruments explicitly requires firms to 
disclose the nature and extent of risks arising from their use of financial 
instruments:  
 
“An entity shall disclose information that enables users of its financial 
statements to evaluate the nature and extent of risks arising from financial 
instruments to which the entity is exposed at the end of the reporting 
period.” (International Accounting Standards Board, 2016, p. A242) 
 
IFRS rules are applicable to all publicly traded firms in the European Union 
including banks when preparing their consolidated financial statements 
(European Commission, 2002). In addition, further regulatory disclosure 
requirements apply to banks due to their specific nature as risk-taking enterprises 
(Linsley & Shrives, 2005b) including:  
(1) the non-binding Basel III guidelines on prudential requirements for credit 
institutions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011) and 
(2)  the binding Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) IV (European 
Parliament CRD, 2013) and Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) 
(European Parliament CRR, 2013) which both came into force in the 
European Union in 2014. In legal terms, the so-called CRD IV/CRR 
framework is directly applicable to all financial institutions headquartered 
in the EU without further national implementation, and therefore replaces 




The leading policymaker in banking regulation and initiator of the Basel III 
guidelines, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), highlights the 
importance of regulatory risk disclosure and active market communication with 
the following quote:  
 
“Market discipline has long been recognized as a key objective of the 
BCBS. (…) The provision of meaningful information about common key 
risk metrics to market participants is a fundamental tenet of a sound 
banking system. It reduces information asymmetry and helps promote the 
comparability of banks’ risk profiles within and across jurisdictions.” 
(BCBS, 2015, p. 1) 
 
The general purpose of disclosure in this respect is to increase 
transparency in firms’ operations, risks, and financial position and performance 
(BCBS, 2015). Furthermore, with mounting pressure from society, firms have to 
accept their corporate social responsibility (CSR) and provide transparency in 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) matters. A good performance on 
these subjects can positively impact social reputation and result in the benefits of 
improved credit ratings (UNIDO, 2019). 
The Basel III guidelines consist of three pillars: pillar one covers rules on 
capital requirements for risk exposures while pillar two includes rules on 
supervisory processes. Regulatory risk disclosure which constitutes the basis for 
this thesis, comprises the third pillar. This pillar defines a risk reporting framework 
that builds on the regulatory requirements of pillar 1 and 2 and that consists of 
quantitative and qualitative disclosure recommendations on banking risks such 
as credit, market, and operational risks.  
With the transfer of the non-binding Basel III guidelines into EU law, some 
Basel III recommendations on disclosure became mandatory, thereby setting a 
minimum threshold for disclosure. However, Art. 431 (3) CRR on General 
Principles of Disclosure (European Parliament, 2013b, p. 254) says that  
 
“…institutions shall (…) have policies for assessing the appropriateness of 
their disclosures (…). Institutions shall also have policies for assessing whether 
their disclosures convey their risk profile comprehensively to market participants. 
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Where those disclosures do not convey the risk profile comprehensively to market 
participants, institutions shall publicly disclose the information necessary (…)”. 
 
This legal text stipulates that disclosures must fully reflect the risk profiles 
of banks in a true and fair way. The responsibility is shifted to banks to decide on 
the quantity and quality of any supplementary and additional information they 
deem necessary to voluntarily communicate their risk profiles to external 
stakeholders (EBA, 2020) 1. This responsibility is interpreted differently by each 
bank and leads to very different levels of disclosure quality per bank. The decision 
of what to disclose should be driven by a comprehensive view of the banks’ risk 
profiles, but also by factors such as impact on cost of capital, share price liquidity, 
and credit rating (Beyer et al., 2010). As far as the quantity of information 
disclosed is concerned, academic research from as early as the 1990’s suggests 
that firms will voluntarily disclose risk information as long as they benefit from it, 
taking the associated proprietary costs into account (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; 
Cheynel, 2013; Elshandidy et al., 2013, 2018; Verrecchia, 1990). Furthermore, 
Awolowo, Garrow, & Somerset (2019) address the importance of the factor ‘trust’ 
in the firms’ reporting with respect to misleading or even fraudulent information. 
They view good corporate governance (of which comprehensive risk disclosure 
is one crucial element) as a key in the quest to maintain trust and protect 
stakeholders. Forensic accounting tools are suggested to enhance trust in 
disclosure.  
The need for transparency in a firm’s communication is also a key theme 
in agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) which studies the relationship 
between a firm’s owners and the firm’s managers (e.g., Donnellan, 2016; 
Wiseman et al., 2012). An inherent conflict of interest exists between owners 
(often also referred to as investors or principals) and managers who are 
employed as agents to run the firm. Usually, managers have better access to 
internal information than external owners and, therefore, can use this information 
asymmetry to take actions to their own advantage and at the expense of the 
owners. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that one way to reduce this conflict 
of interest is to increase transparency by monitoring the behaviour of managers 
 
1 An example of a pillar 3 regulatory risk disclosure report can be found on the website of one of 
the leading UK banks HSBC (2018). 
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through regular (e.g., disclosure) reports on the firm’s financial position and risk 
(Dobler, 2008; European Banking Authority, 2017; Pepper & Gore, 2015). The 
benefits from transparency come, however, at a cost which can be of pecuniary 
or non-pecuniary nature. 
Agency theory  introduces pecuniary agency costs in the form of bonding 
and monitoring costs that both ultimately reduce the wealth of owners (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Bonding costs are costs incurred by firms for preparing and 
publishing reports, but also cover all expenses on the relationship management 
with stakeholders. Monitoring costs are incurred on the stakeholders’ side 
whenever, for example, reports must be analysed or the performance of firms is 
evaluated in general (Palia & Porter, 2007). On the non-pecuniary cost side, too 
much transparency can also weaken the competitive position of firms, as some 
proprietary and confidential information might be disclosed that is of material 
value to competitors. The disclosure of legally problematic information can even 
lead to increased litigation that can potentially damage the reputation and destroy 
firm value (Verrecchia, 1990).  
From the perspective of the users of disclosure reports, it is important to 
note that risk information is not interpreted in the same way by every stakeholder. 
Even if some theories, such as the dominant Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) 
developed by Fama (1970), assume that investors act rationally, other theories 
stemming from behavioural finance studies suggest that human psychology 
influences investment decisions, therefore adding an individual perspective to 
investors’ behaviour and the interpretation of risk disclosure reports (Shiller, 
2003; Thaler, 2005). Consequently, the perceived quality of disclosure does not 
only depend on the preparers of the reports, but also on the users and their 
information assessment. 
Banks regularly face a trade-off between providing adequate risk 
disclosure to cater for the information needs of their stakeholders, and limiting 
their risk disclosure to avoid adverse effects of too much openness (Cheynel, 
2013; Jia et al., 2016). They must balance the pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs 
of disclosure with the benefits received, which is a difficult optimisation task 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). While budgeting and controlling the actual production 
and publishing costs of disclosure reports is rather straightforward, quantifying 
the non-pecuniary costs, such as loss in competition, is less precise. The same 
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applies to measuring the benefits of disclosure such as lower cost of capital 
(Beyer et al., 2010). Benefits directly attributable to risk disclosure are difficult to 
measure empirically considering that, besides disclosure, a variety of other 
factors such as financial performance and overall economic activity impact on the 
monetary value of benefits.  
A prerequisite for optimising the relationship between costs and benefits 
is the ability to measure the quality of disclosure. Models are required that 
evaluate the quality of disclosure reports before further empirical analysis on 
costs incurred and benefits received can be performed. Beyer et al. (2010) state 
that, so far, most theoretical models on disclosure are “abstract representations” 
of the complex corporate information environment. They do not address the 
concrete challenges and requirements experienced in practice of communicating 
risk through disclosure. So, the task is to develop new models that produce 
“insights into practice” and that inform empirical studies as to whether  the proxies 
selected for quality measurement reflect the key challenges faced by managers.  
The research in this thesis, therefore, proposes a scoring model for 
regulatory risk disclosure that measures disclosure quality and provides support 
for banks’ internal decision-making and understanding of what determines the 
quality of their regulatory risk disclosures and how it can be efficiently and 
effectively managed. 
 
1.3 Personal Motivation 
Between 2005 and 2012, I had the chance to contribute to the definition of 
the requirements of regulatory risk disclosure in the European banking industry. 
Later, I was involved in the implementation of several regulatory risk disclosure 
reports in Germany and Austria. Collecting appropriate information and writing 
these reports (about 100 – 200 pages each including quantitative and qualitative 
content) was time-consuming and cost-intensive, and banks started questioning 
the overall purpose and usefulness of these reports. Considering the substantial 
investments, it quickly became clear that banks developed a vital interest in 
benefiting from them economically or at least from a reputational view. 
Despite several efforts to explain potential benefits, the discussions  
remained rather vague and were lacking empirical arguments. A structured 
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scoring model such as developed in this thesis would have helped to convince 
banks on the importance of regulatory risk disclosure as well as make 
suggestions on how to improve it.  
The future will show whether it is possible to establish generally accepted  
quality criteria that measure disclosure quality. This thesis is one initiative to 
promote the progress in disclosure research. Academically, I am interested in 
how a disclosure scoring model for regulatory risk in the banking industry can be 
defined and developed. Professionally, I would like to use the scoring model 
results in the daily consulting work where disclosure reports are prepared, 




1.4 Research Aim, Question and Objectives 
In this section, the research aim, the research question, and the four 
research objectives are defined and explained. Figure 1 provides an overview of 
the research approach and shows that the objectives follow an “analyse – 
develop – apply – evaluate” process.  
 
 
Figure 1: Research aim, question, and objectives 
 
The main aim of this thesis is the development of a model that captures 
the quality of banks’ regulatory risk disclosures based on the CRD IV/CRR legal 
framework (the EU implementation of Basel III). Risk disclosure is a key element 
of banks’ overall communication strategy with external stakeholders, and forms 
an essential part of banking regulation, good corporate governance, and agency 
theory. Substantial amounts of financial resources are invested in the production 
and publication of risk disclosure reports. Therefore, banks and their stakeholders 
have a vital interest in gaining appropriate benefits from their monetary 
investments into the quality of reports. The ability to measure the quality of 
disclosure is, therefore, the missing link between analysing the relationship 
between costs incurred for achieving a certain level of disclosure quality, and the 




The research aim of a regulatory risk disclosure scoring model 
development leads to the following research question and four research 
objectives: 
 
Research Question:  How can the quality of regulatory risk disclosure of banks in 
the EU be measured with a scoring model? 
 
The research question is embedded in three strands of academic research 
on disclosure. Disclosure research in general studies the impact of disclosure on 
management behaviour, and how a desirable behaviour can be reinforced 
(Elshandidy et al., 2015; Linsley & Shrives, 2005a; Verrecchia & Clinch, 2015). 
The underlying theory to this thesis is agency theory where disclosure is seen as 
one way to reduce the conflict of interest between managers and investors 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). A second strand relates disclosure to the impact it 
potentially has on performance indicators such as cost of capital or share price 
liquidity (Cheynel, 2013; Core et al., 2015; Dobler, 2008). Theories in this context 
claim that higher-quality disclosure leads to lower cost of capital and smaller 
bid/ask spreads due to higher share price liquidity. Finally, research on 
supervisory banking regulation analyses the effects of mandatory and voluntary 
disclosures on the resilience of banks and financial markets (Beyer et al., 2010; 
Estrella Arturo, 2004; European Banking Authority, 2017). In this thesis, it is 
argued that all three strands of research require models that measure disclosure 
quantity and quality empirically and that provide evidence-based input for further 
research (Berger, 2011; Beyer et al., 2010).    
The research question, therefore, comprises (1) the development of a 
scoring model that measures the quality and quantity of regulatory risk disclosure 
in the EU banking industry, and (2) the application of the model to a sample of 
risk disclosure reports in order to gain insights into current disclosure practices 
with respect to disclosure quality and quantity, and agency theory.  
The research question is answered by achieving the following four 
research objectives. The research objectives are pursued in a sequential way as 




Research Objective 1) Analyse the risk disclosure environment including the 
risk frameworks of banks, the disclosure regulation 
on risk in the European Union, and the characteristics 
of high-quality disclosure.  
Research Objective 2) Develop a scoring model that measures the quality of 
regulatory risk disclosure based on the findings of 
research objective 1. The model shall result in a 
composite disclosure score that represents the 
overall quality and quantity of a bank’s disclosure 
report. 
Research Objective 3) Implement the scoring model developed in research 
objective 2 and apply it to a sample of regulatory risk 
disclosure reports of banks in the EU for a three-year 
period. 
Research Objective 4) Evaluate the scoring results with respect to the 
quality of regulatory disclosure and their impact on 
agency theory. 
 
1.4.1 Research Objective 1 “Analyse the Risk Disclosure Environment” 
Disclosure reports and their quality measurement are embedded in the risk 
disclosure environment of banks. Banks are risk-taking enterprises as opposed 
to other manufacturing and service companies in an economy (Deloitte, 2015). 
Due to this special nature of banks and their important role for the overall 
economic stability (European Central Bank, 2018; Jorion, 2007), risk disclosure 
is seen as an important way to inform investors about the risk profile of a bank, 
and to supervise banks with a risk-based approach (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2015). Therefore, the analysis of how banks operate within their risk 
disclosure environment and what characterises their risk framework, is a  
prerequisite for measuring the quality of risk disclosure. 
One important aim of banking regulation is to regulate the risk exposures 
of banks with a risk framework in a prudent way. Many large banks are perceived 
as systemically important for the stability of economies (Financial Stability Board, 
2017), so their failure can put major economic sectors at risk. The financial crisis 
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of 2008 led supervisory authorities to strengthen banking regulation in order to 
prevent future crises. European integration and the establishment of a single 
market further advanced the regulatory environment in the EU with the aim of 
providing a single rulebook for the banking industry (European Parliament, 
2013b). Common regulatory rules and regulations such as the Basel III guidelines 
were developed that define the risk framework, the risk categories and risk 
measurement approaches. Based on this set of rules and regulations, regulatory 
risk disclosure reports are prepared and published by banks. The scoring model 
builds on this underlying legal framework on risk disclosure in the EU and an 
analysis is essential to the model development. 
Before regulatory risk disclosure reports can be evaluated with a scoring 
model, the criteria for measurement must be defined. The criteria can be of 
quantitative (e.g., amount of information disclosed) or qualitative (e.g., 
meaningfulness of the content disclosed) nature. Several leading organisations 
such as the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), the Financial 
Stability Board (FSB), and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
suggest a range of potential criteria that aim to capture the characteristics of 
disclosure reports (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2015; Enhanced 
Disclosure Task Force, 2012; International Accounting Standards Board, 2017). 
In this thesis, their proposals are critically evaluated and in a further step 
consolidated into a common set of criteria, before they become part of the scoring 
model framework. 
 
1.4.2 Research Objective 2 “Develop a Scoring Model” 
The development of the regulatory risk disclosure scoring model is at the 
core of this research objective. It builds on the analysis of the disclosure 
environment in research objective one (risk frameworks for banks, risk disclosure 
regulation, and characteristics of high-quality disclosure). The proposed model 
takes the risk categories from the risk framework for banks based on the risk 
disclosure regulations in the European Union (CRD IV/CRR). It then applies the 
quality criteria selected from the analysis of the high-quality disclosure principles 
of leading policymakers and standard setters to the risk categories and calculates 
composite disclosure scores that represent the overall quality of the disclosures.  
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Measuring the quality of content-based risk disclosures has been a 
challenge for a long time (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008; Elshandidy et al., 2018; 
Miihkinen, 2011). Several methods exist that range from assigning subjective 
ratings, quantitative indexing, textual and linguistic analysis, and content analysis 
(see section 2.4). All methods come with advantages and disadvantages 
regarding coding workload, ease of processing of large sample sizes, and 
explanatory power (Hassan & Marston, 2010; Ibrahim & Hussainey, 2019). For 
the development of the scoring model, measurement methods are suggested that 
capture the content quality and quantity of disclosure well, but also support a 
reduction in the coding workload through potential (semi-)automatisation in the 
future.   
Other tasks performed in this research objective include the definition of 
the model framework, the identification of the data requirements, the 
operationalisation of the quality criteria, the definition of the processing logic, and 
the development of the algorithms for calculating the composite disclosure 
scores. 
 
1.4.3 Research Objective 3 “Implement and Apply the Scoring Model” 
The theoretical scoring model framework developed in research objective 
two is technically implemented in the form of a prototype before it is applied to 
regulatory risk disclosure reports of a sample of thirty large EU banks. This 
requires the development of the technical architecture of the model and the 
selection of software for coding, data storage, processing, statistical analysis, and 
consolidation. Then, the prototype of the scoring model is programmed and 
installed. In parallel, a sample of regulatory risk disclosure reports from thirty large 
banks, mainly headquartered in the European Union, for the period 2016 to 2018 
is collected from banks’ websites. Finally, all reports are processed with the 
prototype software and composite disclosure scores are calculated for each 




1.4.4 Research Objective 4 “Evaluate the Disclosure Scores” 
In this objective, the composite disclosure scores are evaluated with 
respect to disclosure quality and the impact on agency theory. First, the risk 
disclosures in the banks’ reports are analysed for each pair of risk category and 
quality criterion. Individual disclosure scores are calculated and evaluated 
separately for each bank report. Then, the individual scores are consolidated and 
evaluated with respect to the overall quality criteria defined. This approach 
supports the identification of common disclosure practices within and across 
banks and highlights differences and commonalities within the sample. The 
analysis and evaluation of the scores explain and inform banks in which 
disclosure areas they are already performing well and in which areas they need 
to improve compared to their competitors for achieving an overall higher 
disclosure quality.  
Second, the composite disclosure scores are evaluated with respect to 
agency theory. The analysis focuses on the identification of different kinds of 
disclosure qualities when studying the effects of information asymmetry. The 
analysis of disclosure scores will show whether the disclosure practices on 
regulatory risk in the EU banking industry are homogeneous or heterogeneous, 






1.5 Research Scope 
 
The research scope presented in Figure 2 defines the focus of this research 
(shaded boxes) and the boundaries that are not part of it.  
 
 
Figure 2: Scope of the research 
 
The research focus is on regulatory risk disclosure in the banking industry. 
This industry is special with regards to the risk-taking nature of banks, their risk 
profiles and risk management as compared to the manufacturing or service sector 
(Linsley & Shrives, 2005b) and, therefore, justifies a separate analysis of its 
disclosure policies.  
Furthermore, the banking industry in the European Union is regulated by 
a homogenous set of regulatory reporting rules defined by the Basel III guidelines 
and legally implemented in the EU CRD IV/CRR framework. The common 
reporting environment makes risk disclosures easily comparable within the 
industry. Other legal reporting requirements such as the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) or the Environmental, Social and Governance 
regulations (ESG) coexist besides the banking regulation, but serve different 
purposes and are, therefore, not in the focus of this research.  
The proposed scoring model evaluates the quality of the so-called Pillar 3 
Regulatory Risk Disclosure Reports. These reports include information on 
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regulatory risk that is specific to banks, which cannot be found in the risk sections 
of annual reports or corporate governance reports (International Accounting 
Standards Board, 2010).  
As far as the reporting language is concerned, the scoring model is applied 
to the English language version of risk disclosure reports only. This is an issue 
for banks from non-English speaking countries. Such banks regularly prepare 
their disclosure reports in the local language before they get translated into 
English. It must be noted that other languages have different language properties 
and would require the adjustment of parameters of the scoring model at the 
expense of comparability. As this research focuses on the largest European 
banks, the sample is selected in a way that all disclosure reports are available in 
the English language.   
The sample of disclosure reports for the purpose of model testing and 
results evaluation is taken from the G-SII (global systemically important 
institutions) and O-SII (other systemically important institutions) lists annually 
published by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the European Banking 
Authority (EBA). The largest banks headquartered in the EU are selected (with 
one exception of Switzerland which is sharing similar banking regulations to that 
of the EU). Large banks are regularly the industry leaders with the most 
comprehensive risk profiles and, therefore, represent the industry and the  
disclosure benchmarks well (EBA, 2020). The sample comprises thirty banks, 
with the largest proportion of banks originating from the biggest EU countries UK2, 
Germany, France, Spain, and Italy.  
The time frame considered for analysis is the period 2016 to 2018 during 
which the regulatory environment for disclosure was effectively stable. In this 
period, no material changes were made to the CRD IV/CRR framework issued in 
2013 (European Banking Authority, 2018). In total, the sample covers ninety bank 




2 For the research period 2016 to 2018, the UK was still a member of the EU. 
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1.6 Gaps and Contribution to Knowledge and Practice 
Disclosure research originates from the analysis of the information content 
provided in financial statements in general without considering the particular 
requirements of the banking industry. Researchers have examined how the 
quality of the content of annual reports can be evaluated from the perspective of 
stakeholders as these reports are viewed as an important tool for reducing 
information asymmetry between firms and their stakeholders (e.g., Beretta & 
Bozzolan, 2008; Core, 2001; Core et al., 2015; Elshandidy et al., 2013; Healy & 
Palepu, 2001; Miihkinen, 2011). Others have focused on the perspective of a firm 
having to decide which kind and quantity of information to disclose in financial 
statements, by also considering the costs incurred (Guay et al., 2016; Hope et 
al., 2016; International Accounting Standards Board, 2018; Li, 2010). Recent 
research focuses on the information content of ad hoc statements and analysts’ 
reports and their impact on performance ratios such as cost of capital or return 
on equity (Cheynel, 2013; Francis et al., 2008; Lambert et al., 2006; Verrecchia 
& Clinch, 2015). With the rise in importance of corporate governance, several 
studies examine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on firm 
performance (Kodwani et al., 2020; Ntim et al., 2013).  
The information provided in financial statements regularly focuses on the 
financial position and performance of firms. General disclosure on risk as part of 
annual reports emerged only in the last two decades (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2006c; Mendoza, 2015). Disclosure on environmental, 
social and governance issues (Refinitiv, 2019) is still developing, considering for 
instance the discussion on the European Green Deal (European Commission, 
2019). 
Regulatory risk disclosure is a special case of disclosure and only applies 
to the banking industry. Although research and model development was 
performed on general risk disclosure (see section 2.2.7), there does not yet exist 
a model that addresses the evaluation of the quality of regulatory risk disclosure 
of banks. The proposed scoring model closes this research gap.  
A recurring suggestion for further disclosure research is the unresolved 
issue of quantifying disclosure quality (Beyer et al., 2010). Several approaches 
are suggested ranging from self-constructed indices (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; 
Francis et al., 2008) to using the external disclosure ratings (e.g. Brown & 
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Hillegeist, 2007; Refinitiv, 2019). Li (2010) adds a new perspective by using 
natural language processing techniques. However, no approach has become a 
general standard for measuring disclosure quality so far due to several reasons 
such as little practicality or too much specialisation (Berger, 2011; Beyer et al., 
2010). This thesis closes a gap in the applicability of disclosure measurement 
models by suggesting a framework for quantifying regulatory risk disclosure 
quality based on widely accepted measurement criteria in the banking industry 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2018).  
Previous studies often focus on the risk reporting of non-financial firms. 
Financial firms are purposely excluded from the research due to their specific risk 
nature as risk-taking enterprises (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Elshandidy et al., 
2015; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012; Miihkinen, 2011). By addressing the specific 
regulatory risk disclosure requirements of banks, this thesis closes the research 
gap with respect to disclosure in the banking industry.  
Banking risk regulation gained prominence over the last decade and now 
stands side by side with financial reporting in the banking industry (European 
Parliament, 2013b). There is a research gap in linking banking regulation based 
on the Basel III guidelines to measuring the quality of reporting on regulatory risk. 
It is not clearly understood whether more and better disclosure leads to more 
resilient market behaviour by reducing the information asymmetry between firms 
and stakeholders (Beyer et al., 2010). A precondition for such an analysis is the 
ability to measure disclosure quality reliably. The model developed in this thesis 
offers such an opportunity. 
There is a genuine and significant interest in evaluating the impact of 
disclosure on the resilience of economies and on society as a whole. Often, 
increasing the level of disclosure is suggested as one way for improving 
economic stability (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2018; IFRS, 2019; 
UNCTAD, 2017). Firms, including banks, are expected to conduct their business 
transparently and act responsibly by society (European Parliament, 2014). 
Current political initiatives such as the European Green Deal follow suit 
(European Commission, 2019). It is expected that the discussion on disclosure 
will further gain momentum in the future. However, without models and tools that 
“measure” the quality of disclosures, the discussions remain on a rather 
theoretical level. The research in this thesis takes the discussion on improving 
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the stability of financial markets one step forward by developing a tool that can 
quantifying disclosure quality.  
 
1.7 Ethical Considerations 
The Declaration of Helsinki (World Medical Association, 2013) sets 
standards of good practice in research ethics. Although the declaration originates 
from medical research, it is widely accepted in other research settings such as 
social sciences and business administration. The principles of the declaration 
also provide guidance for this research.  
The declaration categorises the ethical principles of research in 
beneficence, non-malfeasance, informed consent and confidentiality, and 
anonymity. Research should strive to do something positive (beneficence) and 
not harm anyone or anything (malfeasance). In case human subjects are 
involved, they shall be informed about the research underway and asked for 
permission (informed consent). Their data shall be treated confidentially. In 
published research work, individual data shall be anonymised if not agreed 
otherwise (World Medical Association, 2013). 
The principles of the declaration apply to this thesis in the following way. 
In this research, the objects of interest are regulatory risk disclosure reports 
published periodically by banks. Although these reports are prepared by 
employees of banks, there is no direct interaction taken with these individuals. 
The research focuses on analysing and evaluating the document-based 
disclosure reports with a scoring model, and no personal or proprietary 
information is used or inquired during and after the research process. 
The research contributes positively to knowledge in the field of disclosure, 
and it is not expected to harm the interests of individual participants or 
organisations (banks).  
All disclosure reports are available on the banks’ websites in the public 
domain and can be freely accessed by every interested party. The download, 
usage and analysis of the reports conform to the legislation on data protection.  
During the research process, the names of the banks in the sample and 
other characteristics such as asset size, risk weighted assets, country of 
headquarter, and risk assessment are known to the researcher. However, in the 
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evaluation phase, the results on disclosure scores are anonymised and 
consolidated. Upon publication of evaluation results, it is not possible to identify 
an individual bank anymore. Individual information on banks is kept confidential 
in a secure online workspace and access granted only to university supervisors 
or other interested academic researchers. 
The author of this thesis has worked for a number of banks included in the 
research sample on a consulting basis in the past, but has not been affiliated with 
any of them over the last three years.  
 
1.8 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is structured into seven chapters. Figure 3 provides an overview 
of the chapter contents. 
 
 
Figure 3: Structure of the thesis 
 
 Chapter one introduces the research subject of the thesis. It creates 
awareness for the trade-off faced by banks to disclose as much information to 
stakeholders and the public as possible, but also not to threaten their competitive 
and legal position. The research problem of measuring the quality of regulatory 
risk disclosure is explained in the general background section. It is followed by a 
section where the research aim, the research question and the four research 
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objectives are precisely defined. The section on the research scope adds to the 
definition by setting out the focus of this research. The next section outlines the 
existing research gaps and explains the contributions of this research to 
academic and professional progress. In a final section, potential ethical issues 
arising in this research are discussed and explained how potential dilemmas are 
solved. 
In chapter two the existing literature on bank disclosure is reviewed. This 
review is divided into three sections. First, the theoretical framework of disclosure 
in general is discussed. The chapter then narrows down the focus to the reporting 
regime in the European Union and the disclosure regulations for banks operating 
in this environment. The third section extends the literature review to quantitative 
and qualitative measurement approaches of disclosure.  
Chapter three introduces the philosophical stance of this thesis and it 
justifies the choice of pragmatism as the main paradigm adopted for this 
research. Continuing with the methodological approach, the next section explains 
why the use of multiple methods best help to answer the research question. The 
chapter concludes with the description of the research design and the 
consecutive steps taken as required in multi-methods research. 
The regulatory risk disclosure scoring model is developed in chapter four. 
The basis is set with a closer look at agency theory focusing on benefits of 
information sharing and incurred agency costs. As this thesis is about regulatory 
risk disclosure in the banking industry, the next section outlines the risks 
particularly relevant to this industry. The chapter continues with the selection of 
the criteria used to measure disclosure quality in the proposed scoring model. 
The final section of this chapter develops the scoring model with the integration 
of the risk and quality dimensions in one model.  
Chapter five includes the implementation and testing of the scoring model. 
First, the selection criteria for the test sample of thirty large European banks over 
2016 - 2018 are summarised. In semantic content analysis it is important to follow 
a strict process and organisation to minimise inherent subjectivity. These 
procedures are set out in section two. The results of the statistical tests for 
reliability and validity undertaken can be found in section three. Section four 
includes the coding rulebook that coders had to follow rigorously. The last section 
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explains the technical implementation of the model in Nvivo, SPSS, Python and 
Excel. 
The results of the scoring model testing are evaluated in chapter six. In 
section one, each quality criterion is analysed individually before the composite 
disclosure scores are finally evaluated. Section two continues with the statistical 
factor analysis on the model results. First, the correlation matrix between all 
quality criteria is analysed and interpreted. The second part includes the principal 
component analysis that results in the identification of the underlying thematic 
structure of the model. In the final section of this chapter, the impact of the model 
results on agency theory is discussed and analysed. 
Chapter seven concludes this thesis. It summarises the empirical results 
of the risk disclosure scoring model and the activities undertaken in this research, 
but also critically discusses experiences made during the model development 
and evaluation phase. In the two remaining sections, limitations of the research 
are listed and suggestions for further research are made. 
 
1.9 Chapter Summary 
The chapter introduced the thesis. It provided the academic and 
professional background of regulatory risk disclosure which is the main theme of 
this thesis. It explained the significance of the subject by highlighting that banks  
only can manage their disclosure when they can measure it. The research 
question “How can the quality of regulatory risk disclosure of banks in the EU be 
measured with a scoring model?” was explained and split into four major research 
objectives that follow the analyse-develop-implement-evaluate process. The 
definition of the scope of the research set the main constituents of the model but 
also separated the model from related research questions. Several research 
gaps were discussed of which the most important one was that there simply does 
not yet exist a comparable regulatory risk disclosure scoring model for the 
banking industry. The gaps lead to an extensive overview of potential academic 
and professional contributions of this thesis. Finally, ethical considerations were 
made that are relevant for this academic research.   
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2 Chapter Two: Literature Review 
2.1 Overview 
Research in the disclosure field asks three fundamental questions (Beyer 
et al., 2010). Why do firms disclose, what do they disclose and how do they 
disclose information? The answers to these questions all make a strong impact 
on the development of the regulatory risk disclosure scoring model in this thesis 
(Figure 4). They give the reasons for disclosing regulatory risk information to the 
public, they define the content of regulatory risk disclosure reports, and they 
provide criteria for measuring the quality of the disclosure. 
 
 
Figure 4: Disclosure research and the scoring model 
 
First, the question is “why do firms disclose internal information at all?” that 
makes it necessary to develop a disclosure scoring model. Internal information is 
proprietary to a firm and it needs good reasons for communicating this information 
externally (Elshandidy et al., 2018). The first section of the literature review 
critically summarises the state of disclosure research including definitions for 
“disclosure”, “risk”, and “regulatory reporting”, determinants of disclosure and 
vehicles of disclosure. These factors build the foundation for the disclosure 
scoring model. It further gives an overview of the theories that aim to explain the 
disclosure policies of firms. Agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) is a 
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prominent theory in this field, but there are also other theories that explain the 
disclosure policies from different perspectives. The first section concludes with a 
critical discussion of agency theory in the banking environment and highlights the 
research gap the scoring model closes in this respect. 
The second question is “what do firms disclose?” Besides the information 
needs of investors there is also a public interest in a basic flow of information 
(EBA, 2020). This public interest is reflected in mandatory and voluntary 
disclosures that can be found in laws, regulations and guidelines (European 
Parliament, 2013b). The literature review in the second section examines the 
disclosure requirements found in banking regulatory reporting (Basel III, 
implemented in the EU through the Capital Requirements Directive CRD IV and 
Regulation CRR), in financial accounting (IFRS), in stock exchange listing 
requirements, and in environmental, social and governance (ESG) reporting. The 
main emphasis in this section is on banking regulatory reporting, as this is the 
focus of the disclosure scoring model. 
The third and last question is “how do firms disclose?” The answer defines 
the measurement of disclosure quantity and quality in the disclosure scoring 
model. In the literature many research papers suggest different answers to this 
question. However, so far no measurement approach is generally accepted 
(Berger, 2011). This third section of the literature review first gives an overview 
of the measurement methods, ranging from direct to indirect approaches as well 
as from quantitative to qualitative approaches (scores and indices, semantic 
content analysis, computational linguistics, surveys, interviews). Then the 
methods are critically evaluated as each one has its benefits (time, cost, and 
sample size) and drawbacks (subjectivity and validity). In the end, the section 
prepares the basis for the selection of the measurement approach suggested in 




2.2 Theoretical Framework of Disclosure  
The objective of this thesis is to develop a “regulatory risk disclosure 
scoring model”. In order to define the constituents of the model, this section first 
reviews the literature on the terms “disclosure”, “risk” and “regulatory reporting”, 
highlights the disputes in the research, and then applies the definitions to the 
scoring model. 
 
2.2.1 Definition of Disclosure  
The term “disclosure” can be defined in a broader and narrower sense. 
The definition which is used depends on the purpose of disclosure. Figure 5 
provides an overview of relevant aspects for the definition of the term “disclosure” 
found in various sources. 
 
 
Figure 5: Definitions of disclosure 
 
At a 2017 conference on the future development of corporate disclosure, 
the United Nations Commission for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
suggested a rather general definition of disclosure (Figure 5 [1]) that leaves room 
for subsuming many different aspects of disclosure. It states that “corporate 
disclosure comprises the communication of information by corporate insiders, 
such as management and entrepreneurs, to stakeholders of a company” 
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(UNCTAD, 2017). It leaves open which kind of information is meant, 
understanding that even a commercial on TV represents a form of communication 
in addition to the more traditional forms of annual reports and regulatory filings. 
The explanation following the definition lists the main external audiences of 
disclosure. These are primarily the stakeholders that provide equity and debt 
capital to a firm. However, other stakeholder groups such as regulatory bodies, 
tax authorities, policymakers, employees, and society are interested in disclosure 
as well and must be included in the audience. Lastly, the definition recognises 
that good corporate governance heavily depends on information, thereby 
highlighting the importance of disclosure (UNCTAD, 2017).  
The accounting profession is a major driver in the development of financial 
reporting and disclosure. One of the leading policymakers in this area, the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) sets out the objective of 
financial reporting as to “… provide financial information that is useful to users in 
making decisions relating to providing resources to the entity” (International 
Accounting Standards Board, 2018). In this definition (Figure 5 [2]), disclosure 
must support users such as current and potential investors in decision-making. 
For this purpose, they need information on an entity’s economic resources, claims 
against the entity and changes in those resources and claims, as well as 
information on how efficiently and effectively management has discharged its 
responsibilities to use the entity’s economic resources (International Accounting 
Standards Board, 2018). Information is presumed to be useful only if it is material 
(“materiality concept”). Information is material if omitting it or misstating it could 
influence investors’ decisions. 
Supervisory authorities such as regulatory bodies in the banking industry 
often share interests with financial accounting policymakers but add their specific 
goals to the definition of disclosure. In the case of the banking industry, the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) sets the (non-binding) standards for 
prudent banking regulation and disclosure. It is a forum for regular cooperation 
on the supervision of the international banking system and is made up of national 
banks and supervisory authorities from 28 leading countries worldwide. The 
BCBS adds to its definition of disclosure (Figure 5 [3]) the overall goal of resilient 
financial markets through market discipline (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2015). It states that regulatory risk disclosure (pillar 3 of the Basel 
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III framework) “complements the minimum risk-based capital requirements and 
other quantitative requirements (pillar 1) and the supervisory process (pillar 2)” 
and it “aims to promote market discipline by providing meaningful regulatory 
information to investors and other interested parties on a consistent and 
comparable basis” (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2015). The basis 
of regulatory risk disclosure is information from financial accounting (the so-called 
Financial Reporting FINREP) that is further processed through extensive risk-
related rules set forth in pillar 1 and 2 of the Basel III framework (European 
Parliament, 2013b). The BCBS regards a disclosure report as being of high-
quality if it “enables users to better understand and compare a bank’s business 
and its risks”, an observation that already establishes criteria for the scoring 
model  (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2015).  
Linsley & Shrives (2005b) add to the risk perspective that “… the essence 
of any bank is that it is a risk-taking enterprise…” and therefore, as part of good 
corporate governance, “… it is expected that relevant risk-related information will 
be released to the marketplace”. So, in addition, they define the responsibility of 
the provider of information. Disclosure must include relevant risk-related 
information on credit, market, and operational risks as well as the approach of 
how these risks are assessed and managed. 
Beretta & Bozzolan (2004) add a current and future time orientation to the 
definition of disclosure (Figure 5 [5]). They state that the definition of disclosure 
must include two important aspects. One aspect is that disclosure must inform on 
the “sustainability of current value-creation drivers”. The second aspect is of 
equal importance: “… shareholders require public companies to disclose 
information concerning their prospects for future performance” (Beretta & 
Bozzolan, 2004). They go on to mention that the narrative components of risk 
communication must offer useful insights into value-generation drivers besides 
clarifying and validating quantitative measures. They highlight the importance of 
qualitative descriptive disclosure besides an exclusive normative and figures-
based disclosure. In developing their risk communication model in their study on 
Italian firms, they define risk disclosure as “the communication of information 
concerning firms’ strategies, characteristics, operations, and other external 




Finally, provision 31 of the UK Corporate Governance Code 2018 
(Financial Reporting Council, 2018) shifts the focus of the disclosure definition to 
the board of directors (Figure 5 [6]). The Code defines the responsibilities of the 
board by saying that by “…taking account of the company’s current position and 
principal risks, the board should explain … how it has assessed the prospects of 
the company, over what period it has done so and why it considers that period to 
be appropriate” (Financial Reporting Council, 2018). The board shall include in 
its governance reports both, compliance with the Code but also, equally 
important, explanations for non-compliance (Kodwani et al., 2020). 
Consequently, good disclosure must consider content but also the role and 
intention of the authors of the disclosure reports. 
In summary, the literature review on the definition of disclosure shows that 
the definition is often driven by the purpose of disclosure. The organisations and 
researchers pursue different goals in their work, therefore leading to rather 
heterogeneous disclosure definitions. They highlight in their definitions various 
aspects as summarised in Figure 5. Disclosure can be a tool for communication, 
decision making, market discipline, or assigning responsibility. Disclosure must 
also be relevant and oriented to the current and future performance of a firm. 
While all aspects are important for the definition used in the development of the 
scoring model, the basic definition applied here is the one from the BCBS (Figure 
5 [3]). The reason is that the disclosure scoring model is based on regulatory risk 
reporting, and banks must follow this regulation (European Parliament, 2013b) 
when preparing their disclosure reports (European Banking Authority, 2018).  
 
2.2.2 Definition of Risk  
The main focus of the disclosure scoring model is on regulatory risk. There 
is a long-standing debate in the financial literature whether the term “risk” refers 
only to negative outcomes of an event or whether the positive outcomes (the 
chances) of the same event should be included in the definition of risk as well 
(Brealey et al., 2014; Ibrahim & Hussainey, 2019; Jorion, 2007). The question of 
the scope of risk is of high importance for the scoring model development. For 
instance, in semantic content analysis it makes a difference if only negative risk 
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words (e.g., uncertainty, danger) are counted or also positive words (e.g., 
success, opportunity) (Li, 2010), thereby materially impacting scoring results. 
In their analysis of the definition of risk Ibrahim & Hussainey (2019) 
differentiate between a pre-modern and a modernist view. They argue that the 
pre-modern view recognises risk as something bad, therefore covering only a 
single side of risk (the negative one). The modernist view recognises risk as both 
the negative and the positive side of an uncertain event, therefore covering both 
sides of potential outcomes.  
Arguments supporting either view can be found in the literature. It often 
depends on the purpose of the research which definition is recommended. In their 
study of risk disclosures in the annual reports of UK companies, Linsley & Shrives 
(2006) decide to apply the broad, modernist definition of risk. For the purpose of 
their study they mark a sentence in an annual report as risk-relevant “…if the 
reader is informed of any opportunity or prospect (edited: the positive side), or of 
any hazard, danger, harm, threat or exposure (edited: the negative side), that has 
already impacted upon the company or may impact upon the company in the 
future or of the management of any such opportunity, prospect, hazard, harm, 
threat or exposure“ (Linsley & Shrives, 2006). 
Brealey et al. (2014) use a technical definition of risk. By statistical means 
they analyse the variability of expected stock price returns. They define risk in 
terms of price variability. The higher the variability of a stock, the higher the risk 
is (in the case of normally distributed returns). Hence, variability is not 
differentiated in positive and negative outcomes. This technical definition of risk 
follows the modernist definition of risk. 
The pre-modern standpoint is taken by bank supervisory authorities 
(Kinglsey et al., 1998). The Basel III framework regulates the own capital (equity) 
required to support the risks taken by banks. The definition of risk is essential to 
correctly measure the risks incurred. In a paper of the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (2017) amendments are suggested for finalizing the post-
financial crisis reforms of banking regulation. In the context of operational risks, 
the committee defines risk as “the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed 
internal processes, people and systems or from external events” (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2017). This single-sided perspective on risk 
(“failure”) is followed up in the EU implementation of the Basel III framework, the 
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CRD IV/CRR package. A definition of risk is mentioned in point (10) of article 3(1) 
of the directive 2013/36/EU (European Parliament, 2013a). There, the definition 
of systemic risk includes the “risk of disruption in the financial system with the 
potential to have serious negative consequences for the financial system and the 
real economy”. Point (11) of Article 3(1) of the same directive defines model risk 
as the “potential loss an institution may incur, as a consequence of decisions that 
could be principally based on the output of internal models, due to errors in the 
development, implementation or use of such models ” (European Parliament, 
2013a). 
The Basel III and the EU CRD IV/CRR definitions of risk clearly show that 
for banking regulatory purposes the pre-modern, single-sided view of risk is 
applied as key phrases “risk of loss”, “negative consequences” and “potential 
losses” in the risk definition suggest. Consequently, the regulatory risk disclosure 
scoring model follows this risk definition focusing on the negative outcomes of 
risk only. 
 
2.2.3 Definition of Regulatory Reporting and Disclosure 
The European Central Bank (ECB) defines “regulatory reporting” from the 
perspective of a banking supervisor: “The aim [edited: of regulatory reporting] is 
to provide supervisors with all relevant information on the financial institutions’ 
risk exposures, as well as their capital and liquidity positions” (Nouy, 2014). Nouy, 
then the chairperson of the ECB’s supervisory board, suggests a broad scope for 
defining regulatory reporting. In the definition, regulatory reporting includes all 
information that supervisors need to evaluate the financial soundness of a bank. 
This comprises information on risk exposures, capital, and liquidity. On a side 
note, he also acknowledges that the public interest in regulatory reporting is 
growing (Nouy, 2014). Risk information that used to be reported only to banking 
supervisory authorities is on the verge of becoming a major concern for external 
stakeholders as well. Therefore, risk information must continuously be made 
accessible to the public. Technically, the public provision of information on 
regulatory risk is summarized as “regulatory disclosure” and thereby extends the 
original term “regulatory reporting” that used to focus only on requirements of 
regulatory supervision (European Parliament, 2013a).  
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The EU CRD IV/CRR framework goes into more detail in the definition of 
regulatory disclosure. The purpose of regulation is to “establish uniform and 
directly applicable prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment 
firms, since such requirements are closely related to the functioning of financial 
markets in respect of a number of assets held by credit institutions and 
investment firms” (European Parliament, 2013a). In the public interest, 
supervisors must establish common banking rules for ensuring stable and 
resilient financial markets, and the supervised banks must disclose all regulatory 
information that is needed to achieve this goal. 
The leading banking policymaker in the EU, the European Banking 
Authority (EBA) summarises the need for regulation and regulatory disclosure in 
its “single rulebook” approach (European Banking Authority, 2018). The Single 
Rulebook “aims to provide a single set of harmonised prudential rules”. The goal 
of this unified regulatory framework for the EU financial sector is to complete the 
single market in financial services. A precondition for the functioning of a single 
market is that rules and regulations such as Basel III are uniformly applied in all 
member states, and banks have to adhere to comparable reporting standards. It 
is essential that similar standards for regulatory disclosure, and the same 
methodologies for the calculation of key requirements, such as capital and 
liquidity ratios are used by all market participants. This way, regulatory disclosure 
will contribute to a more effective functioning of the single market (Morrison & 
White, 2009). 
In summary, it can be observed that the definition of regulatory reporting 
has changed over the years. Originally, the main purpose of regulatory reporting 
was banking supervision where banks had to submit risk-relevant data to 
supervisory authorities only. With the introduction of the Basel III framework, the 
group of potentially interested stakeholders in regulatory reporting and potential 
receivers of information was widened to include all market participants. The 
information provided through regulatory reporting must now guarantee both, the 
resilience of the individual bank but also the functioning of financial markets. This 
change in purpose has strong implications on the development of the scoring 
model. The model must consider the needs of a wide audience. It must cover all 
relevant risk-related information as well as measure the quality of disclosure for 
a diverse group of stakeholders.   
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2.2.4 Dimensions of Disclosure 
The nature of disclosure is best described using a multi-dimensional 
approach (Elshandidy et al., 2018). Disclosure can take on many different forms. 
Figure 6 summarises the main dimensions ranging from mandatory/voluntary 
disclosure to benefits of disclosure. In this section, the literature on these 
dimensions is evaluated and the impact on the development of the disclosure 
scoring model explained. 
 
 
Figure 6: Dimensions of disclosure 
 
2.2.4.1 Mandatory versus Voluntary Disclosure 
Linsley & Shrives (2000) examine the merits and demerits of disclosing 
risk information in annual reports from both the firms’ and investors’ points of 
view. They observe that “…although businesses have had the opportunity to 
disclose risk information voluntarily few have done so, and if it is considered that 
such disclosure is desirable then there is a strong argument for regulation” 
(Linsley & Shrives, 2000). Linsley and Shrives find that firms tend to be reluctant 
to disclose internal risk information voluntarily. In order to ensure a minimum level 
of disclosure, supervisory authorities must issue mandatory rules and 
regulations. Institutions such as the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision 
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(BCBS) define their role in the same sense although their guidelines are non-
binding (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006c). 
Disclosure of information can be mandated/regulated by supervisory 
authorities or be voluntary at the choice of the firm. Often a minimum level of 
disclosure is mandated and everything above is considered voluntary 
communication (UNCTAD, 2017). The most common sources of mandated 
disclosure are accounting standards, e.g., IFRS 7 Financial Instruments 
Disclosure, legal regulations such as the EU Capital Requirements Directive CRD 
IV together with the Capital Requirements Regulation CRR package for the 
banking industry in the European Union, corporate governance codes with their 
comply or explain obligation, non-financial disclosures such as ESG reporting, 
and listing rules of stock exchanges (Beyer et al., 2010).  
The originators of voluntary disclosure are the firms themselves whenever 
they decide to voluntarily communicate information (Verrecchia, 1990). While 
voluntary disclosure can take on many forms, the academic literature focuses on 
disclosures on risk and financial products, such as value-at-risk, new ventures, 
and exposures to interest rates (Jorgensen & Kirschenheiter, 2003). Cheynel 
(2013) expands the range of voluntary disclosure to expected or projected cash 
flows, such as asset values, earnings forecasts, sales projections, expense 
reductions or asset acquisitions.  
The distinction in either mandatory or voluntary disclosure is not always 
clear-cut. Several informal industry norms (e.g., the Operating and Financial 
Review in the UK, recommendations for good disclosure practice by the Deutsche 
Bundesbank) and societal norms such as corporate governance codes or ESG 
standards exist, that often put pressure on firms to disclose information even if 
they are not obliged to do so. A well-known approach is the “comply or explain” 
method that can be found in corporate governance codes (see for instance: 
Financial Reporting Council, 2018).  
 
2.2.4.2 Disclosure Channels and Vehicles 
A variety of channels and vehicles are available for firms through which 
they can disperse information. Beyer et al. (2010) suggest a broad range of 
means of disclosure. They view every communication of a firm with the outside 
world even in the form of an email or a TV commercial as a form of disclosure. 
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However, traditional disclosure vehicles include disclosure reports for regulatory 
purposes (e.g., Basel III, CRD IV/CRR framework), financial statements (annual 
reports, interim reports) for financial accounting purposes (e.g., IFRS, GAAP), 
and publication requirements such as prospectuses for stock exchange listing 
purposes (see section 2.3.2 Risk Disclosure Regulation in the European Union). 
Voluntary disclosures consist of investor and analyst presentations, management 
forecasts, conference calls and press releases, online publications such as 
websites, newsletters, and ad hoc reporting in case of events with an impact on 
the economic situation of a firm (Beyer et al., 2010).  
 
2.2.4.3 Purpose of Disclosure 
Healy & Palepu (2001) analyse why firms do disclose information at all. 
They find that not every firm is necessarily interested in disclosure and the 
transparency it brings with it. Often, small or medium-sized firms are wholly 
owned and managed by the owner. Such firms do not see a benefit in publishing 
internal information, in particular when considering competitive issues and the 
costs incurred. Healy and Palepu note that the disclosure policies have changed 
historically. Disclosure gained a new purpose starting in the late 19th century 
when the era of industrialisation began. Firms grew larger and became more 
capital intensive (Healy & Palepu, 2001). This development paved the way from 
sole proprietorships to joint stock companies when the role of owners was often 
reduced to capital providers. The firms were run by managers that were externally 
hired. An information asymmetry arose between owners and managers where 
the latter regularly have easier and better access to information. This fact created 
the demand for increased disclosure (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
The literature identifies two purposes of disclosure as a consequence of 
the separation of investors’ and managers’ roles (Beyer et al., 2010). One 
purpose is solving the valuation problem. Before an investment in a firm is made 
potential investors need to value various investment alternatives. Investors can 
do so only if they have access to internal information of the target firms (due 
diligence agreements are a special case of disclosure). A firm therefore might 
disclose information in order to attract investors. 
Once the investment is made, a stewardship problem occurs. Due to the 
separation of ownership and control, there is an information gap between the 
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investor and the management (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Disclosure is one 
method that serves the purpose of reducing this gap by providing sufficient 
information to investors for the ongoing assessment of the performance of their 
investment.  
 
2.2.4.4 Quantitative versus Qualitative Disclosure 
Disclosures must be useful to a diverse group of users posing a particular 
challenge for the definition of quality criteria for the disclosure scoring model 
(Enhanced Disclosure Task Force, 2012; International Accounting Standards 
Board, 2017). Some users expect mainly data-driven disclosures, some look for 
narratives that explain the financial position and the performance of the firm (EBA, 
2020). Firms and standard setters face the challenge of how best to provide the 
optimal balance between quantitative information and accompanying qualitative 
information (Miihkinen, 2011). The provision of quantitative information offers the 
advantage for standard setters that the content and the level of detail can be 
specified, and for firms that they can follow rules and fill in templates for their 
disclosures. Users benefit from receiving structured information on the firm which 
can be conveniently evaluated and compared to other firms’ data. However, the 
standardisation of quantitative disclosure comes with the disadvantage that the 
provision of the templates quickly becomes a technical task without much 
managerial judgement added, thereby reducing the information value of 
disclosure (International Accounting Standards Board, 2017). 
Besides the provision of quantitative data, there is an information need for 
descriptive and explanatory disclosure. Users regularly require two kinds of 
additional narrative information (Miihkinen, 2011). First, they expect an evaluation 
of the firm’s current performance and risk enriched with managers’ comments. 
And second, users are interested in forward-looking information that helps them  
understanding the future prospects of the firm. Such information on opportunities 
and risks in the future are difficult to communicate in the form of standardised 
quantitative templates but can better be conveyed in textual, narrative form 
(Abraham & Cox, 2007; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012).  
For the development of the disclosure scoring model, it is argued that both, 
current and forward-looking disclosures are important for measuring the quality. 
In the context of regulatory reporting, the BCBS aims to improve the comparability 
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and consistency of disclosures, but also wants to leave banks enough room for 
discretionary reporting (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2015). To this 
end, the standard setter introduces harmonised templates for quantitative 
disclosures that all banks are recommended to disclose. However, the BCBS also 
recognises the need to allow management flexibility to provide qualitative 
commentary on a bank’s specific risk profile. Management therefore shall enrich 
quantitative information with comments and explanations in order to provide a 
comprehensive risk assessment of the bank (European Banking Authority, 2017). 
The disclosure scoring model takes up this point and evaluates how 
comprehensively a bank communicates its risk profile through quantitative and 
qualitative information. 
 
2.2.4.5 Financial versus Non-financial Disclosure 
The content of disclosure can be of financial or non-financial nature. Firms 
regularly publish financial information in the form of annual/interim reports, 
regulatory risk reports, corporate governance reports, ad hoc news and similar 
reports. Beyer et al. (2010) divide financial disclosure into reports with an ex-ante 
and an ex-post perspective. Disclosure allows investors to evaluate the potential 
return of investment opportunities in a firm (the ex-ante perspective). Once 
investors have committed financial resources to a firm, financial disclosure allows 
them to monitor the use of their capital (the ex-post perspective). 
The discussion on corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting has 
brought forward the need for further, non-financial disclosures (European 
Parliament, 2014). Firms are expected to be good and responsible corporate 
citizens (Dhaliwal et al., 2011). They must contribute to a sustainable 
development in terms of environmental, social and governance issues (Ali et al., 
2017). The need for transparency is one of the core principles of CSR reporting. 
The principle requires firms to be “…open about decisions and activities that 
affect society, the economy and the environment and willing to communicate 
these in a clear, accurate, timely, honest and complete manner” (International 
Organization for Standardization, 2010). CSR reporting is implemented in the EU 
through the directive 2014/95/EU Disclosure of non-financial and diversity 
information (European Parliament, 2014). Companies are obliged to publish non-
financial statements from 2018 onwards. 
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2.2.4.6 Cost of Disclosure  
Disclosing information comes at a cost (Berger, 2011). The cost can be 
divided into two categories. The first category is the operational cost of 
preparation, production and dissemination of disclosure information and reports 
(EBA, 2020). The costs can be material as in the case of regulatory and 
accounting reports, separate departments are responsible for the reporting 
process, and auditing is required to ensure correctness and completeness of the 
reports (International Federation of Accountants, 2018).  
The second category of costs are proprietary costs (Dhaliwal et al., 2011). 
The published information may be used by competitors and other parties in a way 
which is disadvantageous to the reporting firm (Verrecchia, 1983). Disadvantages 
can be copying of products by competitors, but also negative consequences such 
as litigation if disclosed information turns out to be misleading or false in 
hindsight. Verrecchia (1990) argues in the proprietary cost theory that a firm will 
only disclose information if the benefit received exceeds the production and 
proprietary costs. In consequence this means that not all relevant information is 
disclosed, particularly if a negative reaction from investors is foreseeable. 
However, Verrecchia notes that investors will react less negatively to this 
disclosure dilemma if they are aware of the consequences of disclosure. 
Regulatory authorities are also aware of potentially negative consequences of 
disclosure. For instance, in the CRR (European Parliament, 2013b) Art. 431a 
allows firms to abstain from disclosing if confidentiality agreements prevent this.  
The consequences for the scoring model development are manifold. 
Information which is not disclosed cannot be evaluated by the model due to 
obvious reasons. Furthermore, despite extensive internal and external auditing, 
there remains a certain degree of uncertainty on the correctness and robustness 
of the information disclosed including the quality and objectivity of audit reporting 
(e.g., Awolowo et al. (2019); Garrow et al. (2019)). 
 
2.2.4.7 Benefits of Disclosure 
The literature suggests two benefits that can be partly attributed to the 
effects of disclosure: a reduction in the cost of capital (resulting in higher 
valuations) and an increase in stock price liquidity. 
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Disclosure can have a positive impact on the cost of capital (CoC). 
Investors use this rate for valuing their investments by discounting the operating 
cash flows (Brealey et al., 2014). According to the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(Sharpe, 1964) the cost of (equity) capital depends on the risk premium investors 
charge on top of the risk-free market interest rate. This risk premium is derived 
from an evaluation of the specific risk of a firm (Markowitz, 1952) and is closely 
related to the rating of the firm. The relationship between the rating and the cost 
of capital is inverse. The better the rating of a firm, the lower the risk premium 
investors demand from the firm. One important factor that impacts the rating is 
the quantity and quality of information disclosed (Servigny, 2004).  
Cheynel (2013) develops a theory on the relationship between disclosure 
and cost of capital where she explores the links on two levels. On a 
microeconomic level, she empirically confirms the inverse relationship between 
more disclosures and lower cost of capital. However, she also acknowledges the 
difficulties in isolating the disclosure effect on the cost of capital from other 
economy-wide, exogenous factors. Furthermore, on a macroeconomic level, she 
performs the analysis of the effects of disclosure on the aggregate cost of capital 
within an economy with respect to overall economic efficiency. She identifies a 
“disclosure friction”, meaning that investors are unable to fully distinguish 
between firms that choose not to disclose and firms that cannot disclose. As a 
consequence, the risk-sharing efficiency in an economy is reduced.  
Clinch & Verrecchia (2015) challenge the dominant discourse of the 
inverse relationship between disclosure and cost of capital. They critically discuss 
the problem that disclosure is just one of many endogenous factors that may have 
an impact on the risk premium. Other factors should not be omitted from the 
analyses. Clinch and Verrecchia find that it is not obvious to clearly discern the 
effect of disclosure from other factors. In some circumstances, the relationship 
between disclosure and the cost of capital can be positively correlated. For 
instance, an increase in disclosure levels could be interpreted by the market 
participants as a worrying sign of corporate troubles (Verrecchia & Clinch, 2015). 
Another potential benefit of disclosure comes from higher liquidity in a 
firm’s shares trading. Liquidity is defined as the possibility to buy and sell shares 
anytime at fair market prices (Jorion, 2007). A restricted information policy may 
increase bid/ask spreads and therefore hinder these efficient trading activities. 
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Leuz & Verrecchia (2000) study the disclosure environment in Germany for 102 
firms listed in the DAX index for the year 1998. It was a year when several DAX 
firms switched to the IAS reporting regime that requires more disclosure than 
local GAAP rules. Leuz and Verrecchia find that after the introduction of higher 
disclosure standards, the share prices of the firms experienced a lower bid-ask 
spread and the trading volume increased compared to firms remaining with 
German local GAAP.  
 
2.2.4.8 Summary on Dimensions of Disclosure  
The literature review in this section shows how manifold the dimensions of 
disclosure are and in which environment the regulatory risk disclosure scoring 
model is embedded. The detailed review is the prerequisite for the definition of 
the scope of the model in chapter 4 where the theoretical basis for the model is 
developed.  
Regulatory risk disclosure is part of the overall financial reporting of a bank. 
It consists of mandatory elements, but banks are also free to disclose any 
additional information voluntarily. It is argued that the scoring model must 
consider both sides. The content of disclosure is a mix of quantitative risk figures 
and qualitative comments on risk exposures, and serves the purpose of informing 
market participants in every phase of their investment. The question of benefits 
of disclosure is again addressed in the recommendation for further research, as 
the model can provide empirical input for the analysis of relationships such as  
disclosure and cost of capital or liquidity.  
 
2.2.5 Theories on Disclosure  
This section of the literature review summarises the theories that help to 
explain the reasons for disclosure in general and for risk disclosure in particular. 
Literature on agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and how it is impacted by 
disclosure is reviewed in a separate section (2.2.6) due to its importance as the 
underlying theory of this research.  
Khlif & Hussainey (2016) identify two schools of thought when analysing 
the reasons for disclosure. One strand is best described by the social/political 
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theory approach, and the other one by the economic theory approach. Figure 7 
contrasts these two schools of thought and categorises the individual theories.  
 
 
 Figure 7: Theories on disclosure  
 
Social/political theories on disclosure focus on the social and political 
relationships between a firm and its stakeholders in the society to understand the 
motivations of risk disclosure and the communication methods used.  
Economic theories on disclosure rely on self-interest and profit 
maximization of economic agents. These theories study the individual behaviour 
of firms and their nature. They assume that risk information is disclosed only if 
individual economic benefits can be achieved (Khlif & Hussainey, 2016).  
Stakeholder theory is social/political theory explains the dynamic and 
complex relationships between an organisation and its environment (Gray, 2014). 
Firms are assumed to be aware of the many different interests of their 
heterogeneous groups of stakeholders and their information needs. Stakeholders 
will request as much information as possible which they need for their own 
decision-making. It is the challenge of firms to balance their disclosure in a way 
that is to the benefit of the firm, but also to its various groups of stakeholders. 
Political cost theory (Watts & Zimmerman, 1990) takes a strategic 
perspective on disclosure. A firm’s capitalistic endeavour to maximise profits 
might attract unwanted attention and criticism from public institutions such as 
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media, politicians, or NGO’s. In order to avoid negative headlines, firms might 
proactively communicate certain kinds of information that will put them in a 
brighter light and avoid political costs in the form of negative press or public 
sentiment. 
Legitimacy theory (Tapan, 2019) views firms in a permanent struggle to 
justify their societal existence. The legitimacy of firms’ existence is derived from 
a social contract with society that requires them to act in accordance with certain 
accepted social norms. If firms violate this social contract through their 
misbehaviour, they need to redeem themselves by disclosing additional 
information to make up for the loss in societal trust. 
In the context of social/political theories, external factors such as the 
governance, the legal system and regulation, uncertainty avoidance, and industry 
are analysed for their impact on disclosure (see sections 2.2.7.5 to 2.2.7.8). 
Signalling theory and agency theory fall both into the category of economic 
theories. Typical determinants of this stream of theories are the analysis of the 
impact of firm-specific (internal) factors such as corporate size, leverage, 
profitability and risk factors on disclosure (see sections 2.2.7.1 to 2.2.7.4), factors 
that are of high relevance for the development of the scoring model as well.  
Signalling theory, originally developed in evolutionary biology, examines 
the communication between individuals with conflicting interests, a situation 
which is familiar to the relationship between a firm and market participants. 
Spence (1973) transfers signalling theory into the economic context. The theory 
draws on the positive/negative and honest/dishonest “signals” a firm’s managers 
send to the investors with the information communicated. The theory assumes 
that managers have a certain purpose in mind when they are disclosing 
information. In good times they wish to demonstrate their success, in bad times 
their ability to handle the crisis. However, the signals do not necessarily have to 
be true and must therefore be taken with care.  
The second economic theory is agency theory. Agency theory is the 
foundation of the regulatory risk disclosure scoring model. Therefore, the next 
section reviews literature on this theory with a special focus on its specific 




2.2.6 Disclosure and Agency Theory  
2.2.6.1 Overview 
Agency theory draws on different aspects of property rights, agency costs 
and the construct of a firm itself. It recognises that a firm is simply a legal fiction 
that serves as a nexus for contracts between various stakeholders such as 
owners, managers, employees but also customers, suppliers and governments 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Regularly, the interests of each group are brought 
into equilibrium by normative actions such as bilateral contracts. Various forms 
of contracts are entered into to formally define the work requirements and 
compensations (Jensen, 1998). Above the normative aspects there also exist 
informal agreements and disagreements of how collaboration should be 
organised. Agency Theory focuses on these informal relationships and the 
consequences of sub-optimal performance (Fama, 1980). 
The split in owner and manager roles is at the core of agency relationships. 
An agency relationship is defined as:  
 
“a contact under which one or more persons (the principal(s)3) engage 
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves 
delegating some decision-making authority to the agent.” (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976) 
 
Agency theory assumes that both the principal and the agent act rationally 
as postulated in the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (Fama, 1970). This means that 
in their relationship they both try to maximise their utility. It becomes apparent 
that the agent therefore will not necessarily always act in the interest of the 
principal and vice versa (Figure 8).  
An agent who maximises his own wealth does so at the expense of the 
principal’s wealth. In order to reduce this conflict of interest, the principal as well 
as the agent can take costly actions to help to align the interests of both (Cuevas-
 
3 „Principal” refers in the context of Agency Theory to the legal owner of a firm who is entitled to 
receive proceeds such as dividend payments but also bears the risk of the firm’s failure. 




Rodríguez et al., 2012). Such actions can result in pecuniary costs such as bonus 
payments or share options. They can also be non-pecuniary costs such as a 
fancy office, friendship, or discipline. Principals are willing to accept these costs 
as long as the benefits in wealth creation exceed the costs. 
The alignment attempts can be categorised into actions that are initiated 
by the principals and those initiated by the agents of a firm. 
 
 
Figure 8: Agency costs and firm value 
 
Figure 8 depicts the conflict of interest between the firm’s agents and the 
principals, shows how the different forms of agency costs reduce firm value, and 
locates the disclosure scoring model in the conceptual framework of agency 
theory.   
Monitoring costs are incurred whenever principals demand a scheme that 
observes and measures the performance of agents with the goal of making them 
act in the interest of the principals. Monitoring schemes appear in many different 
forms such as regular risk and profitability reports, budget restrictions or certain 
operating rules (Chakravarty & Grewal, 2016). A good example for monitoring are 
the banks’ regulatory risk disclosure reports that constitute the basis for the 
disclosure scoring model developed in this thesis. 
Monitoring activities are not restricted to principals. With increasing public 
interest in corporate well-behaviour, the influence of other external stakeholders 
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rises. Organisations such as standard setters (BCBS), banking regulators (e.g., 
ECB, Bank of England4) and accounting boards (IASB) suggest guidelines and 
introduce regulations that monitor the economic behaviour of firms in the public 
interest and therefore align the interests of different stakeholder groups not 
limited to principals (EBA, 2020). Firms are required to follow financial accounting 
rules (IFRS, local GAAP), are recommended to implement good corporate 
governance, and prepare non-financial reports (see section 2.3). In the case of 
banks, they must also adhere to the requirements of regulatory risk reporting 
(CRD IV/CRR) that defines the legal framework for the scoring model 
development (European Parliament, 2013b). 
Agents can have an interest themselves in demonstrating that they are 
acting in the best interests of principals. So-called bonding activities are promises 
and guarantees to the principals for a certain behaviour, informal meetings for 
lunch or additional presentations of financial and non-financial information 
(Chakravarty & Grewal, 2016). Often, such bonding activities are of voluntary 
nature. But again, all bonding costs incurred use financial resources of the firm 
that reduce the total value of the firm as long as there is no positive offsetting 
wealth effect from conflict alignment.  
Besides monitoring and bonding expenditures, Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) find a third category of potential value reduction of a firm as a result of the 
separation of principal and agent roles. Even if monitoring and bonding 
expenditures are at their optimal level one cannot be sure that there is no 
divergence between an agent’s and a principal’s decision for maximizing firm 
value. Jensen and Meckling call this divergence cost the residual loss that 
remains, despite attempts to align conflicting interests with other means. 
In summary, monitoring in the form of public regulation and bonding in the 
form of voluntary disclosure comes at a cost to the principals of a firm. Ultimately, 
any costly action taken by principals or agents destroys firm value and the cost 
must ultimately be borne by the principals. Therefore, principals have a vital 
interest in keeping the agency costs low as long as the wealth creation through a 
reduced conflict of interest exceeds the costs (Chakravarty & Grewal, 2016). 
Enhanced disclosure on risk is generally seen as one suitable way of solving the 
 




conflict of interest (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2015). In this thesis 
it is argued that the provision of higher quality risk disclosure has a positive effect 
on the agency relationship. Therefore, various stakeholder groups including 
principals have an interest in achieving a high quality in risk disclosures that lead 
to further wealth creation. For their decision making, stakeholders need a tool 
such as the disclosure scoring model developed in this thesis that empirically 
measures disclosure quality.  
 
2.2.6.2 Criticism on Disclosure and Agency Theory  
Agency theory is often seen as being too positivistic in its assumptions. 
The theory assumes that agents and principals act rationally on information 
(Fama, 1970) and in a bureaucratic way (e.g., regulatory risk disclosure reports 
“describe” the corporate reality) (McAuley, 2014) where “form fits function” 
(Donaldson, 1996). This positivistic view raises criticism which is of high 
relevance for the development of the disclosure scoring model. The criticism 
revolves around the question whether it is fair to assume a (fully) rational 
behaviour of firms’ managers and investors in risk disclosure. 
Sanders & Carpenter (2003) and Pepper & Gore (2015) challenge agency 
theory by developing a “behavioural agency theory” where non-rational, 
subjective behavioural components such as the agents’ motivation, risk 
averseness and time preference are viewed as equally important to solving the 
agent-principal conflict as aligning the interests through technical monitoring and 
compensation schemes. The agents’ motivation to disclose information or even 
not to disclose information has an impact on the content of disclosure and must 
be taken into account when analysing and evaluating disclosure reports through 
a scoring model.  
Other academics challenge agency theory by pointing out that the theory 
is limited to a rather reductionist agent (manager) – principal (owner) relationship 
and it produces an “under socialised” view of agents and principals (Lubatkin, 
2007). Agency theory is said to neglect other stakeholders that make up the world 
of corporate governance such as taxpayers, employees and society as a whole. 
Wiseman, Cuevas-Rodríguez & Gomez-Mejia (2012) suggest a compromise in 
defence of agency theory by arguing that “agency theory’s flexibility allows for its 
application to a variety of non-traditional settings”. They suggest extending 
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agency theory to diverse settings using a deductive approach. This can be 
accomplished by formally recognizing and incorporating the institutional context 
surrounding agent-principal relationships into agency-based models that include 
other stakeholders as well (Pepper & Gore, 2015).  
A practical application for this “institutional context” are the BCBS 
guidelines on risk disclosure that form the basis for the disclosure scoring model 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2015). The BCBS explicitly states that 
the addressees of the Basel III pillar 3 disclosure reports are the “market 
participants” e.g., the investors, but also supervisory authorities, rating agencies 
and other interested parties. 
 
In summary, the overview of theories in the previous two sections (2.2.5 
and 2.2.6) shows that there are several theories that attempt to explain the 
disclosure policy of a firm from different perspectives. The theories share the 
finding that disclosure is an important tool to enhance the relationship between 
firms and stakeholders and reduce potential conflicts of interest through better 
information-sharing. For the development of the scoring model, it is important to 
understand that disclosure reports are not only a factual tool to communicate risk 
exposures but serve many different purposes driven by the interests of diverse 
groups of stakeholders. The quality of disclosure reports and how it is perceived 
therefore often depends on how well the reports address the subjective needs of 
an individual or a societal group. In consequence that means that a scoring model 
on disclosure must incorporate objective quantitative but also subjective 
qualitative elements when measuring disclosure quality.   
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2.2.7 Determinants for Disclosure Level and Quality 
A large number of studies can be found in the literature on the 
determinants of risk disclosure. The findings are discussed in this section as they 
have an immediate impact on the development of the disclosure scoring model 
and the control variables used in the model. In the context of this thesis, “risk 
disclosure determinants” are factors that influence the disclosure policy of a bank 
and as a consequence also the content of disclosure reports. For instance, the 
factor “industry” might have an impact on the level of disclosure. Banks are 
eventually more likely to disclose information on risk than manufacturing firms 
because banks operate in the financial industry. The literature review first critically 
analyses the research on internal disclosure determinants (see section 2.2.7.1 to 
2.2.7.4) before it moves on to external disclosure determinants (see sections 
2.2.7.5 to 2.2.7.8), and finally consolidates the impact of the determinants on the 
disclosure scoring model.  
Figure 9 summarises the determinants identified in the literature and maps 
them to the internal and external categories. 
 
 
Figure 9: Determinants for disclosure  
 
Internal factors have their roots within the firms whereas external factors 
are found in the external environment of a firm.  
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2.2.7.1 Corporate Size 
Several studies on the determinants of disclosure identify corporate size 
as a driving force behind the amount of disclosure. Deumes & Knechel (2008) 
and Elzahar & Hussainey (2012) find that large firms run more complex and 
sophisticated operations that often result in higher risk levels. This in turn leads 
to a higher information asymmetry as explained by agency theory (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Consequently, the information needs of investors rise and firms 
must spend more on disclosure. Deumes and Knechel also identify other reasons 
for the impact of firm size on disclosure. The higher visibility of large firms in the 
economy results in increased public interest. Furthermore, due to corporate size, 
more resources are available to prepare disclosure reports compared to smaller 
firms. Elzahar and Hussainey suggest that “…regulators may wish to allow firms 
some flexibility in their internal control reporting choice, as firms take a broad 
approach to internal control that goes beyond Sarbanes-Oxley act-based 
regulations, and tailor their internal control reports to suit their specific 
environments” (Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012). 
Corporate size is also an important issue in regulatory risk disclosure. 
Often, disclosure rules are eased for smaller banks and subsidiaries. For 
instance, Art. 13 CRR says that only EU parent institutions must comply with the 
disclosure regulations on a consolidated basis (European Parliament, 2013b). 
Significant subsidiaries of EU parent institutions and those subsidiaries which are 
of material significance for their local market must disclose only a reduced 
amount of information.  
Contrary to the findings on the impact of corporate size above, Handley-
Schachler (2009) does not find a significant relationship between firm size and 
the amount of disclosure. He explores the disclosure practice of 52 UK listed 
companies in three different years around the millennium. He finds that only 
UK/US dual listings and involvements in heavy industry are positively correlated 
with the amount of disclosure, but not firm size in general.  
 
2.2.7.2 Leverage  
Elzahar & Hussainey (2012) examine the determinants of narrative risk 
information in interim reports of 72 UK companies. Besides corporate size, they 
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also analyse the impact of leverage on the level of disclosure. The leverage ratio 
measures the proportion of debt and equity in a firm’s balance sheet (Saunders, 
2017). Firms with higher leverage ratios tend to be riskier due to the higher 
perceived default risk on debt. Consequently, investors require more disclosure 
from higher-leveraged firms for evaluating their investment risk.  
The study of Dobler, Lajili, & Ze (2011) observes that risk disclosure 
quantity is positively correlated with firms’ leverage ratios, although this 
observation is true for the US only. They do not find such a positive relationship 
in Germany where the amount of disclosure is negatively associated with the 
leverage ratio. 
Elzahar & Hussainey (2012) show contradicting results. Although they find 
that investors’ monitoring costs rise with higher leverage ratios, they do not find 
a significant relationship between leverage and disclosure level. A similar 
observation of non-significance is made in the studies of Handley-Schachler 
(2009) and Abraham & Cox (2007). 
2.2.7.3 Profitability  
Some research papers see profitability as a determinant for risk disclosure, 
although findings are again mixed. Researchers find good arguments for more 
disclosure in cases of high, but also of low profitability levels. Elshandidy, Fraser, 
& Hussainey (2013) argue that managers prefer more disclosure in periods of 
higher profits as they are happy to signal to the market their successful 
management skills. Managers also want to assure investors that they can sustain 
high profitability levels in the future. Firms characterised by higher risk-adjusted 
returns and lower levels of stock return variability are likely to exhibit significantly 
higher levels of aggregated and voluntary risk disclosures. Furthermore, firms 
with greater compliance with mandatory regulations have a greater probability to 
make additional voluntary risk disclosures (Elshandidy et al., 2013).  
In cases of low profitability or even loss-making times, the interest in more 
risk disclosure shifts from managers to investors. Douglas (1994) finds that bad 
performance forces managers to increase the amount of disclosure as investors 
are worried about their investments and the future of the firm. Douglas observes 
large stock price declines on days with negative earnings announcements and 
notes that shareholders are more likely to enter legal action if adverse information 
is not disclosed promptly and explained in detail. He also observes reputational 
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damage to managers once professional money managers or security analysts 
get the impression that managers appear to delay disclosure of bad news. 
 
2.2.7.4 Risk Factors 
Risk means uncertainty to the investors (Jorion, 2007). According to the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) rational investors attempt to limit uncertainty 
to their predefined risk appetite (Sharpe, 1964). In the banking industry 
frameworks such as the Basel III guidelines (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2006b) and legal regulations such as the EU CRD IV/CRR 
(European Parliament, 2013b) limit the risks banks may take on their balance 
sheets. The banking guidelines and regulations identify a number of risk factors 
such as credit and market risks, but also operational and liquidity risks. The 
complete list of risk factors relevant for the regulatory risk disclosure model is 
analysed in section 4.3.4 Content Overview on Risk Disclosure in the CRR. 
Miihkinen (2011) finds a positive relationship between risk factors and risk 
disclosure. He finds that information asymmetry increases with higher risk 
exposures in several risk factors, and the need for more risk disclosure coincides 
with a reduction of the information gap. He analyses the impact of the introduction 
of a new and detailed Finnish risk disclosure accounting standard on the 
disclosure policies of listed Finnish firms. Miihkinen notes that national regulatory 
bodies were able to raise the quality of risk disclosure on several risk factors. 
Furthermore, the amount of risk disclosures increases when more 
comprehensive disclosure on risk factors is required in a risk disclosure 
accounting standard. However, he does not find a corresponding increase in 
quantitative disclosure on risk factors such as Value-at-Risk (VaR) as their 
disclosure is not required in the accounting standard. 
 
2.2.7.5 Governance 
Turning to literature on external determinants of disclosure, corporate 
governance is “the system by which companies are directed and controlled. 
Boards of directors are responsible for the governance of their companies….” 
(Financial Reporting Council, 2018). The UK Corporate Governance Code of 
2018 recommends in Principle N that the “the board should present a fair, 
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balanced and understandable assessment of the company’s position and 
prospects” and in Principle O that the board should “… establish procedures to 
manage risk” (Financial Reporting Council, 2018). Several studies analyse 
whether a tighter governance regime leads to more disclosure. 
Abraham & Cox (2007) analyse the significance of governance functions 
such as number of executive directors, dependent non-executive directors, and 
independent directors, for the level of risk disclosure. They assume that board 
separation into various roles can reduce agency problems and therefore lower 
the agency costs of a firm for meeting disclosure requirements. Abraham and 
Cox find that both the number of executive and the number of independent 
directors is positively correlated with the amount of corporate risk disclosure. 
However, they do not find the same positive relationship for dependent non-
executive directors. Abraham and Cox conclude that independent and/or 
executive directors are beneficial for more disclosure as recommended in the 
Principle N of the UK Corporate Governance Code (Financial Reporting Council, 
2018). 
The study of Bhasin, Makarov & Orazalin (2012) confirms the findings of 
Abraham & Cox (2007). Bhasin et al. examine the impact of voluntary disclosure 
in the banking sector with respect to corporate governance issues. They include 
governance factors such as board size, board composition as well as bank size 
and bank maturity in their analysis. They find that the number of outside 
(independent) directors and bank size have the most significantly positive impact 
on the amount of disclosure.  
 
2.2.7.6 Legal and Regulatory Environment 
The legal and regulatory environment for financial reporting depends on 
the rules and regulations developed by national and supranational lawmakers 
and standard setters (Rutterford, 2006). Although the environment differs from 
country to country (or supranational bodies), two general financial reporting 
models can be distinguished.  
The Anglo-American model is shared by countries where common law is 
prevalent (Rutterford, 2006). This model seeks to present a “true and fair” view 
of the company’s assets and liabilities. It measures the financial performance 
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from the point of interest of the shareholders. Financial positions are frequently 
revalued to their fair value and fluctuate with market developments. 
The Franco-German model is guided by a more conservative reporting 
approach where primarily the interests of creditors are protected. This model is 
widely applied in countries where the legal system is based on Roman civil law 
(Rutterford, 2006). In the financial statements, assets and liabilities are carried at 
historical cost, and the financial performance is based on the realisation principle.  
The financial reporting regime has an impact on disclosure and the 
disclosure scoring model. The need for regular disclosure is seen as more 
important in environments where earnings are more volatile. This is the case in 
the Anglo-American model due to frequent mark-to-market revaluations of the 
financial position and performance. In the Franco-German environment where 
the financial position and performance of firms changes less frequently as a result 
of the historic cost approach, regular disclosures are of lesser importance 
(Rutterford, 2006). 
The impact of the legal system on disclosure policies is examined in a 
cross-country study prepared by Dobler, Lajili & Ze (2011). By analysing annual 
reports from 160 manufacturing firms across the US, Canada, UK, and Germany 
the study finds that in terms of quantity of risk disclosure, US firms generally 
dominate with the highest amount of disclosure. Despite Germany being a civil 
law country, it takes second place in the quantity of disclosed information. In the 
special case of environmental risks, UK firms disclose the highest amount of 
information. However, Dobler et al. can only partly link the cross-country variation 
in risk disclosure quantity to domestic legal systems. They note that besides the 
legal and reporting environment, local incentives for risk disclosure also play an 
important role. 
Elshandidy, Fraser & Hussainey (2015) examine the drivers of mandatory 
and voluntary risk reporting across Germany, the UK, and the US. They find that 
the proportion of mandatory versus voluntary disclosure quantity differs 
significantly across these three countries. German firms operating in a 
traditionally civil law environment tend to disclose more information mandatorily 
and less voluntarily. In the UK, a traditionally common law country, firms disclose 
more information voluntarily than mandatorily. Furthermore, Elshandidy et al. 
note that the findings in their study are not fully consistent with theory. By 
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comparing US firms with German firms, the latter tend to disclose more 
information voluntarily despite residing in a civil law country. They conclude that 
the distinction in mandatory and voluntary disclosure does not only depend on 
the legal and regulatory reporting environment, but must also be seen from the 
systemic risk and cultural values environment of a country (Elshandidy et al., 
2015). 
 
2.2.7.7 Cultural Environment 
Disclosure decisions are usually embedded in a specific cultural 
environment. In his pioneering research, Hofstede (1980) collects structural 
elements that together describe the culture of a nation. He focuses on elements 
that strongly affect the behaviour of organisations and institutions in a country 
and differentiates it from others. Originally, Hofstede identifies individualism/ 
collectivism, masculinity/femininity, power distance and uncertainty avoidance as 
significant cultural elements. Hofstede later added long-term orientation and 
indulgence/self-restraint to the list.  
The decision to disclose a certain content is influenced by all elements, 
although uncertainty avoidance is seen as the dimension with the highest material 
impact (Wong, 2012). Uncertainty avoidance is defined as a society’s tolerance 
for uncertainty and ambiguity (Hofstede, 1980). Wong’s research shows that 
European cultures score high on avoiding uncertainty whereas the US is on the 
other end of the scale with a high tolerance level on uncertainty. Wong finds that 
firms operating in cultures with high uncertainty avoidance (e.g., Europe) disclose 
less risk information as they try to avoid possible conflicts, restrict uncertainties 
of competition, and preserve security. Interestingly, countries with high 
uncertainty tolerance (e.g., the US) are open to more risk disclosure as 
transparency is seen as a tool to reduce potential uncertainty. 
A detailed analysis5 of uncertainty avoidance reveals that there are also 
substantial differences among European countries. Figure 10 summarises the 
uncertainty avoidance scores for France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and 
adds the US for comparison reasons. 
 
5 Source: https://www.hofstede-insights.com/country-comparison/germany,france,the-uk,the-





Figure 10: Hofstede: uncertainty avoidance in Europe  
 
Following the research findings of Wong (2012) firms from France with a 
high score of 86 on uncertainty avoidance (fourth block from the left) are expected 
to disclose more information than their peers from Germany (score 65) and the 
UK (a low score of 35). The results of the disclosure scoring model on disclosure 
quantity will show whether Wong's (2012) observation holds in the context of 
regulatory risk reporting. 
2.2.7.8 Industry 
Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) suggest “industry” as a key external factor 
that influences the amount of disclosure of a firm. In their study they find that the 
amount and content of disclosure tend to become similar within an industry. The 
dominant firms set the disclosure standards, and other firms follow suit in a way 
they call the “bandwagon effect”. Beretta and Bozzolan argue that stakeholders 
are primarily interested in the relative ranking of a firm within an industry and less 
in its absolute position. Furthermore, investors use disclosure reports as a tool 
that supports them in comparing the performance and the risk across firms in an 
industry. The comparability analysis is facilitated by similarly structured 
disclosure reports. Firms are aware of this fact and prepare their disclosure 
reports accordingly (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004). Besides the industry factor, 
Beretta and Bozzolan also note that shared business models and risk exposures 
lead to similar report structures.  
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Khlif & Hussainey (2016) support the observation from Beretta and 
Bozzolan (2004) of the bandwagon effect in an industry. With respect to the 
banking industry, they note that this industry is a highly regulated one compared 
to other industries. The shared regulatory environment implies that disclosure 
reports of banks tend to become similar. From the perspective of the factor 
“banking industry” the variation of disclosure levels among banks is expected to 
be rather low. 
 
2.2.7.9 Summary 
The literature review in this section reveals that a large number of 
determinants of disclosure are analysed in several studies that potentially have 
an impact on the amount and content of disclosure. The determinants of 
disclosure can be divided into internal and external factors. Internal factors are 
related to firm-specific properties and are therefore likely to influence disclosure 
directly, whereas external factors are more of general nature and impact 
disclosure levels only indirectly.  
Research results on internal factors are mixed and arguments can be 
found for and against potential impacts on disclosures. No general consensus on 
a final set of factors has yet been found. Still, “company size” was identified in 
the studies as a rather strong factor. Results on “leverage” are contradicting, and 
the findings on “profitability” support both sides of the disclosure argument. There 
is evidence that the number of “risk factors” makes a positive impact on disclosure 
levels. Therefore, company size and number of risk factors are taken into closer 
consideration in the further development of the disclosure scoring model. 
External factors relate to macroeconomic issues and are indirectly taken 
into account in the scoring model development. Research on “governance” 
shows that this factor makes a general impact on disclosure, depending how 
strictly governance codes are applied. The factor “legal system and regulation” 
also makes a difference depending on where the firms are headquartered. The 
“cultural environment” shows strong variation in uncertainty avoidance across 
European countries, an observation which is possibly reflected in scoring model 
results. “Industry” was found as a decisive factor between different parts of the 
economy. The scoring model takes these macroeconomic factors into account by 
focusing on a homogeneous basis for model testing and sample selection. The 
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relevant “industry” for the model is the banking industry only. The legal and 
regulatory environment is the EU CRD IV/CRR framework which is applicable to 
all banks in the sample. Should the scoring model be applied to a wider sample 






2.3 Risk Disclosure and the EU Regulatory Environment 
2.3.1 Status of Risk Disclosure Research 
Beyer et al. (2010) present a cross-sectoral review of the corporate 
information environment. The study summarises the state of the mandatory and 
voluntary reporting environment and raises many open questions in disclosure 
research of which developing scoring models for measuring disclosure quality is 
one of them. They see the main benefit of disclosure in supporting (1) disclosures 
mandated by regulators, (2) managers’ voluntary disclosure decisions, and (3) 
reporting decisions by analysts. 
On the mandatory disclosure side including regulations and frameworks 
such as Basel III, IFRS or US-SOX, Beyer et al. (2010) note that so far there is 
no clear empirical evidence on the (positive) effects of regulation. It is still unclear 
what the triggers for changes in the regulatory regime are, whether regulation 
addresses the observed failures in financial markets, what the regulators’ 
objectives and incentives are, and what the overall costs of regulation to the 
economies are. 
On voluntary disclosure decisions, Beyer et al. (2010) emphasise three 
aspects that need further research: how voluntary disclosure is perceived 
depends on how investors interpret the disclosure made; management and not 
the “firm” makes the disclosure decisions therefore the management’s utility 
curve must be considered; and incentive systems derived from agency theory are 
not only relevant for managers’ compensation but also for other decision-making 
processes such as investment allocation, capital structure and competitive 
behaviour.  
On disclosures made by analysts, Beyer et al. (2010) acknowledge the 
importance of the analysts’ roles as mediators between firms and investors and 
as market participants who use and provide information at the same time. For a 
firm making a disclosure decision, it is crucial to research which content analysts 
look for in disclosure reports for writing their forecasts, how they decide to cover 
a firm and how the financial markets react to their output.  
Beyer et al. (2010) clearly identify a research gap in the context of agency 
theory. They argue that theoretical models based on agency theory are “abstract 
representations” of a complex corporate information environment and the 
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challenge is to develop new models (such as the regulatory risk disclosure 
scoring model in this thesis) that produce “insights into practice” and that inform 
empirical studies if the proxies selected for quality measurement reflect the key 
challenges faced by managers.  
 
2.3.2 Risk Disclosure Regulation in the European Union 
Rules and regulations for risk disclosure in the banking industry can be 
found in several guidelines and legal documents. It depends on the purpose of 
the rules and regulations which kind of disclosure is recommended or required 
(Becker et al., 2012). Traditional sources of disclosure in the banking industry 
originate from banking regulation (CRD IV/CRR in the EU), International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS), corporate governance, non-financial (ESG) 
reporting, and listing requirements of stock exchanges (for a summary of financial 
and risk disclosures see Table 1). Disclosures are made through regulatory 
reports, annual reports, governance and ESG reports, and securities 
prospectuses (Beyer et al., 2010). In recent years, non-financial disclosures 
covering environmental, social and governance issues gained importance in 
addition to financial disclosures (Refinitiv, 2019). Firms are increasingly viewed 
as “corporate citizens”. To become a good corporate citizen, it takes not only 
financial success and tax payments, but also social and environmental 
awareness as well as a good corporate governance (Ali et al., 2017). 
Table 1 summarises the disclosure regime in the EU. It includes the four 
binding EU directives that are most relevant for disclosure in general (regulatory 
reporting, financial reporting, reporting on securities trading, reporting on 
corporate social responsibility). Corporate Governance Codes (CGC) of the UK 
and Germany are added to the table due to their importance for disclosure. CGC 
are not legally binding (“comply or explain approach”) and are still a national issue 
in the EU. The table reflects the applicable laws as of June 2020. The row 
“Regulatory Reporting (Banking)” is highlighted as it represents the basis for the 
regulatory risk disclosure scoring model developed in this thesis.
 
 





Access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of 
credit institutions and investment firms (CRD IV).  
Prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms (CRR) 
Directive 2013/36  
 
Regulation (EU) 
No 575/2013  
Financial 
Reporting (IFRS) 
Annual and consolidated accounts of certain types of companies, banks and 
other financial institutions and insurance undertakings.  
Annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related 
reports of certain types of undertakings. 
Directive 2003/51 
 




UK, latest version July 2018 
 





Harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about 






Disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large 
undertakings and groups 
Directive 
2014/95/EU  
Table 1: Disclosure regime in the EU 
 
6 Basis for the development of the regulatory risk disclosure model in this thesis. 
2.3.3 Transparency in Regulatory Reporting 
The regulatory risk disclosure scoring model builds on the regulations on 
regulatory risk reporting. Therefore, the largest part of this section is dedicated to 
this subject. Many of the banking regulations are first developed by the BCBS on 
a supranational level and are non-binding for banks (“recommendations/ 
guidelines”). In the case of Basel III, the guidelines are legally implemented in the 
EU in the form of the CRV IV/CRR legal package. 
 
2.3.3.1 The Basel III Regulatory Reporting Framework 
The Basel III regulatory reporting framework comprises three pillars that 
together form the requirements for prudent banking regulation (Becker et al., 
2012). The Three-Pillar approach has long been discussed in a quest to define a 
good methodology for banking supervision, before in 2006 an agreement was 
reached that resulted in 25 Basel core principles for an effective banking 
supervisory system (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006a).  
For the purpose of regulatory risk disclosure, principle 22 (accounting and 
disclosure) states that “supervisors must be satisfied that each bank … publishes, 
on a regular basis, information that fairly reflects its financial condition and 
profitability” (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006a).  
Figure 11 shows the three pillars of Basel III. They include the “minimum 
capital requirements” (pillar 1), the “supervisory review process” (pillar 2) and 
“market discipline” (pillar 3). The three pillars are all interrelated (Becker et al., 
2012). For the development of the disclosure scoring model, pillar 3 is of highest 





Figure 11: The pillars of Basel III banking regulation  
 
Pillar 1 “minimum capital requirements” includes the rules for calculation 
of the minimum capital requirements which banks must hold to support their 
credit, market, and operational risks (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
2006a). For each position in an asset class, the risk-weighted asset (RWA) value 
is calculated by taking into account the exposure at default (EAD), loss given 
default (LGS) and the probability of default (PD). In a separate calculation, the 
eligible own funds’ components (tier 1, tier 2) are added to result in the total 
available regulatory capital. Finally, the solvency ratio is calculated by dividing 
the regulatory capital by the sum of all risk-weighted assets (RWA). The ratio 
must not fall below a minimum level (Becker et al., 2012). 
Pillar 2 “supervisory review process” outlines the supervisory review 
process SREP (Buchmüller, 2019). It recommends banks to develop and use 
better risk management techniques in monitoring and managing their risks 
(Cannata & Quagliariello, 2011). It also instructs bank supervisors how to perform 
a prudent supervision of banks. Supervisory authorities such as the European 
Central Bank (ECB), the Bank of England7 or Germany’s Deutsche Bundesbank 
are expected to evaluate how well banks are assessing their capital requirements 
relative to their risks, and to intervene when and where appropriate. Major 
 
7 Through the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). 
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advances in pillar 2 were achieved in 2018 with the introduction of the Internal 
Capital Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP) and the Internal Liquidity 
Adequacy Assessment Process (ILAAP) (Buchmüller, 2019).  
Pillar 3 “market discipline” includes the regulatory risk disclosure 
framework on which the scoring model developed in this thesis is built. This pillar 
includes recommendations for quantitative and qualitative disclosures (Andrae et 
al., 2018). Banks may follow these recommendations, but are essentially free to 
decide which and how much quantitative and qualitative information to disclose 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2016). Banks must have a formal 
disclosure policy approved by the board of directors that addresses the bank’s 
approach for determining the disclosure content and the internal controls over the 
disclosure process. In addition, banks must implement a process for assessing 
the appropriateness of their disclosures, including validation of disclosed items 
and frequency of disclosures (Becker et al., 2012). For “assessing the 
appropriateness of their disclosures” banks need a model that supports them in 
their work. Beyer et al. (2010) raise the point that there does not yet exist a model 
that measures the quality of disclosures based on Pillar 3 and no further literature 
is yet available on this specific subject. Filling this research gap is one of the main 
aims of this thesis.  
 
2.3.3.2 The Current Legal Status of Regulatory Reporting in the EU8  
Building on the Basel III regulatory reporting framework published as a 
revised version in June 2011, the European Union introduced in 2013 the CRD 
IV/CRR legal package in order to complete the single market for financial services 
(European Banking Authority, 2018).  
It comprises  
• the CRD IV9 (Capital Requirements Directive) 2013/36 on access to the 
activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions and investment firms (European Parliament, 2013a)  
and  
 
8 As of June 2020 
9 EU directives do not unfold immediate binding effects on member states but need to be 
implemented in national laws by member states first. 
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• the CRR10 (Capital Requirements Regulation) 575/2013 Prudential 
requirements for credit institutions and investment firms (European 
Parliament, 2013b).  
 
The CRD IV/CRR legal package is the fourth set of amendments (Draghi, 
2011) to the original banking directive (CRD) of 2006. It follows two earlier sets 
of revisions adopted by the Commission in 2009 (CRD II) and 2010 (CRD III) as 
a consequence of the financial crisis of 2008. 
The overarching goal of the CRD IV/CRR package is to prevent financial 
capital and liquidity crises in the future by defining stricter prudential risk 
requirements for banks (Cannata & Quagliariello, 2011). The package requires 
banks to keep certain minimum capital reserves (measured by the solvency ratio) 
and sufficient liquidity (measured by the liquidity coverage ratio). 
The directive CRD IV governs the access to deposit-taking activities in the 
EU (European Parliament, 2013a). It establishes rules on the corporate 
governance of banks, powers and responsibilities of national authorities (e.g., 
supervision, authorisation, capital buffers and sanctions) and requirements on 
internal risk management that are linked to national company laws (Becker et al., 
2012).  
The regulation CRR establishes the technical prudential requirements that 
financial institutions must follow (European Parliament, 2013b). It sets out the 
manifold rules for calculating capital requirements and reporting for credit, 
market, and operational risks, and for measuring liquidity requirements and 
reporting on them.  
 
2.3.3.3 The Nature of Disclosure in the CRR 
The CRR follows a mixed mandatory and voluntary disclosure approach 
(Andrae et al., 2018). Banks must disclose basic information on the composition 
of regulatory capital, risk management structure and processes, the risk 
exposures for credit, market and operational risks, and the capital adequacy. The 
disclosures on capital and risks are data-driven, but qualitative commentaries 
 
10 EU regulations are self-executing and do not require any implementing measures in member 
states. They are immediately legally binding and there is no room for national adaptations. 
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shall be added voluntarily where necessary for easier comprehension or 
whenever the bank sees a need to communicate its risk profile comprehensively 
(Enhanced Disclosure Task Force, 2012). In general, the CRR defines the 
structure of the disclosure reports and the key content. Banks are then flexible to 
choose how best to implement the requirements. In this thesis, it is argued that 
the disclosure scoring model will measure the quality of such implementations  
and highlight areas for improvements as supervisory authorities expect the 
banking industry to develop a “best practice” approach (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2018). A recent market survey of the EBA (2020) concludes 
that still a wide quality range of disclosure reports exists and no standard has 
been reached so far. 
 
2.3.4 Transparency in other Reporting Areas 
Regulatory risk disclosure must be seen in the wider context of financial 
and non-financial disclosure (Berger, 2011). This section of the literature review 
summarises disclosure requirements from other sources such as financial 
accounting, and corporate governance reporting, and concludes that (1) 
regulatory risk reporting is embedded in a comprehensive disclosure policy of a 
bank and (2) there does not yet exist an overarching model for measuring the 
quality of the entire communication of a firm. 
 
2.3.4.1 Transparency in Financial Accounting 
For a long time, financial accounting has been the driver of corporate 
disclosure (Abraham & Cox, 2007). Several IFRS standards include the 
requirement or recommendation to disclose information to external stakeholders.  
The non-binding IFRS Practice Statement 1 expects preparers of financial 
reports according to IAS 1 (financial statements) to add a management 
commentary that helps users “… evaluate an entity’s prospects and its general 
risks, as well as the success of management’s strategies for achieving its stated 
objectives” (International Accounting Standards Board, 2010).  
The binding IFRS 7 (financial instruments) requires “disclosure of 
information about the significance of financial instruments to an entity, and the 
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nature and extent of risks arising from those financial instruments, both in 
qualitative and quantitative terms” (International Accounting Standards Board, 
2016).  
In 2015 the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) decided that 
better communication in financial reporting is a central theme of the Board’s work 
for the period 2017-2021 (International Accounting Standards Board, 2017). The 
IASB established the so-called Disclosure Initiative. This Initiative is a broad-
based research project exploring how to make disclosures in financial statements 
more effective. The main objective of this project is to identify disclosure issues 
and develop new, or clarify existing, disclosure principles in IFRS Standards to 
“… address those issues and to: 
• help entities to apply better judgement and communicate information 
more effectively, 
• improve the effectiveness of disclosures for the primary users of 
financial statements and 
• assist the IASB to improve disclosure requirements in Standards”.  
(International Accounting Standards Board, 2017). 
In a first step the “disclosure problem” was identified. The three main 
concerns about information disclosed in general purpose financial statements are 
that  
• there is not enough relevant information disclosed  
• irrelevant information is included and 
• information is communicated ineffectively. 
The reason for these weaknesses is identified as a judgement problem. 
Comparable to regulatory reporting (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
2015), firms, auditors and regulators view the preparation of reports primarily as 
a compliance matter that can be met with technical tools. However, the IASB 
expects the preparers of disclosure reports to use judgement when evaluating 
the financial situation (International Accounting Standards Board, 2017). By 
2019, the IASB had developed disclosure principles that form an important input 
for the development of quality criteria used in the disclosure scoring model (see 





2.3.4.2 Transparency in Corporate Governance 
A corporate governance code (CGC) is a “set of principles that emphasise 
the value of good corporate governance to long-term sustainable success” 
(Financial Reporting Council, 2018). Many countries have issued their own 
corporate governance code, so for instance the UK (Financial Reporting Council, 
2018) or Germany (Deutsche Regierungskommission, 2017). There is no EU-
wide directive in place that governs CSR. 
CGC reports must be meaningful. This requires the discussion of how the 
principles are applied. A simple boilerplate reporting must be avoided. 
Furthermore, firms must explain which measures were taken to comply with the 
principles and what outcomes were achieved. High-quality reporting must include 
signposting and cross-referencing to those parts of the annual report that 
describe how the principles were applied (Financial Reporting Council, 2018). 
With respect to disclosure the section “audit, risk and internal control” of 
the UK CGC is of high relevance to this thesis (Financial Reporting Council, 
2018). Principles N states that “a fair, balanced and understandable assessment 
of the company’s position and prospects” should be presented. Principle O says 
that “the board should establish procedures to manage risk, oversee the internal 
control framework, and determine the nature and extent of the principal risks the 
company is willing to take in order to achieve its long-term strategic objectives” 
(Financial Reporting Council, 2018). Firms must disclose the role and 
responsibilities of the audit committee, the roles and responsibilities of its 
directors and state whether the directors consider that “…the annual report and 
accounts, taken as a whole, are fair, balanced and understandable, and provide 
the information necessary for shareholders to assess the company’s position, 
performance, business model and strategy.” (Financial Reporting Council, 2018) 
The German CGC (Deutsche Regierungskommission, 2017) is quite 
different to the UK’s CGC as German corporate law requires firms to operate on 
a two-tier system made up of a management entity (“Vorstand”) and a separate 
supervisory entity (“Aufsichtsrat”). A full section of the German CGC relates to 
disclosure. Section 6 is dedicated to transparency and requires firms to treat all 
shareholders equally with respect to information. Firms shall “disclose to all 
shareholders, without undue delay, all material new facts that used to be made 
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available only to financial analysts and similar addressees” (Deutsche 
Regierungskommission, 2017).  
2.3.4.3 Summary 
The detailed discussion of regulatory risk disclosure in the EU and the 
overview of disclosure requirements found in other sources demonstrates that 
achieving transparency through disclosure is an important objective in many 
reporting fields. Research is quite advanced in defining the constituents of good 
disclosure, but as the literature review shows not much progress has been made 
on quality and impact measurement of disclosure.  
For the development of the regulatory risk disclosure model, the basis is 
the CRD IV/CRR legal package focusing on banking regulation. However, it must 
be acknowledged that regulatory risk disclosure is an important, but only one part 
of the entire reporting agenda of a bank. This is a good reason why the 
recommendations for further research include one suggestion to develop an 
overarching disclosure scoring model where this scoring model can add much 
value (see section 7.4). Furthermore, it is important to compare the disclosure 
requirements from different sources. They share many conceptual similarities in 
particular when the question is raised about what quality criteria should be 
selected and applied to disclosure reports in the scoring model. The findings of 
this section of the literature review form an integral part of the development of the 




2.4 Measuring Disclosure Quantity and Quality  
In this part of the literature review methods and techniques are analysed 
that are applied in similar studies to measure the quantity and quality of disclosure 
in various contexts. This literature review prepares the basis for selecting the 
measurement method and technique used in the regulatory risk disclosure 
scoring model. 
 
2.4.1 Overview on Disclosure Measurement 
A prerequisite for analysing the effectiveness of disclosure is the ability to 
measure disclosure quantity and quality (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008). Several 
measurement approaches were suggested so far in the literature but none has 
become an industry benchmark (Hassan & Marston, 2010). The reason lies 
mainly in the fact that many of the approaches are single goal oriented, meaning 
that they serve one purpose well but cannot be easily generalised.  
Hassan & Marston (2010) and Ibrahim & Hussainey (2019) categorise the 
different measurement approaches found in the literature. They differentiate 
between the methods of how the research object is treated and into the 
techniques applied to the research object (Figure 12). Before they come to a 
conclusion, they acknowledge that disclosure cannot be exactly measured as 
there is always some subjectivity involved. Still, although not perfect they note 
that proxies can be found that closely represent disclosure quantity and quality. 
Figure 12 summarises the methods and techniques where the methods are 
assigned to the direct or indirect group, the techniques to the content or linguistic 





Figure 12: Methods and techniques for measuring disclosure 
 
In disclosure research, the research object is the means by which 
disclosure is made (Hassan & Marston, 2010). The most common means are 
financial and non-financial reports such as regulatory risk reports (as it is the case 
in this thesis), annual reports or corporate governance/ESG reports (see in more 
detail sections 2.2.4.2 and 2.3.2).  
Methodologically, the research object can be treated in two ways (left side 
in Figure 12). It can be examined directly by analysing the actual disclosure 
report. It can also be examined indirectly by surveying preparers and recipients 
of the reports on how they rate the report and how they perceive the content 
(Hassan & Marston, 2010). 
The direct research method includes counting and evaluating disclosure 
relevant facts (words, sentences, paragraphs) in a report or calculating an index 
from a predefined framework that is applied to a report (Miihkinen, 2011). Also, 
less-complex methods can be found in the literature such as the use of dummy 
variables. A dummy variable is constructed in the form of whether for example 
some piece of information is disclosed or not.  
The indirect research method makes use of recipients’ perceptions and 
third-party information (deVaus, 2011). Reports are not analysed per se but 
peoples’ perception of the reports is of interest in the research. Personal 
interviews are held with preparers and users, asking questions such as how the 
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quality of a report is rated. Also, surveys are conducted with a larger number of 
market participants asking standardised questions. Personal interviews and 
surveys have in common that the researchers are responsible themselves to 
collect the research data. In the financial industry there are also other data 
sources available for collecting data on disclosure. Several external information 
providers offer generic disclosure data and pre-calculated ratings that can be 
used by researchers in their work (Refinitiv, 2019). 
The choice of the research technique (right side of the figure) is between 
analysing the content itself, or analysing the linguistic features of a text (Ibrahim 
& Hussainey, 2019). The decision on the form of content analysis is driven by 
questions of labour intensity, sample size, and precision (Krippendorff, 2004). 
Content analysis performed manually may lead to better and more precise results 
but is very labour intensive, and usually can be done once and only for small-
sized samples (Elshandidy et al., 2018). Analysing content in a computerised way 
solves the problem of too small sample sizes as a large number of reports can 
be processed in a short time (Hall, 2013). The automated analysis also reduces 
the intermediate workload on the researcher as long as enough computational 
power is available. However, the programming process and the clear definition of 
disclosure coding rules upfront is a prerequisite and again labour and cost 
intensive. 
Computational linguistics techniques are applied for measuring the 
properties of text (Li, 2008). For example, the well-known Gunning-Fog index 
(Gunning, 1952) with which readability can be measured has been applied in 
several disclosure studies (Ajina et al., 2016). Often, general linguistic techniques 
are adjusted for specific purposes. So in the case of analysing financial texts, the 
linguistic properties of the financial language are added (Li, 2008).  
 
2.4.2 Direct Measurement Methods 
2.4.2.1 Index Construction Method 
The index construction method is a multi-step approach (Hassan & 
Marston, 2010). Before the quality index of a disclosure report can be 
constructed, the approach first requires the definition of a standard of expected 
risk disclosure outcomes. In a second step the content of actual disclosure 
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reports is benchmarked against this standard. The index then measures the 
extent of conformity of the disclosure report with the predefined standard (Hassan 
& Marston, 2010).  
In a similar way, Ibrahim & Hussainey (2019) recommend the following 
three steps in the process of constructing the index. First a “checklist” of 
disclosure items must be compiled. This checklist requires careful consideration 
as it will strongly influence the validity of the resulting index values. In a second 
step, the actual reports are examined whether the items from the checklist are 
covered or not (binary approach) or to what extent they are covered following a 
defined coding scheme (ordinal approach). For each report, a checklist is 
completed, the matched items are evaluated, and a score is assigned to each of 
them.  
The total index score can be calculated with two basic methods (Hassan 
& Marston, 2010). One method means adding up all item values and dividing 
them by the number of items (averaging method). The other method first requires 
the assignment of weights to each item (weighting method). Weights can be 
derived from expert estimations for example or from choosing a suitable 
quantitative base such as balance sheet values or risk-weighted assets (RWA) 
showing the relative importance of disclosed items. Then, the item values are 
multiplied by the respective weights and summed up for the total index. 
Several studies use the index construction method. Beretta and Bozzolan 
(2004) propose a framework for the qualitative analysis of risk communication 
and an index for measuring the quality of risk disclosure. The four dimensions of 
their index checklist are content of information disclosed, economic sign, type of 
measures and the outlook orientation. For content evaluation they apply a manual 
content analysis technique. The results are indices for the four dimensions and a 
composite average index which can be used to rank firms according to their 
disclosure quality. Beretta & Bozzolan (2004) conclude that still more research 
needs to be done on the identification of the determinants of the disclosure index.  
Lipunga (2014) chooses the structure and the requirements of the Basel II 
risk framework as the index checklist which he applies to annual reports on a 
rather small sample of seven commercial banks. The goal is to measure both the 
risk disclosure levels and the influence of disclosure on profitability. The checklist 
consists of six high level categories (risk management structure, market risk, 
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credit risk, liquidity risk, capital management, and operational and other risks) 
and a total of 34 individual disclosure items (compare to the risk dimension of the 
regulatory risk disclosure scoring model in section 4.5.1). By applying the average 
method to the calculation of the composite index, the study finds that the 
disclosures sections in annual reports match closely the Basel II structure and 
requirements. Summarizing, Lipunga (2014) sees limitations of his study as far 
as the sample selection, the sample size and the short time horizon are 
concerned, but sees added value on the methodological side.  
Finally, the determinants of voluntary disclosure in the banking sector are 
empirically studied by Bhasin (2012) with respect to corporate governance 
issues. He links governance factors (independent variables) which he derives 
from annual reports to a voluntary disclosure index (dependent variable). The 
sample consists of twenty-three banks for which the annual reports for the year 
2010 are collected. The index checklist includes nine categories with 65 items. A 
dummy variable of 1 is awarded if the item is found in the annual report and 0 if 
not. No weighting is used for computing the total disclosure index. Bhasin (2012) 
finds that the number of outside directors and the banks’ sizes have the most 
significantly positive impact on disclosure.  
In summary, Ibrahim & Hussainey (2019) view the construction of an index 
for measuring disclosure as a very effective method. Particularly, it is important 
that the checklist contains all disclosure items as imposed by the disclosure 
regulation. A remaining challenge is measuring not only the existence, but also 
the quality of the items disclosed. Berger (2011) sees a potential limitation in self-
constructed indices that they are very labour-intensive to calculate, potentially 
subjective, expensive, and feasible only for rather small samples.  
 
2.4.2.2 Semantic Content Analysis  
Semantic content analysis is the most immediate method of all methods 
available for measuring disclosure quality and quantity (Saunders, 2013). It refers 
to the semantic analysis of content of both written and non-written documents 
where the content is categorised objectively in a systematic and replicable 
manner. This approach allows text analysis with quantitative tools. The main 
purpose is to embed the content of a document in its context (Saunders, 2013). 
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The method requires the counting of data items such as risk-related words 
in a text. An item can be a single word, a sentence, a paragraph, and other text 
elements. The literature therefore distinguishes into conceptual content analysis 
(existence and frequency of keywords) and relational content analysis (taking 
also relationships among words into account) (Hassan & Marston, 2010). 
The implementation of semantic content analysis requires a considerable 
amount of preparatory work. The selection of the “right” keywords (Li, 2008) and 
understanding the appropriate comprehension level of the users (“the 
readability”) is crucial (Ajina et al., 2016). For example, specialised financial texts 
such as regulatory risk disclosure reports (that are of interest in this thesis) use a 
different financial language than the (general) markets section in a daily 
newspaper. Also, investors or analysts who are used to reading financial texts 
have a different comprehension capability of financial texts than the average 
reader of a newspaper.  
In a study, Henry (2008) creates the first word list targeting financial texts 
specifically, although she includes only 85 negative words. In the years thereafter, 
the number of keywords grew. The widely used Harvard GI words list11 (although 
not specifically derived from financial texts) includes more than 4,000 negative 
words excluding inflections. The Diction word list12 is another collection of words 
that focuses on optimistic and pessimistic meanings of words therefore 
measuring the sentiment in a text. Loughran & Mcdonald (2016) advance the 
word lists by criticising the Harvard GI and Diction word lists for not originating 
from the financial and accounting area. They then create their own word list with 
a focus on financial market communication. The freely available13 Loughran & 
Mcdonald word list comprises six sub-categories (negative, positive, uncertainty, 
litigious, strong modal, weak modal) and covers about 350 positive and 2,300 
negative words.  
Semantic content analysis can be conducted manually or automatically 
(Hassan & Marston, 2010). Manual content analysis is labour-intensive and 
requires expert coders and therefore limits the sample sizes and iterations. 







power (Saunders, 2013). Several supporting software tools have been developed 
(e.g., Nvivo, ATLAS.ti, Diction). Automated contents analysis is easy to (re-)use 
and economically feasible in terms of time, effort, money, and replicability. The 
main criticism is that software solutions have difficulties capturing the meaning of 
text and not only counting items (Hassan & Marston, 2010). 
  
2.4.2.2.1 Manual Semantic Content Analysis 
Linsley & Shrives (2005) are conducting a manual content analysis on a 
sentence basis. They examine the risk disclosures within annual reports for 79 
large UK non-financial companies, selected from the FTSE 100 list for the year 
2001. Methodologically, the authors first read each annual report personally. 
They mark all sentences with risk and management meaning. While coding, 
Linsley and Shrives categorise each sentence based on the potential current or 
future impact on risk and management policy. In further steps they assign each 
marked sentence to six predefined risk categories (financial risk, operations risk, 
empowerment risk, information processing and technology risk, integrity risk, and 
strategic risk) and also map each marked sentence according to its 
monetary/non-monetary content, good/neutral/bad news and past/current/future 
orientation. 
Linsley & Shrives's (2005) study reveals that in most cases strategic risks 
are disclosed in annual reports, followed by integrity risks and financial risks. The 
authors also find that firms are more willing to disclose external than internal risks. 
They further find that firms provide a statistically significant higher proportion of 
future information than historic information. And finally, the study reveals that 
most of the risk information disclosed is neutral, not as one might expect of 
positive nature. The authors are critically aware of problems of subjectivity in their 
work. In order to reduce the bias in coding, Linsley and Shrives first code a limited 
set of reports individually before they compare their results and agree on common 
coding rules. The remaining reports are coded by single coders who must follow 






2.4.2.2.2 Automated Semantic Content Analysis 
Elshandidy & Neri (2015) use automated content analysis when they study 
the influence of corporate governance on mandatory and voluntary risk disclosure 
practices in the UK and Italy. They review annual reports of 290 British and 88 
Italian listed firms (excluding financial firms due to their special risk profile) for the 
period 2005 (the year of IFRS introduction) to 2010. With the software package 
QSR Version 6, they calculate risk disclosure scores for each annual report14.  
During the software parameterisation process, Elshandidy and Neri 
individually read and code thirty randomly selected annual reports. From the 
coding results they generate a proprietary risk word list originally in the English 
language which they later translate into Italian. They then pass on the risk word 
list to the software where it is automatically processed on the annual reports. In 
order to check for validity and reliability of the automatically calculated results, 
the authors compare the manually and automatically generated scores by using 
Cronbach’s alpha analysis. The study finds that governance factors influence the 
decisions of UK and Italian firms to disclose risk information either voluntarily or 
mandatorily in their annual report narratives. More strongly governed firms tend 
to provide more meaningful risk information to their investors than firms governed 
more weakly (Elshandidy & Neri, 2015).  
Henry (2008) prepares a study where she aims to gain an understanding 
of the firm-investor communication process by analysing press releases on 
earnings. She finds that the communication process involves quantitative and 
qualitative elements which makes her choose a mixed-methods research 
approach. In the qualitative part she explores the properties of earnings press 
releases with automated content analysis software, using a word list (see section 
2.4.3.1). In the subsequent quantitative part, she assesses the impact of the 
press releases on investors by analysing the stock market reaction following 
release dates with respect to the tone and other stylistic attributes. The measures 
of tone and style are created by another computer-based content analysis 
software, Diction 5.015.  
 
14 QSR is the producer of the Nvivo Software. As of 2020 the software is available in version 12. 
15 Diction software allows for user-defined word lists for frequency counts (known as dictionaries). 
The software has also a built-in tool for measuring verbal complexity (e.g., the average number 
of characters per word). 
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In summary, Henry finds in the qualitative analysis that earnings press 
releases exhibit a potential duality of purpose: information and promotion. The 
quantitative analysis suggests that the tone of earnings press releases, even 
when controlling for financial performance, influences investors, as indicated by 
market reaction. 
 
2.4.3 Indirect Measurement Methods 
Surveys, interviews and third party measurements are indirect methods for 
measuring disclosure quality (Hassan & Marston, 2010). All methods focus on 
the users of disclosure reports and their perceptions, and not directly on the 
disclosure reports.  
Surveys are a quantitative method for collecting data regarding the 
characteristics of cases relevant for the analysis and evaluating the data with 
statistical variance analysis (deVaus, 2011).  
Interviews are a qualitative method that can be seen as a conversation 
with a purpose, where the interviewer’s aim is to obtain knowledge about the 
interviewee’s world (Alvesson & Svensson, 2013). 
Third party measurements is a collective term for using information such 




Surveys are taken when the interest lies in collecting data from a large 
focus group with the aim of gaining insights into the behaviour of this group 
(deVaus, 2011). The literature review shows that this method has not yet been 
applied in the academic context of disclosure research. However, in practice, this 
method was applied by the European Banking Authority (2013) for comparing 
banks’ risk disclosure approaches. In a survey which the EBA called the “EU-
wide transparency exercise” 64 European banks from 21 countries of the 
European Economic Area (EEA) were surveyed. A questionnaire was sent out 





sovereign exposures. The survey data returned covered 730,000 data points and 
were processed and evaluated automatically. Enria (European Banking Authority, 
2013), then the chairperson of the EBA, claims that the survey results help to 
continue the efforts to enhance transparency through disclosure in the EEA 
banking industry. He continues that “…reliable and comparable information on 
EU banks fosters the trust of investors, as well as the proper functioning of the 
market. It puts all market participants in a better position to understand the 
situation of EU banks" (European Banking Authority, 2013). Since 2013 this 
survey on disclosure is conducted every second year. 
 
2.4.3.2 Interviews 
No study on risk disclosure has yet been conducted that uses interviews 
exclusively as a research method. However, a study by Tauringana & Chithambo 
(2016) uses the interview technique as part of a mixed methods approach for 
measuring risk disclosure. In their study, they investigate the extent and the 
determinants of risk disclosure compliance with the requirements of IFRS 7 
(Financial Instruments: Disclosures, see section 2.3.4). The authors criticise 
previous studies by being too single sided on either the quantitative or qualitative 
side. Tauringana and Chithambo observe that only a combination of both sides 
can fully explain the quality of risk disclosure. Their study comprises a quantitative 
panel data regression analysis, and qualitative interviews. They identify four 
company variables (number of non-executive directors, company size, gearing, 
and profitability) which they assume to explain IFRS 7 risk disclosure compliance.  
 
2.4.3.3 Third Party Measures 
Researchers do not necessarily have to participate in the data collection 
process for risk disclosure analysis, but can rely on disclosure ratings from 
intermediates such as Refinitiv (2019) or the Association for Investment 
Management and Research (Healy & Palepu, 2001). 
Refinitiv publishes disclosure scores on environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) measures based on reported data in the public domain across 
three pillars and ten different ESG topics (Refinitiv, 2019).  
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AIMR disclosure ratings were available in the US during the 1980s and 
1990s (Healy & Palepu, 2001). These ratings were calculated by the Association 
for Investment Management and Research (AIMR), which nowadays is known as 
the Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) Institute. Leading analysts for each 
industry were surveyed annually on their perception of disclosure quality in 
annual reports and 10-K’s (a standardised and structured format of an annual 
report in the US). The analysts were supposed to be experts in their fields and 
particularly well-suited to give a qualified opinion on the disclosure quality of the 
firms they cover.  
 
2.4.3.3.1 Computational Linguistics 
Computational linguistics is a developing research method that examines 
how computers might be used to process and interpret human language and texts 
automatically (Li, 2008). The mathematical and logical characteristics of natural 
text and language is analysed first. Then computer software is developed that 
builds on algorithms and statistical processes for automatic language processing. 
Li (2008) is the first to analyse the characteristics of a large sample of 
Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) sections of annual reports of US 
firms with the help of computational linguistic techniques. The sample consists of 
about 55,000 firm years for the period 1993 – 2003. Li measures the readability 
with the linguistic Gunning-Fog index (Gunning, 1952) and with the length of the 
MD&A document. He relates readability to earnings persistence (= future stability 
of earnings). Through regression analysis he finds that [1] poorer performing 
companies are more likely to hide bad information through complex and harder 
to read annual reports and [2] that firms with positive persistent earnings are 
easier to read (Li, 2008).  
Li (2010) introduces another computational linguistics method of analysing 
the content of corporate filings. He applies a naïve Bayesian Machine Learning 
Technique instead of a dictionary-based approach as in a previous study (Li, 
2008). He first categorises 30,000 test sentences manually along the dimensions 
tone and content and uses the results to statistically infer the tone and content 
from another 1,400,000 sentences. The Bayesian algorithm calculates the 
statistical correlation between the frequency of some key words and the 
document type. Li finds that the tone of a forward-looking statement in an annual 
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report is a function of current performance, accruals, firm size, return volatility, 
the Gunning-Fog index and firm age (Li, 2010).  
 
2.4.4 Summary on Methods and Techniques 
The literature review on disclosure measurement methods and techniques 
shows that a variety of approaches are used to capture disclosure quality. Direct 
methods that evaluate disclosure reports immediately are found to be used more 
frequently than indirect methods. Still, it is interesting to observe that even direct 
method studies suggest further research to apply indirect methods as well by 
adding the users’ perception of reports to the overall quality evaluation. 
Another striking observation from the literature review in this section is that 
many authors suggest mixed method approaches. They acknowledge that the 
quality of disclosure reports depends on quantitative and qualitative elements and 
focusing only on one side neglects the impact of the other on report quality.  
Within the discussion on direct methods, semantic content analysis is 
widely used in many studies where the coding results are then further processed 
for index calculation. Index construction on the basis of standardised 
(benchmark) templates is less frequently applied as this method potentially limits 
capturing the richness of a disclosure report. 
Interesting trends on the development of a disclosure scoring model can 
be found in the literature review for automation and third-party initiatives. 
Measuring disclosure quality manually is time-consuming therefore many studies 
suggest moving to automatization for the recurring parts of coding. Also, a market 
is developing for centrally calculating and providing third-party disclosure scores, 
comparable to ratings from large rating agencies such as Standard & Poor’s and 
Moody’s. The regulatory risk disclosure scoring model developed in this research 
aims to add value in both cases by defining (semi-) automated processes and to 
be  open for implementation in various bank internal and external environments. 
2.5  Chapter Summary 
The literature review in this chapter was split into three parts. The first part 
focused on disclosure literature in general and explained its impact on the 
research question of this thesis. For that purpose, definitions of “disclosure”, 
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“risk”, and “regulatory reporting” were collected, compared and the appropriate 
definitions for this thesis selected. The review of the dimensions of disclosure 
showed how rich the disclosure subject is and how important it is do precisely 
define the scope of this research. The dimensions of disclosure covered issues 
such as mandatory versus voluntary disclosure, quantitative versus qualitative 
disclosures and, besides others, costs and benefits of disclosure. Several 
theories attempt to explain why firms are actually disclosing information. This 
chapter reviewed these theories and put a focus on agency theory which is the 
chosen underlying theory of this thesis. The literature review on the determinants 
of disclosure provided important input for the scoring model development. 
Determinates such as “industry”, “size”, and “risk” became control variables in the 
scoring model.  
The second part of the literature review shifted the focus to the banking 
industry and its risk disclosure. Literature on the risk reporting environment of 
banks was analysed before the review moved to the legal and regulatory 
requirements. The Basel III guidelines were evaluated with respect to disclosure 
(pillar 3). Then, the implementation of the guidelines in the European Union in 
form of the CRD IV/CRR legal package was explained as it builds the legal basis 
for the regulatory risk disclosure model.  
The third part of the literature review covered the review of methods and 
models on how to measure the quality of disclosures. Direct methods such as 
index construction and semantic content analysis were considered, as well as 
indirect methods such as surveys and interviews. The literature review in this part 




3 Chapter Three: Research Philosophy, Methodology and Design 
In this chapter, the research philosophy of this thesis is set forth, the 
methodology explained, and the design described. In the first section, the 
historical struggle for finding the best-fitted approach for risk disclosure 
measurement is outlined. In the second section, the philosophical stance of this 
thesis is set, with pragmatism as the chosen philosophical position. The third 
section moves on to explain the multi-methods approach, which combines 
qualitative semantic content analysis with Computer-Aided Qualitative Data 
Analysis (CAQDAS) and quantitative factor analysis with descriptive statistics on 
empirical indicators. Finally, the last section on research design describes in 
detail the four stages of this research including requirements analysis, model 
development, model operationalisation, and test and results evaluation. 
3.1 Historical Challenges in Risk Disclosure Research  
Risk disclosure research has undergone several methodological changes 
over the last decades. Initially, mostly quantitative analysis was performed before 
qualitative methods took over and finally an integrated view was suggested 
(Beyer et al., 2010).  
Regulatory risk disclosure comprises quantitative and qualitative 
information. A good disclosure measurement model must integrate both. The 
underlying EU regulation of this thesis, the Capital Requirements Regulation 
CRR (European Parliament, 2013b) makes a clear distinction between 
quantitative disclosures that are based on financial figures, and qualitative 
disclosures that explain the financial figures and comment on the risk exposures 
of a bank. Both parts are complementary. The quantitative parts are significantly 
standardised by the regulatory authorities, so offering few possibilities for banks 
to differentiate themselves from other banks with respect to presentation. The 
qualitative parts, however, provide many more opportunities for banks to 
customise their risk reporting to their specific risk profile (Jia et al., 2016). This is 
the area where banks can make a difference to competitors and benefit from 
higher quality disclosures. Therefore, a comprehensive disclosure of risk must 
combine elements of both quantitative figures and qualitative 
explanations/comments. However, this raises the question of how both aspects 
can be captured best in a common measure. 
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Prior research on disclosure is undecided on this question, although over 
time a development is discernible. Early research in the 1980s and 1990s applied 
a positivistic approach where disclosure is measured in binary terms. That means 
a simple distinction is made between whether a firm discloses a certain risk item 
(value = 1) or not (value = 0) (Botosan, 1997; Guthrie et al., 2004; Verrecchia, 
1990; Zarzeski, 1996). Often, signalling theory (see section 2.2.5) is adopted to 
explain the disclosure strategy of firms. The idea is that a firm either wants to 
signal something to the market or not. For achieving this purpose, a quantitative 
research method is sufficient (Dobler, 2008). 
Once disclosure research gained momentum around the millennium, 
positivistic quantitative measures were still widespread for measuring the quality 
of disclosure. However, the tools became more refined by transitioning from 
binary measures to ordered numerical measures such as counting the number of 
words or sentences on disclosed risks. The justification for this approach is the 
assumption that more quantitative disclosure is a proxy for higher quality 
disclosure (Hassan & Marston, 2010). Another more recent example of a 
quantitative method to measure quality can be found in the work of Loughran & 
Mcdonald (2014) on measuring the readability of disclosure reports. The authors 
suggest measuring the file size of disclosure reports in bytes to derive a proxy for 
disclosure quality. In their study, they identify a significant but surprising 
correlation between file size and readability.  
Beretta & Bozzolan (2008) critically challenge in their widely-quoted study 
the assumptions found in previous disclosure research that the quantity of 
information disclosed has an implication in determining the quality of disclosure. 
And Healy & Palepu (2001) note that measuring the quality of disclosed 
information with quantitative research methods is problematic, and remains one 
of the questions that must be answered in a satisfactory way. Consequently, 
many researchers were dissatisfied with applying only quantitative methods to 
disclosure measurement and thereby neglecting the qualitative elements of the 
disclosure narrative. They turned to suggesting a mixture of quantitative and 
qualitative measures. Ground-breaking work was done by Beretta & Bozzolan 
(2004) with their initial development of a partly qualitative and partly quantitative 
disclosure framework. Besides quantitative measures, they suggest several 
qualitative measures for semantic content analysis of disclosure texts. Semantic 
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context analysis is a classical qualitative research method (Saunders, 2013). 
Other researchers who also adopted qualitative methods include Abraham & 
Cox, 2007; Elshandidy et al., 2018; Ibrahim & Hussainey, 2019; and Jia et al., 
2016. Most of these studies are focused on the financial disclosure of non-
financial firms and not - as in this thesis - regulatory risk disclosure of financial 
firms (banks).  
In conclusion, researchers appreciate the advancements in qualitative 
research methods in the disclosure field, but also note that quantitative analysis 
remains of similar importance and must be addressed equally (Beretta & 
Bozzolan, 2008; Miihkinen, 2011). By understanding that neither a straight 
quantitative nor a straight qualitative research methodology captures disclosure 
quality in its entirety, this research suggests a multi-methods approach, 
comprising quantitative and qualitative elements. 
 
3.2 Philosophical Position 
The underlying philosophical position of this research is pragmatism. “In 
pragmatism there are no ‘a priori’ propositions or categories and no universal 
cognitive structures or mental models that shape knowledge. Meaning is derived 
from lived experience in which humans are at work with their environments on a 
continuous basis” (Dewey, 1924 in Boydston, 1985).  
Applied to the context of this research, this quote is interpreted in the 
following way: regulatory risk disclosure reports are prepared by humans who 
interact with their environment. Employees of financial institutions write regulatory 
risk disclosure reports for a wider audience including market participants such as 
investors and other external stakeholders. Reports are prepared on a regular 
basis (minimum annually) and are continuously revised through lived experience.  
There is no a priori or normative definition of what represents a “good” risk 
disclosure report. Knowledge on disclosure quality develops over time through 
experience and interaction with stakeholders in the wider sense of agency theory. 
Regular interaction also takes place between practitioners and academics in 
advancing knowledge of disclosure quality (Johnson & Duberley, 2000). This 
cooperation is complementary and necessary in constructing theories and 
models on “disclosure quality”. Johnson and Duberley (2000) note that “practice” 
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in general is often viewed by pragmatists as a source of inspiration. The neo-
modernist concept of the learning organisation as a means of developing 
corporate and personal capabilities points in the same direction (McAuley, 2014). 
In the case of risk disclosure, the focus of this thesis, organisations are evolving 
through constant learning on how to prepare better quality disclosure reports to 
reduce the information gap between agents and principals as suggested in 
agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). As long as it “works” to improve the 
quality through constant learning, the pragmatic approach is justified.  
Pragmatism (Sayer, 1992) emphasises a fallibilistic epistemology in which 
experience develops through action and critical thinking in the process of inquiry 
and reflection. A typical example for this fallibilistic epistemology can be found in 
this thesis. There is no absolute “truth” about the quality of risk disclosure. There 
is not one “correct” or “right” risk disclosure report. However, through the 
cooperative effort of preparers, users, regulatory authorities, and standard setters 
(see section 4.4.2), a common understanding of what constitutes quality 
disclosure can be developed. Such understanding can be achieved through 
repetitive inquiry and reflection. 
In pragmatism, the ontological position is often a realistic one (Arbib & 
Hesse, 1986). A realistic ontology emphasises the transactional relationship 
between the research object (here: the “risk disclosure reports”) and the world 
(here: the preparers and the users of the reports, and regulatory authorities and 
standard setters). It is no question that the risk disclosure reports exist in reality 
and represent the risk profile of an individually existing legal entity (the “bank”). 
However, whether they do this in an objective way is something that can be and 
must be debated. Kołakowski (1969) states that “while reality does exist, we can 
never ultimately know it because of our lack of a theory-neutral observational 
language”. Even at this point it must be noted that a certain degree of subjectivity 
remains in the interpretation of the reports (compare to the discussion on 
“subjectivity in risk disclosure” in section 4.5.4). 
 
3.3 Research Methodology 
Regulatory risk disclosure consists of information that can be of 
quantitative or qualitative nature (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
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2015). The quantitative amount of relevant risk information disclosed plays an 
important role in evaluating the risk profile of a bank. However, also the qualitative 
comments on the risk exposures and risk management add value to the 
comprehensive understanding of the banks’ risk profiles. Both kinds of 
information are essential to gain a comprehensive view of the overall quality of 
risk disclosure (compare to the historical development of disclosure research 
discussed in section 3.1). Therefore, neither a quantitative research method 
alone, nor a qualitative method alone may lead to a complete assessment of the 
risk profile. In order to capture both aspects of risk disclosure, this research 
adopts a mixed methods approach.  
The mixed-methods methodology developed as an umbrella term is 
appealing to research situations where more than one methodological approach 
is used in combination with another (Bazeley, 2013). Often elements are drawn 
from both quantitative and qualitative approaches to research. A comparative 
analysis of studies in the management research journals Administrative Science 
Quarterly (ASQ) and Academy of Management Journal (AMJ) by Bazeley (2013) 
shows that eight out of 35 studies use mixed methods, where the most common 
approach is the quantification of qualitative data for statistical analysis according 
to an ‘a priori’ coding scheme. 
A multiple methodology approach works well for two kinds of research 
settings (Bazeley, 2013). The first setting is one where complementary data is 
sought to enhance overall or general understanding of research questions. 
However, this setting is of lesser importance to this thesis as the primary data 
sources (the risk disclosure reports) are uniform and not complementary.  
The second research setting covers cases where different methods are 
appropriate for various elements of one common data source, and where each 
element contributes to the overall picture. Smith (1975) explains that such 
“methodological triangulation” overcomes the inherent bias of any single-method 
approach. He advocates that different methodological strengths are enhanced, 
and inherent weaknesses are cancelling out, thereby producing more convincing 
research results.  
For this thesis, this second research setting is of high relevance. The 
research question asks how to measure the quality of a bank’s regulatory risk 
disclosure with a scoring model (see section 1.4). Answering this question 
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requires different forms of approaches to a shared dataset of regulatory risk 
disclosure reports. Therefore, the theoretical framework of the scoring model 
suggests different quality criteria (see section 4.4.3) that are either of quantitative 
(e.g., quantity of disclosed information) or of qualitative (e.g., readability, 
richness, and depth) nature, and therefore require different research methods to 
capture their quantities and meanings. Only combined they provide a 
comprehensive picture of the disclosure quality level that is represented by the 
composite disclosure score.  
A challenge in applying a the multi-method approach is the staging and 
sequencing of the research methods applied (the so-called “components”) and 
the identification of the relative dominance of one method over the other (Bazeley, 
2013). Also, the results of the various research methods must be integrated at a 
certain point during the research process. Typically, the integration occurs at the 
end of the process where results are interpreted and discussed (Bazeley, 2013). 
This thesis approaches the integration by following a sequential procedure. First, 
qualitative semantic content analysis with Computer-Aided Qualitative Data 
Analysis (CAQDAS) is carried out on the regulatory risk disclosure reports. Then, 
the results are processed with quantitative descriptive statistics techniques. 
Finally, the results are integrated and the composite disclosure score for each 
disclosure report is calculated and analysed with a quantitative factor analysis. 
3.3.1 Semantic Content Analysis (qualitative) 
Saunders (2013) defines semantic content analysis as an “analysis of the 
content of both written and non-written documents where each document is 
quantified objectively in a systematic and replicable manner using predetermined 
categories, thereby allowing the data to be analysed quantitatively”. Saunders 
mentions company reports, annual reports and mission statements as examples 
of the main sources of semantic content analysis within business and 
management research. It can be used as the sole or main technique as well as a 
secondary or supplementary technique in a multi-methods study (see section 
2.4.2.2).  
Krippendorff (2004) sets the content of a document in relation to its 
context. The context may include the purpose of the document (here “regulatory 
risk disclosure”), but also organisational and cultural aspects (here “banking 
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industry sector”). Document analysis can be performed manually (see section 
2.4.2.2.1) or with computer support (see section 2.4.2.2.2). Computer-Aided 
Qualitative Data Analysis (CAQDAS) can assist in the management of rich, 
complex but often non-standardised unstructured data. Data can comprise text, 
audio, and video files. Computer systems may facilitate the analysis of data, but 
it remains for the researcher to analyse the data and draw the right conclusions 
(Hall, 2013). In this research, functionalities of Nvivo, one of the leading CAQDAS 
systems, are used for qualitative semantic content analysis of risk disclosure 
reports. All disclosure reports are coded in Nvivo following the rules  predefined 
in a coding rulebook. In parallel, word lists are developed that capture the text 
properties for the relevant quality criteria. Once the reports are coded, several 
word frequency queries of Nvivo are run on the raw data for capturing individual 
results on the quality criteria. Finally, methodological quality and consistency 
checks are performed using built-in statistical methods for the Kappa coefficient 
test and the percentage agreement test for analysing coding reliability and 
validity. 
 
3.3.2 Numerical Descriptive Statistics (quantitative) 
Descriptive statistics are a way of summarizing the properties of large sets 
of quantitative (numerical) information (Sincich, 1995). Univariate analysis is 
performed on the dataset for each quality criterion that is identified as quantitative 
in the scoring model framework. Univariate analysis describes the behaviour of a 
single variable. This involves the occurrences and the distribution of the variable, 
its central tendency (measured with its mean and mode) and its dispersion 
(including range and quartiles as well as measures of the spread such as the 
variance and standard deviation). Of particular importance for the scoring model 
is the shape of the distribution and the analysis of potential outliers as these 
effects point to deviations from the norm. For each variable, the skewness (the 
measure of the lack of symmetry) and the kurtosis (the measure that compares 
the fit of the actual distribution to the normal distribution) are calculated and 
analysed (Sincich, 1995).  
In summary, for each variable the following statistical values are calculated 
and analysed:  
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• Mean and mode values 
• Standard error 
• Variance and standard deviation 
• Skewness and kurtosis 
• Minimum and maximum values 
• Count of occurrences 
Finally, where applicable, ordinary and cumulative relative frequency distributions 
(histograms) are used to describe and analyse the results for the quality criteria. 
 
3.3.3 Factor analysis (quantitative) 
Factor analysis is a quantitative statistical technique that is commonly 
applied in management research (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 2011). It is used 
extensively in textual data analysis (Miihkinen, 2011) where underlying data 
structures must be analysed, patterns identified, and theoretical insights to the 
research question be provided. Factor analysis uses statistical tools to extract 
underlying factors from a dataset that capture the variation in the collected data. 
In social and management research, multiple factors often have an impact 
on one particular variable, and their relative impact is difficult to discern. From 
this fact, two consequences should be considered. First, factors are usually not 
fully independent of each other, meaning in statistical terms that they are 
correlated. In consequence, they have a similar impact on the variable especially 
if highly correlated. It would therefore be redundant to consider highly correlated 
factors simultaneously, and such factors should be consolidated. The second 
consequence relates to finding the relative importance of each factor as not every 
factor is of the same importance to the value of the variable. By employing factor 
analysis, it becomes transparent which factor has the higher relative impact on 
the variable than the others. Knowing the importance of each factor is crucial as 
factors with a higher impact also have a better statistical explanatory power on 
the variable values/results (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 2011; Sincich, 1995).  
For the evaluation of scoring model results in this thesis, addressing both 
consequences is of high relevance. Several quality criteria (see section 4.4.3) are 
determined in the disclosure scoring model that proxy the quality of the risk 
categories identified. The explanatory power of the composite disclosure scores 
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calculated in the proposed scoring model improves with a deliberate selection of 
quality criteria. If empirical indicators (“factors”) are chosen with low correlations, 
then the scoring model covers a wider range of quality properties of the risk 
disclosure reports, and predictions are not redundant. 
 
Finally, the composite disclosure score is made up of several empirical 
indicators for disclosure quality. Only with factor analysis the relative importance 
of each factor for the model as a whole becomes transparent. 
 
3.4  Research Design 
The research design comprises a sequence of four stages (Figure 13):  
• First, the requirements of the regulatory risk disclosure model are defined 
(stage 1) 
• Second, the model framework is developed (stage 2) 
• Third, the model is implemented (stage 3) 
• Finally, the model is tested and the results are evaluated (stage 4).  
 
 




3.4.1 Stage 1 Requirements Analysis 
In stage one the requirements for the regulatory risk disclosure scoring 
model are analysed. Requirements can be found in the context of agency theory 
(disclosure as a tool to reduce the information asymmetry), the general risk profile 
of banks (risk categories), the regulatory environment of the banking sector (risk 
measurement and reporting), and in prior studies of the leading standard setters 
and policy makers IASB, FSB and BCBS (criteria for quality disclosure).  
The conceptual framework of the scoring model is agency theory (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). The requirement analysis highlights how agency theory 
defines the conflicts of interest, how disclosure is embedded in the theory and 
how the agency cost/benefit trade-off can be improved through higher-quality 
disclosure. The basis for the analysis is the seminal paper by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). Additional research papers are included to capture the critical 
discussion of the theory with respect to disclosure after its initial publication 
(Pepper & Gore, 2015; Sanders & Carpenter, 2003; Wiseman et al., 2012).  
The risk profile of banks is different to that of non-financial firms (Beretta 
& Bozzolan, 2008; Miihkinen, 2011). Many prior studies exclude banks from their 
analysis due to their risk-taking nature. For banks, managing financial risks is the 
core business, whereas non-financial firms attempt to minimise their exposure to 
financial risks. The requirements analysis discusses in detail the financial risks 
that constitute a bank’s risk profile. Disclosures on these financial risks build the 
primary input for the disclosure scoring model and the calculation of composite 
disclosure scores and is, therefore, of high relevance to the model development.   
Regulatory disclosure happens within the regulatory environment for 
banks. Banks are heavily supervised by regulatory authorities that set mandatory 
rules and regulations which banks must adhere to. Authorities also issue 
voluntary guidelines which banks are recommended but not obliged to follow. The 
primary EU regulation for this thesis is the Capital Requirements Regulation CRR 
(European Parliament, 2013b) which is legally applicable to all banks operating 
in the European Union. The requirements analysis focuses on part 8 of this 
regulation where the structure and main contents of risk disclosure are defined 
(Art. 435 - 453 CRR). A second source for the requirements analysis is the 
consultative paper on Basel III Pillar 3 (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
2015) published by the BCBS. This paper is the non-binding guidance for 
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disclosing risk in the banking industry, prepared by the leading banking standard 
setter BCBS worldwide. 
Finally, the fourth part of the requirements analysis covers the quality 
criteria. Measuring the quality of risk disclosure reports means that the 
determinants of quality must be identified. The analysis makes use of three 
sources of documents, all published by the leading policymakers in the financial 
accounting, finance, and banking regulation field. Disclosure quality principles are 
suggested by the International Accounting Standards Board IASB (2017), the 
Enhanced Disclosure Task Force EDTF as a working group of the Financial 
Stability Board FSB (Banziger et al., 2012), and the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision BCBS (2015). In the requirements analysis, the various disclosure 
quality principles are analysed, compared, and consolidated into a common set 
of quality principles that are applied in the scoring model.  
3.4.2 Stage 2 Development of the Disclosure Scoring Model  
In stage two, the framework of the regulatory risk disclosure scoring model 
is developed. The findings on the regulatory risk profiles and quality principles 
identified in stage one are taken and integrated into a two-dimensional model. 
The procedure results in splitting the risk profiles in relevant risk categories (the 
first dimension “risk categories”), and in mapping the quality criteria to the second 
dimension (the “quality criteria”) of the scoring model (see section 4.5).   
In a next step, the model parameters are operationalised. For each 
criterion on the quality dimension, an empirical indicator is suggested. The 
indicators are proxies that represent and capture the content and purpose of each 
quality criterion. Following the multi-methods approach, the selected empirical 
indicators are partly of qualitative and partly of quantitative nature. The 
assignment depends on the properties of the quality principles to be measured. 
For model development, the general risk frameworks of Beretta & 
Bozzolan (2004), Beretta & Bozzolan (2008), and Miihkinen (2011) are adapted 
to the financial industry and expanded with the regulatory risk perspective. These 
risk frameworks suggest various indicators that measure the quality of risk 
communication in the Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section of 
annual reports of non-financial firms, and in IFRS risk reporting. There does not 
yet exist a framework that specifically addresses the requirements of the financial 
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sector. Therefore, it is necessary to adapt existing indicators to the regulatory 
environment of banks, but also develop new indicators for disclosure areas not 
covered in the frameworks.  
A second input for the development of the scoring model are the studies 
of Gunning (1952) and Loughran & Mcdonald (2016). Both studies include  
research in the area of text readability. Gunning developed the Gunning-Fog 
index for readability. Loughran and Mcdonald suggest financial word lists that 
complement standard readability methods to the financial sector. The proposed 
word lists are used as a basis for the development of the Gunning-Fog readability 
index for risk disclosure in banks.  
Once the risk and quality dimensions are established and criteria 
operationalised, the internal processing logic and the algorithms of the model are 
defined. Algorithms and functions are developed that apply the quality criteria to 
the risk categories (see section 4.5.1) and calculate disclosure scores for each 
pair of risk category and quality criterion. Then, the scores are standardised in 
order to make them comparable to each other. Control variables such as risk 
factors, firm size and industry are used to take scale effects into account. Risk 
categories are weighted with their respective proportion of total risk weighted 
assets (RWA) to account for their relative importance in a bank’s risk profile. 
Finally, the process for calculation of the composite risk disclosure scores is 
defined.  
3.4.3 Stage 3 Model Implementation and Test  
After the development of the model framework in stage two, the model is 
technically implemented in stage three. The structuring and coding of the risk 
disclosure reports is facilitated by the computer-aided textual analysis software 
Nvivo. A coding rulebook is developed where coding rules and coding categories 
are defined, along with instructions of how they shall be interpreted by the coders.  
The technical implementation of the prototype of the scoring model builds 
on the database of Nvivo, and where possible on existing query functionalities of 
Nvivo. Additional functionalities required by the scoring model are implemented 
in the statistics software package SPSS, and in the programming language 
Python running in the integrated development environment of PyCharm. The final 
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consolidation and calculation of the composite disclosure scores is performed in 
Microsoft Excel. 
Objectivity is an issue in semantic content analysis. There is always the 
possibility that the person performing the coding is biased, so results cannot be 
easily replicated. Saunders (2013) suggests that transparency of procedures and 
processes in the selection of the sample and in coding the text sources helps to 
mitigate the inherent subjectivity. In addition, a clear set of rules can make the 
coding easier to replicate. In order to prevent subjectivity, this thesis follows a 
two-step approach. Before the actual coding of all disclosure reports is 
performed, a subset of reports is coded by independent coders to ensure validity 
and reliability. The coding results are compared, and open or unclear issues are 
discussed, clarified, and documented in the coding rulebook. The final coding is 
done by using the text analysis functionalities of Nvivo on the basis of the coding 
rulebook. Then, a sample of the automated coding is manually double-checked 
by the coders. Also, statistical tests are performed to check again for reliability 
and validity of the coding. These tests include the analysis of the Kappa 
coefficient (Cohen, 1960) and the percentage agreement factor (see section 5.4). 
 
3.4.4 Stage 4 Sample Selection and Evaluation of Results  
In stage four, the model is first applied to a sample of risk disclosure 
reports, before the disclosure scores are interpreted and  evaluated. The sample 
is selected following a clear rationale in terms of the type of disclosure report and 
publication date. The type of document is given by the definition of regulatory risk 
disclosure in the Basel III Pillar 3 framework and implemented in the EU by the 
CRD IV/CRR legal package (European Parliament, 2013b). The sample consists 
of all EU headquartered banks that are classified as global systemically important 
institutions (G-SII) by the Financial Stability Board (FSB). The sample is 
supplemented with other systemically important institutions (O-SII) as defined by 
the European Banking Authority (EBA). Both lists were established after the 
financial crisis in 2008 and are updated annually. All major EU banks are included 
that are deemed as posing a potential threat to the stability of the financial system 
by regulators. The sample size is thirty banks that mainly originate from the six 
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largest financial markets in the EU (UK16, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, The 
Netherlands). A detailed discussion of the sample compilation and the selection 
criteria can be found in section 0. 
Once all disclosure reports are processed with the scoring model software 
implemented in stage 3, the composite disclosure scores and scores per risk 
categories and quality criteria are evaluated in two directions. The longitudinal 
direction includes the comparison of individual banks’ composite disclosure 
scores over time. The cross-sectional direction evaluates scores among different 
banks and countries of origin. (see sections 6.2 and 6.3). The overall goal of the 
result evaluation in this stage is to learn about the disclosure quality of individual 
banks, but also to spot trends in disclosure practices in the EU banking industry. 
Composite disclosure scores are also evaluated with respect to a potential 
reduction of information asymmetry as highlighted in agency theory. Disclosure 
is seen as an important constituent of the information environment of a bank. 
Different levels of disclosure quality represented by the composite disclosure 
scores will show how differently the term “information” is interpreted by EU banks.  
3.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter discussed the philosophical and methodological stance of the 
thesis. The main challenge was to choose  research methods that capture the 
quantitative and qualitative elements of regulatory risk disclosure reports. For 
this, a multi-methods approach is suggested that includes both, quantitative 
statistical methods (descriptive statistics and factor analysis) as well as qualitative 
methods (semantic content analysis).  
Furthermore, the research design was described and explained. The research 
follows a four steps approach where first the business requirements are analysed 
(agency theory, general risk profile of banks, regulatory and disclosure 
environment of the banking sector in the EU). In step two, the scoring model is 
conceptionally developed and technically implemented. Step three includes the 
testing of the model and applying it to a sample of disclosure reports. Finally, in 
step four the composite scores are evaluated in the context of disclosure quality 
and agency theory.   
 
16 During the research period 2016 – 2018 the UK was a member of the European Union. 
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4 Chapter Four: The Regulatory Risk Disclosure Scoring Model  
4.1 Overview 
In this chapter the theoretical foundations of measuring the quality of 
regulatory risk disclosures with a scoring model are developed.  
The entry point in section 4.2 is agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) 
and how it impacts disclosure. Agency theory is a powerful and far-reaching 
theory that covers many aspects of interactions between a firm’s managers and 
its investors. Given that there exists an information gap between them and that 
agency costs must be incurred to reduce the gap, it is in the interest of investors 
to get the best return for their money by receiving high-quality risk disclosures. 
Section 4.2 analyses the parts of agency theory that are of high relevance to 
disclosure. It also discusses where and how a disclosure scoring model can help 
to improve managers’ behaviour to increase firm value with high-quality risk 
disclosure, while still considering the costs incurred.  
The proposed scoring model is a two-dimensional model. One dimension 
covers the various categories of financial risks that are evaluated with the model. 
The other dimension consists of quality criteria that are applied to each risk 
category. Section 4.3 on risk categories (risk dimension of the scoring model) 
describes the risks incurred by banks and how their business model is different 
from firms in non-financial sectors. The rest of the section then moves on to 
banking regulation and reviews in detail the parts of the Basel III guidelines and 
the EU Capital Requirements Regulation CRR that are relevant for disclosure. 
The risk categories for the model are subsequently defined and the expected 
contents on risk described. In total there are five risk categories which present 
the major input into the scoring model. 
Section 4.4 develops the quality criteria dimension of the risk disclosure 
scoring model. Prior research on disclosure from the leading standard setters and 
policymakers in the regulatory, finance, and accounting area (BCBS, FSB and 
IASB) is analysed for this purpose. Their research findings are then consolidated 
into five quality criteria. These are criteria that are generally agreed by market 
participants to be indicators of high-quality disclosures.  
Section 4.5 introduces the framework for the regulatory risk disclosure 
scoring model. It uses the research findings from sections 4.3 and 4.4 as model 
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input. The generic measurement approach and the structure of the model are 
outlined in this section. The risk dimension is split into five categories (risk 
management, credit risk, market risk, operational risk, and other risks). The five 
quality criteria (readability, comprehensiveness, meaningfulness, time 
comparability, sector comparability) are operationalised. An empirical indicator 
that proxies each quality criterion is suggested. Next, the application method of 
the quality criteria on the risk categories is defined, and the calculation rules and 
algorithms are developed. Finally, the procedure of calculating the composite 
disclosure score is described. The section concludes with a word of caution on 
model measurement errors and model-inherent subjectivity. 
 
4.2 Risk Disclosure in Agency Theory 
4.2.1 Optimisation Strategies for the Agency Cost/Benefit Relationship 
Agency theory lays out the fundamental properties of agency costs but 
leaves it to professional bodies to develop concepts for the measurement and 
prudent management of these costs (Pepper & Gore, 2015). Few firms are in a 
position to actively understand what total amount of agency costs they incur and 
what the associated benefits are (Westermann, 2018). Firms therefore need a 
system that compiles agency costs and benefits of all activities undertaken in this 
respect. The development of the proposed disclosure scoring model is one step 
in this direction.  
It is in the interest of firms to optimise their agency costs and benefits 
relationship. In the case of external communication, for a given level of cost 
incurred they expect to get the highest quality of disclosure possible. The 
potential optimisation strategy firms may follow can be analysed by first taking a 





Figure 14: The agency cost constraint 
 
The graph shows on the vertical axis the firm value and wealth, on the 
horizontal axis expenditures a manager can make on non-pecuniary benefits. 
Any such expenditure a manager makes reduces firm value. The straight line 
V1F1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ represents the budget constraint of (fractional) owner-managers of a firm 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Initially, the firm value is at V1. The more of a firm’s 
resources owner-managers spend for their own good, the more the value of the 
firm will decline until ultimately point F1 is reached. As owner-managers also have 
an ownership interest17 in the firm, the actual value of firm resources spent 
depends on their marginal utility given by curve U3. In Figure 14 this point is 
represented by point C.  
A firm’s value can be increased by implementing a monitoring and 
reporting system that limits owner-managers’ abilities to spend firm’s resources 
for their own good (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The implementation of such a 
system is costly, therefore the net gain in firm value will be less than the expected 
gain. The level of agency costs incurred is the distance between the straight line 
V1F1 and the curve CDE for different levels of expenditures. The curve CDE 
represents the agency cost constraint. Ideally, the firm value would increase 
proportionally to the reduction in owner-managers’ spending of a firm’s 
 
17 An ownership interest in this respect means that (fractional) owner-managers have to bear 
themselves the cost of some of the resources they spend as managers. 
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resources. However, as agency costs must be incurred to prompt owner-
managers to reduce their spending, the resulting new firm value lies on the 
agency cost constraint curve CDE, while the difference GD̅̅ ̅̅  between the budget 
constraint and the agency cost constraint represents the agency costs incurred.  
For analysing the impact of risk disclosure (Donnellan, 2016; Palia & 
Porter, 2007), the shape of curve CDE must be analysed in more detail as it 
reveals important insights for the principals. Starting from point C and moving to 
the left, an initially rather small investment in a monitoring system such as  
regulatory risk disclosure reports will lead to a rather large reduction in the 
spending of firm’s resources by the owner-managers, thereby increasing firm 
value by more than the cost incurred. Subsequently, the incremental benefits 
decline until additional investments in monitoring systems do not result in any 
further value appreciation.  
From this observation a sub-optimal and an optimal monitoring strategy for 
principals can be derived. Scenario one in Figure 15 discusses the sub-optimal 
strategy that results in a ratio where high costs are incurred for receiving low 
benefits. Scenario two in Figure 16 shows the strategy that optimises the 
cost/benefit ratio (low costs but high benefits). 
 
 
Figure 15: Optimising monitoring costs and benefits, scenario 118 
 
18 Own figure developed for this research with input from Figure 14 
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Scenario 1 in Figure 15 depicts the situation which principals should 
attempt to avoid. Large amounts of firm resources (dotted line) are spent on 
monitoring and reporting systems. However, the impact on managers’ behaviour 
on spending resources for their own good is low. They keep on expropriating firm 
resources at a high rate despite the monitoring and reporting systems in place. 
In this scenario, the quality of the reporting and monitoring system is not effective 
enough to make an immediate material impact on spending behaviour. Any 
positive effects on firm value appreciation are quickly offset by large investments 
in systems. In technical terms, the shape of the curve CDE is rather flat, resulting 
in a wide distance GD̅̅ ̅̅  between the budget constraint line V1F1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ and the vertical 
point D on curve CDE.  
Scenario 2 in Figure 16 shows the scenario that is more favourable to 
principals. A rather small investment is made on monitoring and reporting 
systems. The agents in the role of owner-managers react strongly to the 
supervision and reduce their expenditures of firm’s resources at a higher rate 
than investments made, resulting in relatively higher firm value appreciations. 
The monitoring and reporting systems in this scenario are effective in reducing 
the expropriation of firm resources by the agents. 
 
  
Figure 16: Optimising monitoring costs and benefits, scenario 219 
 




Again, in technical terms, starting at point C on the budget constraint line 
V1F1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, the curve CDE initially moves closely along the firm budget constraint line. 
Even for reaching the climax point D, only a small investment in the monitoring 
and reporting systems must be made to achieve a high appreciation of firm value.  
Finally, it must be noted that the maximal cost/benefit trade-offs would lie 
on the budget constraint line, meaning that it would be possible to influence the 
owner-managers’ spending behaviour without any monitoring and reporting costs 
being incurred. This extreme scenario can only be achieved if ownership and 
management are not separated which Jensen & Meckling, (1976) discuss in their 
“100% ownership” case. However, as there is no free lunch, at least some 
investments must be made in monitoring and reporting systems in order to impact 
the spending behaviour of agents. The best realistic point D for principals is 
located on curve CDE with a rather small remaining vertical distance GD̅̅ ̅̅  from the 
budget constraint line. 
In summary, it remains the challenge for principals to set up monitoring 
and disclosure systems that effectively reduce the expenditures of a firm’s 
resources by the owner-managers, thereby optimising the agency cost/benefit 
relationship as discussed in Scenario 2. Implementing cost-effective disclosure 
scoring models that evaluate regulatory risk disclosure quantitatively and 
qualitatively in a high-quality manner will support this challenge. The 
implementation of such regulatory risk disclosure systems requires an 
understanding of what constitutes regulatory risk disclosure. The disclosure 
requirements are discussed in section 4.3, and the measurement of their quality 




4.3 Theoretical Framework of Financial Risks 
Regulatory risk disclosure reports published by banks form the basis for 
this thesis. A thorough analysis of their content is important to understand how 
their quality can be measured with a scoring model (see Figure 17). In the first 
part of this section, an overview of the general risk framework of banks is 
presented. The second part of the section moves on to a brief overview of the 
regulatory risk framework and how the general risk framework of banks is 
reflected in the regulatory environment. The third part discusses the details of 
regulatory risk disclosure, and the last part of this section maps the regulatory 
risk disclosure requirements to the risk categories of banks’ general risk 
framework. This mapping will then become the major input for the development 
of the regulatory risk disclosure model in section 4.5. 
 
 
Figure 17: Process for risk content definition 
 
4.3.1 General Risk Framework of Banks 
Taking and managing financial risks is a core activity in the banking 
industry. Banks act as intermediaries between depositors/investors who have a 
surplus of money, and borrowers who have a deficit of money (Brealey et al., 
2014). By taking on the role as intermediary in financial markets, banks enter a 
variety of risk exposures. In some respect, banks experience similar systemic 
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and business risks to those found in the so-called “real economy” of the 
manufacturing and service sector (Renn et al., 2019). After all, banks are equally  
exposed to general economic and market conditions. However, the special nature 
of banks’ business models of accepting and transferring risks implies that they 
are exposed to additional risks that cannot be found to the same extent in other 
sectors of the economy (Renn et al., 2019).  
 
 
Figure 18: General risk framework of a bank 
 
Figure 18 includes the main risk categories of an integrated risk 
management system of a bank (Saunders, 2017; Stulz, 2014). Traditionally, risk 
management activities are mapped under the headings of financial risks such as 
credit, market, and liquidity risk, as well as non-financial risks such as operational 
risks. Integrated risk management does not include business risk which is defined 
as “anything that threatens a company's ability to meet its targets or achieve its 
financial goals” and which is managed separately (Jorion, 2007).  
Traditionally, the most important financial risk for banks is credit risk (EBA, 
2017). History shows that most bank failures were due to credit risk becoming 
imminent. Credit risk is the risk “… of loss due to the fact that counterparties may 
be unwilling or unable to fulfil their contractual obligations” (Jorion, 2007). Credit 
risk can be divided into settlement risk (failed exchange of contractual obligations 
at a specified point in time) and pre-settlement risk (failure of a counterparty to 
 
114 
perform on its obligation such as paying interest during the lifetime of the contract) 
(Saunders, 2017). Disclosure on credit risk usually covers a major portion of a 
regulatory disclosure report, and hence is very relevant to measuring the quality 
of risk disclosure with a scoring model. 
Market risk is defined as the “… risk of loss due to movements in the level 
or volatility of market prices” (Jorion, 2007). It is divided into four sub-categories: 
interest rate risk, equity price risk, foreign exchange risk and commodity price 
risk. Market risks are often measured with Value-at-Risk (VaR) models. High-
quality risk disclosure will communicate information on all market risk sub-
categories and on the methods of how to measure and manage these risks. 
The third major financial risk category in banking is liquidity risk. This risk 
can take on two forms: asset liquidity risk and funding liquidity risk (solvency risk). 
Asset liquidity risk arises if “… a transaction cannot be conducted at prevailing 
market prices due to the size of the position relative to normal trading lots“ (Jorion, 
2007). Jorion (2007) defines funding liquidity risk (solvency risk) as “… the 
inability to meet payment obligations”.  
Operational risk can be generally defined as “… the risk of losses caused 
by failures in operational processes or the systems that support them, including 
those adversely affecting reputation, legal enforcement of contracts and claims.” 
(Kinglsey et al., 1998). Operational risks may arise from the breakdown of 
systems, people, and processes within the organisation (Allen, 2004). Several of 
these items are relevant for the development of the disclosure scoring model and 
its evaluation of disclosed content. For example, reporting systems can break 
down or report poor quality data. People employed in a firm can collude or commit 
fraud when preparing risk disclosure reports. Internal processes can entail 
potential accounting and regulatory reporting errors or faulty valuations. 
Operational risks also include external events such as sudden regulatory, legal, 
political, environmental changes, or physical risks such as natural disasters or 
data theft.  
In the next section, the identified financial and non-financial risks are 
transferred from the economic perspective to the legal perspective that forms the 




4.3.2 Regulatory Risk Framework of Banks 
The general risk framework of banks analysed in the previous section 4.3.1 
provides the basis for the regulatory risk framework. The BCBS recommends that 
the regulatory risk framework for banks shall be driven by the conservative 
concept of resilience and stability (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
2004). The focus of the regulatory risk framework as implemented in the EU 
(European Parliament, 2013b) is on the methods applied for measuring banking 
risks with respect to a bank’s own regulatory capital (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2011). Figure 19 expands the general risk framework with 
the perspective of regulation. 
 
 
Figure 19: Regulatory risk framework 
 
The regulatory risk framework differentiates between risks for which a 
bank must hold own funds (equity capital), and risks that are only assessed and 
a minimum regulatory standard must be met (Mendoza, 2015). Own funds are a 
scarce resource for banks and therefore expensive as capital providers expect a 
return depending on the overall perceived risk of their investment. 
In the regulatory risk framework, all major financial risks, except liquidity 
risk and some other minor risks, must be supported with own funds. Regulatory 
authorities follow a conservative approach when permitting capital instruments 
eligible for using as own funds of a bank. Only highly rated capital may be chosen. 
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Therefore, the amount of available own funds for regulation purposes can differ 
substantially from the actual economic capital available to a bank.  
Comparable to the general risk framework, banking regulation also divides 
the risks into the main categories credit risks, market risks, operational risks, and 
liquidity risks (Mendoza, 2015). When assessing the own funds requirement of 
these risks (except liquidity risk), banks have the choice between calculating the 
capital charge with a standard model or an internal model. The standard models 
for each risk category are defined in detail by the Capital Requirements 
Regulation CRR. Banks must map their assets to exposure classes and apply a 
specific risk weight. These so-called risk weighted assets (RWA) are then 
weighted with the solvency ratio of a minimum 8 % or above where applicable 
(European Parliament, 2013b). The result is the capital requirement banks 
governed by EU law must hold, thereby effectively limiting the overall risk a bank 
can take on in its books.  
Banks with large risk portfolios can opt for internal regulatory risk 
measurement approaches. With this option, they can quantify their financial risks 
more precisely compared to the standard models imposed externally by 
regulators (Allen, 2004). However, a disadvantage of the internal approaches is 
that many risk parameters must be defined by the banks internally which leaves 
room for misjudgement or even manipulation. Internal approaches therefore need 
to be validated by regulatory authorities which is a time-consuming and costly 
process. For regulatory risk disclosure and the scoring model, internal 
approaches are an important area for quality evaluation. Investors are aware of 
the inherent judgement problems and expect detailed comments and 
explanations on model parameters, main methodologies and results. 
The CRR (European Parliament, 2013b) further divides credit risk and 
market risk portfolios into outright assets such as credit exposures or equities, 
and derivatives whose value is conditional on that of the underlying assets (Hull, 
2018). Although derivatives are notional (not nominal) contracts, their trading 
volume and risk can substantially surpass that of the underlying assets. This 
being the case, regulatory authorities as well as investors are especially 
concerned about these derivative instruments and expect extensive disclosure 




The financial crisis of 2008 shifted regulatory attention further to asset-
backed securities (ABS), a special class of financial products with market and 
credit risks based on traditional loan exposures (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2009). ABS can take on various forms and are often subsumed as 
securitisations. The massive default on ABS instruments was one of the main 
reasons for the financial crisis in addition to liquidity problems (Enhanced 
Disclosure Task Force, 2012). For increasing transparency in these exposures, 
regulators set up a separate disclosure category where investors can find 
consolidated information.  
Liquidity risks and a group of other risks such as unencumbered assets 
and leverage do not need to be supported by a bank’s own funds, but regulatory 
minimum ratios must be met. The purpose of these minimum ratios is to make 
banks more resilient towards external shocks in the market. In the case of 
liquidity, these minimum ratios differentiate between short term (liquidity 
coverage ratio - LCR) and medium to long-term (net stable funding ratio - NSFR) 
orientation. 
Lastly, a special case is the subject “remuneration” in the regulatory risk 
framework. During the 2008 financial crisis several banks were heavily criticised 
for paying high management bonuses despite being close to failure or even being 
bailed out with taxpayers’ money (European Parliament, 2010). There was 
substantial public interest in cutting off excessive bonus payments that could 
pose a material risk to the sustainability of a bank. As a result, banks are urged 
to disclose their remuneration policies in regulatory risk reports. 
In summary, the regulatory risk framework imposes a wide range of rules 
and regulations for disclosure on financial risks that banks must comply with. 
Banks must disclose their exposures and how they measure and manage them. 
There are also several options available for non-standardised risk measurement 
(e.g., internal approaches) where banks can choose which model best fits their 
risk profile. Whenever this is the case, there is ample room for additional 
quantitative and qualitative disclosures for explaining methods and procedures 
applied. Evaluating and assessing the quality of these disclosures is one of the 
challenges the proposed disclosure scoring model faces. 
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4.3.3 Content of Regulatory Risk Disclosure in the EU  
After the discussion of the general risk framework of banks and the 
regulatory risk framework in the two preceding sections, this section now explores 
in detail the content to be disclosed in banks’ regulatory risk disclosure reports 
according to the EU regulations. This section is part of the coding rulebook (see 
5.5) as it includes the content that coders can expect in regulatory risk disclosure 
reports, and that later gets evaluated by the disclosure scoring model.   
The international Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
published several recommendations (see section 2.3.3.1) on how best to disclose 
risk information to shareholders and other interested market participants. The 
original ground-breaking consultative document was issued in June 2006. A 
revised framework for the “International Convergence of Capital Measurement 
and Capital Standards” (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006b) was 
compiled and put up for discussion and comments. Part four of this document 
(pages 226 – 242) specifically addresses risk disclosure issues and suggests 
possible contents and formats. Banks may voluntarily follow these 
recommendations. 
The guidelines of the BCBS have the character of recommendations and 
are not immediately legally binding. Within the EU, BCBS disclosure 
recommendations are transferred in EU law in the form of the CRD IV/CRR legal 
package which came into force on 17 July 2013 (“CRD IV”) and 28 June 2013 
(“CRR”). By choosing the form of an EU regulation, there is no further adoption 
into national law of member states required (“single rulebook” of the common 
European market) (European Banking Authority, 2018). The CRD IV/CRR fully 
substitutes national banking regulations, thereby providing a level playing field for 
banking services in the EU (Morrison & White, 2009). The start of the first 
reporting period of the new legal package was scheduled for 1 January 2014. The 
first annual disclosure reports covering the year 2014 were therefore dated 31 
December 2014.  
Regulatory disclosure requires the publication of quantitative (regulatory 
and financial data) and qualitative (explanations and comments) information on 
risk management, regulatory capital, and risks (see for example the disclosure 
report of HSBC Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation (2018)). The reports 
must be prepared on a consolidated level and with an annual frequency (only a 
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subset of key figures must be published quarterly if certain thresholds apply). 
Furthermore, for significant subsidiaries, key capital ratios must be disclosed. 
Internal auditing on the accuracy of the disclosure content must be performed 
formally regarding processes and responsibilities, but not materially on regulatory 
figures (Becker et al., 2012).  
Figure 20 summarises the structure of the regulatory risk disclosure 
requirements of the CRR.  
 
 
Figure 20: Overview disclosure in the CRR  
 
Disclosure by institutions is regulated in part eight of the CRR (European 
Parliament, 2013b) in articles 431 to 455 as follows:  
• The general principles of risk disclosure are laid out in Title 1. They primarily 
comprise qualitative issues such as the description of the risk policy and 
management, and the risk profile of banks.  
• The criteria on transparency and disclosure for various risk exposures follow 
in Title 2. Under this headline, disclosures on own funds and standard 
approaches for risk exposures in the credit, market and operational risk area 
are compiled.  
• Finally, the last part in Title 3 includes the qualifying requirements for the use 
of particular instruments or methodologies (internal approaches). Banks can 
opt for using internal risk measurement approaches, thereby substituting the 
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(default) standard risk approaches (European Parliament, 2013b). If a bank 
chooses to do so, it must disclose an extensive list of additional model 
parameters and supporting comments and explanations on their 
measurement approaches. 
Table 2 summarises the main contents of risk disclosures in the CRR. 
Articles not listed in the right column of this table are not relevant for risk 
disclosure. 
 
Title I General principles  
• Adoption of a formal policy  
• Assessment of appropriateness of disclosure  
• Comprehensiveness assessment of risk profile 
Art. 431 – 
434 CRR 
Title II Technical criteria on transparency and disclosure   
General overview of risk management objectives and policies Art. 435 
Disclosure on own funds (capital) Art. 437 
Disclosure on capital requirements  Art. 438 
Disclosure on counterparty credit risk Art. 439 
Disclosure on credit risk and adjustments Art. 442 
Disclosure on market risk exposures Art. 445 
Disclosure on operational risks Art. 446 
Disclosure on equity exposures not included in the trading book Art. 447 
Disclosure to interest rate risk not included in the trading book Art. 448 
Disclosure on securitisation exposures Art. 449 
Disclosure on the remuneration policy Art. 450 
Disclosure on leverage Art. 451 
Title III Qualifying requirements for the use of particular 
instruments or methodologies 
 
Disclosure on the use of an internal model (IRB) for credit risk Art. 452 
Disclosure on the use of credit risk mitigation techniques Art. 453 
Disclosure on the use of an internal model (AMA) for oper. risk Art. 454 
Disclosure on the use of an internal model for market risk Art. 455 




In the next section the main contents of each CRR article are outlined. 
They cover all issues that a reader (the “principal”, as defined in agency theory) 
may expect from a regulatory risk disclosure report. The quality of such a report 
depends on how well a bank communicates the mandatory and voluntary parts 
of information. The scoring model developed in this thesis relies on this content 
when it measures the quality of disclosure reports. 
4.3.4 Content Overview on Risk Disclosure in the CRR  
The general principles of risk disclosures in Title 1 form a central part of 
regulatory risk disclosures (Becker et al., 2012). They cover only four CRR 
articles but define the scope of disclosure reports. The scope of disclosure (Art. 
431 CRR) comprises all institutions that are subject to the banking regulations of 
the CRR. The top consolidated legal entity, usually the corporate headquarter or 
the holding company, is required to publish the regulatory risk disclosure reports 
on a consolidated basis (Kasprowicz & Klopf, 2016). The proposed scoring model 
will therefore focus only on this level.  
At minimum, banks must publicly disclose all information that is required 
in the regulation. An exception exists only for non-material, proprietary or 
confidential information (Art. 432 CRR). Institutions must formally comply with the 
CRR disclosure framework, therefore forming the mandatory part of risk 
disclosure (Art. 431(1)).  
In addition, banks must adopt a formal policy for assessing the 
appropriateness of their risk disclosures (Kasprowicz & Klopf, 2016). Art. 431(3) 
CRR states that they must assess whether their risk disclosures “… convey the 
risk profile comprehensively to market participants” (European Parliament, 
2013b). Whenever this is not the case, “… institutions shall publicly disclose the 
information necessary in addition to that required in accordance with that 
regulation” (European Parliament, 2013b). This fall-back rule opens the doors for 
any voluntary risk disclosure. Institutions are responsible to disclose whatever 
additional information they deem necessary for communicating their 
comprehensive risk profile to market participants. The proposed scoring model 
measures the quality of information provided, regardless of whether banks follow 
a minimalist or a more open disclosure policy.  
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The scope of disclosure is limited by three dimensions namely materiality, 
non-proprietary and non-confidentiality (Art. 432 CRR). Only material information 
shall be disclosed. Information is regarded as material if the omission of the 
information would alter the economic decisions of market participants. The 
interest of the institutions is considered through the non-proprietary requirement. 
Information is regarded as proprietary if disclosing it would undermine the 
institution’s competitive position in the market. The interest of external 
stakeholders is taken care of in the confidentiality clause. Information shall not be 
disclosed if a confidentiality agreement between the institution and a customer 
exists and disclosure would breach this contract. Still, where appropriate, the 
institution should aim at disclosing more general information avoiding the 
identification of individual contracts or relationships (Becker et al., 2012). 
The next two CRR articles, 433 and 434, cover the frequency and the 
means of disclosure. Banks face the trade-off between publishing regulatory risk 
disclosure reports frequently as financial markets can move quickly, and the 
associated substantial costs for preparing these reports (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2015). The minimum frequency of regulatory risk disclosure 
reports is annually in conjunction with the annual reports prepared for financial 
reporting (Art. 433 CRR). A more frequent disclosure policy shall be taken into 
consideration in case the characteristics of an institution’s business activities 
justify quicker responses to changes in market conditions. At the current status 
of development, the proposed disclosure scoring model is based on an annual 
publication of disclosure reports. 
Risk disclosure reports need to be easily accessible to interested parties. 
The means of disclosure are recommended in Art. 434 CRR. A study conducted 
by the EBA (2020) has found that market participants prefer to find all relevant 
disclosure contents in one place, usually in one document published online on an 
institution’s website under the investor relations section. Institutions face the 
challenge that disclosure does not become too redundant in a sense that 
disclosure requirements from IFRS reporting, corporate governance reporting,  or 
stock exchange listings tend to be quite similar to regulatory reporting in certain 
areas (e.g., equity, credit risk adjustments or the risk discussion in the MD&A 
section of an annual report) (EBA, 2020). However, often the conceptual 
perspective (profitability and financial position in annual reports versus risk in 
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regulatory reports) and the data basis differs between these reporting 
frameworks. Therefore, regulatory risk disclosure reports should be self-
contained and published in one place. Only where necessary should references 
to other sources be made.  
The criteria on transparency and disclosure for various risk exposures are 
discussed in Title 2 of the CRR. The regulation uses the term “technical criteria”. 
Yet, the term is misleading. In the beginning, this part demands a general 
overview of risk management objectives and policies that summarise the overall 
risk profile of an institution. The content of this part is of high importance to the 
disclosure scoring model as this is the place where a bank explains its risk 
management approach (Becker et al., 2012). The part further includes all 
regulatory relevant risk categories ranging from credit risks to leverage risks (see 
Table 2: Disclosure categories in the CRR). It specifies the subjects market 
participants can expect in the risk disclosure reports.  
Disclosures on risk categories are regularly split into a quantitative tabular 
presentation of actual risk figures and an accompanying qualitative explanation 
and discussion of exposures. By and large, the extent of quantitative information 
is predefined, and banks have little room to adjust the reporting templates (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2015). However, banks enjoy much more 
freedom on the qualitative side. In their comments, they can decide whether they 
want to present just basic information on their risk exposures or provide a more 
detailed analysis.  
Art. 435 CRR outlines the main contents of this overview on risk 
management objectives and policies. The disclosures must primarily include the 
strategies an institution has defined to manage its risks and all processes that are 
in place to support the implementation of these strategies (Becker et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the bank must explain the organisational structure and the internal 
organisation of its risk management functions, supported by an organisation chart 
with information on decision-making power and authority and lines of reporting. 
Besides strategy, process and people, the institution must give information on the 
scope and nature of systems used for the calculation and reporting of risk 
exposures (European Parliament, 2013b). Effective risk management means 
actively monitoring and limiting risk exposures through hedging with offsetting 
positions or mitigating through collateral from counterparties. (Jorion, 2007). A 
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bank must disclose its policies for hedging and mitigating risks (Becker et al., 
2012) and the strategies and processes for monitoring the continuing 
effectiveness of the hedges and collateralised exposures (European Parliament, 
2013b). Finally, the responsibilities of management for the risk management 
function are set forth by two declarations management has to make. The 
management must assure that the internal risk management systems in place 
are adequate with regard to the institution’s risk profile and strategy. Additionally, 
a risk statement must be approved by management that describes the overall risk 
profile and how it interacts with the risk tolerance set by the institution’s governing 
bodies (European Parliament, 2013b). Both declarations are very relevant to the 
discussion on disclosure in agency theory as they both define the responsibilities 
of the “agents” for guaranteeing to the “principals” the correctness of the 
monitoring reports. Ultimately, it is a question of maintaining trust whether 
stakeholders “believe” the content presented in the reports (compare to a similar 
discussion on trust in corporate governance practice (Awolowo et al., 2019)).  
A bank must have enough own funds (equity capital) available to support 
its risks (Kuritzkes et al., 2002). This is achieved by first measuring the risk of its 
assets and then applying a minimum capital requirement. In technical terms, risk 
weights are applied to the exposures for calculating risk weighted assets (RWA) 
which are then set in relation to the available own funds. The resulting solvency 
ratio must be above a certain threshold which is at 8 % plus applicable add-ons 
(European Parliament, 2013b). An institution that falls below these minimum 
capital thresholds triggers a process that ultimately leads to the loss of its banking 
license. The models, rules and methods for calculating the solvency ratio are 
defined in the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) that builds on pillar 1 of 
the Basel III guidelines (European Parliament, 2013b).  
The quality of own funds is crucial for the resilience of a bank (Meneau & 
Sabatini, 2011). Institutions must disclose quantitative and qualitative information 
for all key risk and own funds categories investors need in order to understand 
the calculation of capital requirements. Several regulatory restrictions apply to the 
calculation of own funds eligible for regulatory purposes (Meneau & Sabatini, 
2011). Own funds are segregated into high-quality core capital (“Tier 1”) and 
lower-quality additional capital (“Tier 2”). Banks must disclose their own funds 
composition and explain any conditions that apply, especially in the case of 
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innovative, complex or hybrid capital instruments. An institution must also explain 
its approach to assessing the adequacy of its internal capital to support current 
and future operations (Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process ICAAP) 
(Buchmüller, 2019). Art. 436 to 438 CRR specify the disclosure requirements for 
own funds (European Parliament, 2013b). For each risk category, the risk 
weighted assets (RWA) and the required capital must be disclosed. This 
disclosure requirement is particularly important for this thesis. The proposed 
regulatory risk disclosure model requires the weighting of disclosures scores per 
risk category with their relative proportions of total risk (see section 4.5.3). These 
proportions are taken from this disclosure requirement. 
For many banks, credit risk is the single most important risk category 
(European Central Bank, 2018). The disclosure on credit risk (Art. 442) must 
provide external stakeholders with a wide range of information on the total credit 
exposure which is the outstanding credit balance after any specific and general 
credit provisions have been made (Jorion, 2007). Banks must disclose 
information on the specific nature of the exposures (geographic distribution, 
break down by industry and counterparty type) and the methods applied for 
capital assessment and evaluation of the reliability of the information disclosed. 
In addition to an extensive quantitative disclosure, the focus is on the qualitative 
discussion of current and future credit risks. Furthermore banks must explain how 
they integrate their current credit risk profile in their overall credit risk 
management policy (European Parliament, 2013b). The use of an internal credit 
risk model makes the disclosure requirements much more complex (Servigny, 
2004). Banks must explain and review the structure of their internal rating system, 
the use of other internal parameter estimates, the process for managing and 
recognising credit risk mitigation, and the control mechanisms for the rating 
systems with respect to independence, accountability, and the rating system 
(European Parliament, 2013b). 
Counterparty credit risk is a special kind of credit risk where the risk of a 
derivative instrument depends on the value of an underlying instrument (Cannata 
& Quagliariello, 2011), whereas traditional credit risk is based on the outstanding 
nominal balances of loans or similar products (Hull, 2018). Usually, the nominal 
of the contract is not exchanged but only used as a notional amount for 
calculating cash flows (Art. 439 CRR). Most derivative instruments such as 
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futures, options and swaps follow this logic, resulting in notional volumes of 
derivative positions becoming very high. However, the credit exposure is limited 
to the actual interest and currency cash flows on the derivative (Hull, 2018). 
Banks must disclose the methodologies used to assign regulatory and economic 
capital to counterparty credit exposures together with an explanation of how the 
credit limitation process is implemented (European Parliament, 2013b). 
An encumbered asset is an asset that is pledged to secure, collateralise 
or credit-enhance any on-balance-sheet or off-balance-sheet transaction from 
which it cannot be freely withdrawn (European Banking Authority, 2014). Banks 
must separate their assets into those that are used to support existing funding or 
collateral requirements with central banks and emergency liquidity assistance 
provided by central banks, and those that are available for potential funding 
needs (Art. 443 CRR). Investors prefer unencumbered assets in case of 
economic and financial crisis as these assets can be freely manipulated by the 
bank without being constrained by other investors’ rights (Banal-Estanol et al., 
2017). Institutions must disclose narrative information on the impact of their 
business model on their level of encumbrance and the importance of 
encumbrance in their funding model (Art. 443 CRR). 
Market risk is the second most important risk category for banks (European 
Central Bank, 2018). The CRR allows banks to decide whether they prefer to use 
a standardised approach for measuring their market risks or to use an internal 
Value-at-Risk approach (Becker et al., 2012). The content of the disclosure on 
the standardised approach is regulated in Art. 445 CRR. Banks must split their 
market risk measurement into interest rate risk, equity position risk, foreign 
exchange risk, and commodity risk, and comment qualitatively on the exposures 
and trends with a focus on general and specific (issuer) market risks (European 
Parliament, 2013b). In case a bank has opted for an internal market risk model 
(Art. 455 CRR), the disclosure covers a wide range of model parameters and 
model validation rules. For each market risk portfolio banks must explain the 
characteristics of the model used as well as the methodologies applied, and the 
risks measured including migration and correlation risks. They must describe the 
stress testing applied to the portfolios, the approaches used for back-testing and 
the validation of the accuracy and consistency of the internal models and the 
modelling process (Becker et al., 2012). 
 
127 
Similar to the CRR regulations on credit and market risks, banks have the 
option to use a standardised (Art. 446 CRR) or internal (Art. 454 CRR) 
measurement approach for their operational risks. Banks must disclose the 
approach for their assessment of operational risk and describe any bank internal 
methodology they apply, together with a discussion of all relevant internal and 
external factors and parameters considered. Due to the fact that operational risk 
can be manifold in nature (see section 4.3.1), they must disclose the scope and 
coverage of any partial model use. In case of an (internal) advanced 
measurement approach (AMA), banks must describe any use of insurances or 
other risk transfer mechanisms for the purpose of mitigating their operational risks 
(Kinglsey et al., 1998). 
A bank can invest in equities with the sole objective to profit from short-
term price changes. Such positions need to be assigned to the trading book 
portfolio and the risk and capital charge is calculated based on Art. 445 CRR 
(standard approach) and Art. 455 CRR (internal model approach).  
Equity and interest rate bearing instruments with which banks pursue 
mainly strategic and participation objectives as opposed to making capital gains 
through trading activities are assigned to the banking book (Allen, 2004). Art. 447 
and 448 CRR require banks to disclose information on how they differentiate in 
assigning positions to the trading and banking book (European Parliament, 
2013b). Banks must make their investment objectives transparent and discuss 
the policies for their valuation and accounting, including the underlying valuation 
assumptions and eventual changes in accounting policies. 
Securitisation gained prominence in regulatory reporting over the past 
decade as it was considered one of the main factors that triggered the financial 
crisis in 2008 (Enhanced Disclosure Task Force, 2012). The information 
demanded by external stakeholders is high which is reflected in wide disclosure 
requirements (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011). In a 
securitisation agreement, non-tradable bank assets such as loan portfolios 
(mortgages, student or car loans) are converted into marketable securities (Culp, 
2012). Once securitised into asset-backed securities (ABS) banks can physically 
or synthetically sell these credit exposures to other investors, thereby reducing 
their credit and concentration risk. Investors in ABS benefit from risk 
diversification and higher returns for lower rated tranches but bear the risk of poor 
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quality and composition of the underlying loan portfolio (Culp, 2012). Art. 442 
CRR details which information banks must disclose on their securitisation 
positions. They must describe their securitisation objectives, the nature of other 
inherent risks such as liquidity risk, and the type of risks of the underlying assets 
with respect to seniority and re-securitisation (European Parliament, 2013b). 
Banks must further disclose their role in the securitisation process such as 
originator, investor or sponsor as well as the extent to which they are involved in 
each role. Finally, regulatory authorities expect banks to comment on all 
significant changes on quantitative disclosures since the last reporting period.  
Although not a classical risk category, management remuneration is added 
by regulatory authorities to the general disclosure requirements (Art. 450 CRR). 
Regulators are concerned that a remuneration policy not closely linked to risk 
management might induce managers to accept higher risk exposures by not 
being made accountable for eventual negative outcomes, which is a classic 
example for a moral hazard situation (Argimon et al., 2011). Remuneration of 
managers also plays an important role in agency theory in its attempt to reduce 
the information gap between agents and investors through aligning their financial 
interests. Banks must disclose their remuneration decisions and how the general 
remuneration policy is determined (European Parliament, 2013b). 
One of the fundamental constituents of the Basel III framework is the 
weighting of exposures with risk weights. Experience shows that in times of 
financial distress the actual losses exceeded by far the losses predicted by the 
regulatory risk weights (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2013). The 
build-up of excessive on- and off-balance sheet leverage in the banking system 
was identified as another cause of the 2008 financial crisis (Adkins, 2011). To 
cope with this adverse situation, banking authorities introduced a simple, 
transparent, non-risk-based leverage ratio (European Parliament, 2013b). The 
ratio is defined as the relationship between the eligible regulatory capital and the 
unweighted IFRS exposures (Adkins, 2011). The total amount of exposures must 
not exceed a bank’s capital by a certain percentage (3 % as of 2019). Banks must 
disclose the processes implemented to manage the risk of excessive leverage 
(Art. 451 CRR). They also must explain all factors that had an impact on the 
leverage ratio for the period to which it refers to.  
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Risk mitigation covers an important part of the risk management process 
(Art. 453). While taking risks is one of the core businesses of a bank there is also 
the need to actively manage the risk positions with risk mitigation techniques 
(Becker et al., 2012). Traditionally the acceptance of collateral and guarantees is 
the major source of risk mitigation. Banks must disclose in detail these risk 
mitigation instruments and describe the policies and processes for their on- and 
off-balance sheets netting agreements. Banks must also summarise the policies 
for collateral valuation and management as well as the types of collateral they 
are willing to accept. In case banks make use of credit derivatives or guarantor 
agreements they must disclose the main types and creditworthiness of the 
guarantors (European Parliament, 2013b). 
In summary, this section discussed the content of regulatory risk 
disclosures in CRR articles 431 to 455. The proposed regulatory risk disclosure 
scoring model measures the quality of these disclosures. As the discussion above 
shows, banks must describe their risk exposures, but also must explain and 
comment extensively on the current and future impact of the risks, their 
management, and the strategies they pursue with them. Banks have discretion 
on how to disclose the required risk information, and the quality of their 
disclosures will depend on how good they perform on this task. 
 
4.3.5 Mapping of Risk Exposures to Risk Categories 
In the first step of developing the scoring model, the content of the 
disclosure requirements in CRR articles 431 to 455 is consolidated to the risk 
categories reviewed in section 4.3.4 (see Table 3). The risk categories are the 
main input on the risk dimension for the scoring model developed in section 4.5.  
The mapping rules are as follows:  
• CRR articles with credit risk content are mapped to the risk category “credit 
risk” 
• CRR articles with market risk content are mapped to the risk category “market 
risk” 




• CRR articles with capital and risk management content are mapped to the 
category “risk management”, and 
• CRR articles with content that does not fall into any of the aforementioned 
categories are mapped to the risk category “other risks”. 
 
CRR disclosure requirements CRR 
articles 
Mapping to scoring 
model risk categories 
Title I General principles   
Formal policy, appropriateness, 
comprehensiveness of risk profile  
Art. 431 
- 434  
Risk management 
Title II Technical criteria on transparency and 
disclosure  
  
Risk management objectives and policies Art. 435 Risk management 
Own funds (capital) Art. 437 Risk management 
Capital requirements  Art. 438 Risk management 
Counterparty credit risk Art. 439 Credit risk 
Credit risk and adjustments Art. 442 Credit risk 
Market risk exposures Art. 445 Market risk 
Operational risks Art. 446 Operational risk 
Equity exposures not incl. in the trading book Art. 447 Credit risk 
Interest rate risk not incl. in the trading book Art. 448 Credit risk 
Securitisation exposures Art. 449 Market risks 
Remuneration policy Art. 450 Other risks 
Leverage Art. 451 Other risks 
Title III Qualifying requirements for the use of 
particular instruments or methodologies 
  
Internal model (IRB) for credit risk Art. 452 Credit risk 
Credit risk mitigation techniques Art. 453 Credit risk 
Internal model (AMA) for operational risk Art. 454 Operational risk 
Internal model for market risk Art. 455 Market risk 




4.4 Principles of High-Quality Disclosure  
The focus of this section is on how to analyse the quality of risk disclosure. 
The first part of this section summarises criticism of the current practices of 
disclosure and identifies areas for improvement. The second part reviews three 
initiatives for improvements. These initiatives have in common that they all aim 
to improve financial communication to stakeholders. They, therefore, contribute 
to the discussion of reducing the information gap as discussed in agency theory. 
However, the initiatives come from different areas, one from banking regulation 
(BCBS), one from financial accounting (IASB), and one from the finance (political)  
side (FSB). All these three organisations suggest several principles for better 
disclosure. In the third part of this section, the principles are contrasted, 
integrated, and consolidated into five quality criteria. Finally, the five quality 
criteria are analysed and explained in detail for their use in the development of 
the regulatory risk disclosure scoring model in section five. 
4.4.1 Challenges for Risk Disclosure  
At the 2017 conference on “The role of disclosure in risk assessment and 
enhancing the usefulness of corporate reporting in decision-making” organised 
by the United Nations Commission Trade and Development Board the following 
main concerns of users of risk disclosure reports were expressed. The concerns 
are relevant for all types of firms and not necessarily limited to financial 
institutions (UNCTAD, 2017). 
• Disclosures are dispersed within and across several disclosure reports of 
the firm. The reports also vary in quality and quantity and are also often 
leading to ambiguous situations where the discussions and explanations 
for similar cases are not reconciled across reports. 
• Disclosure reports of comparable firms are of different quantity and quality. 
Stakeholders are expected to benefit from being able to compare risk 
disclosure reports from their focus group. Therefore, homogeneous 
reports facilitate their tasks, while heterogeneous reports aggravate them. 
However, even similar firms within the same industry do not share identical 
business models, therefore requiring flexibility in their risk reporting and 
undermining comparability in good faith.  
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• Often generic and industry-specific language is used which is difficult to 
comprehend for outsiders. 
• Disclosure reports cover a long list of many potential risks but lack focus 
on materiality. To be on the safe side, firms tend to use boilerplate 
disclosures that cover all potential adverse scenarios but obfuscate the 
concrete material risks. Stakeholders, therefore, find it difficult to spot the 
risks that are more likely to materialise than others.  
• Disclosures are only descriptive without links to potential economic 
impacts. The evaluation of risks also carries some inherent subjectivity of 
the preparers. Moreover, evaluating the potential future economic impacts 
of the risks makes the risk reports even more subjective. Therefore, firms 
tend to refrain from subjective evaluations while understanding that 
evaluations would add value to the reader’s comprehension of the firm’s 
risk profile.  
• Users face the trade-off between the public wish for transparency and a 
justified interest of the firm for confidentiality.  
 
The concerns mentioned above are not solely those of the users of risk 
reports. Also, the preparers of reports often must make subjective decisions on 
how to disclose their risks. By the very nature of risks, they tend to be difficult to 
assess quantitatively and qualitatively. Consequently, firms favour 
comprehensive, but generic disclosures over concise future-oriented reports in 
order to avoid misinterpretations and criticism for omissions or even litigation 
(UNCTAD, 2017).  
4.4.2 Initiatives for Improvements of Risk Disclosure Reports 
In recent years, three major initiatives were taken to address the concerns 
about disclosure and suggest improvements for risk disclosure reports. The 
initiatives cover different areas of risk reporting. The International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) promotes improvements for all firms that must follow 
IFRS accounting rules. The Financial Stability Board’s (FSB) role is to promote 
banks’ transparency in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. Lastly, the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) suggests improvements from the 
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Figure 21: Initiatives for quality improvements of disclosure 
 
Each organisation has published a list of several principles that are 
summarised in tables Table 4 to Table 8 below. The principles are partly 
overlapping and can be consolidated into five quality criteria.  
A broad-based initiative is undertaken by the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) for the improvement of disclosures in financial reports 
(IFRS). The project called “Disclosure Initiative” was started after a public 
discussion forum on Financial Reporting Disclosure in 2013. Feedback received 
from participants identified a need for substantial improvements in risk and 
general disclosures. In particular, disclosures were viewed as being little effective 
in communicating risk exposures to stakeholders. The project pursues two goals. 
First, firms should be supported by applying better judgement to their reporting, 
and second, the effectiveness of disclosures to stakeholders such as investors, 
lenders and other creditors should be improved. By March 2017, the project 
reached a milestone by publishing its discussion paper “Principles of Disclosure” 
(International Accounting Standards Board, 2017). This paper establishes seven 
principles for high-quality disclosure that provide firms with guidance on 
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improving the effectiveness of their disclosures. The Disclosure Initiative project 
is still ongoing and will run until 2021. 
While the IASB Disclosure Initiative is of a general nature focusing on all 
kinds of IFRS disclosures for various industry sectors, the second initiative is 
targeting risk disclosures of banks specifically. The Enhanced Disclosure Task 
Force (EDTF) was established by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) in 2012 after 
the turmoil of the 2008 financial crisis. Investors’ trust and confidence in banks 
was deemed low and better risk disclosures were an important step towards 
rebuilding resilient relationships. The goal of the task force was to provide firms 
with a “foundation for developing high-quality, transparent disclosures that clearly 
communicate banks’ business models and the risks that arise from them” 
(Enhanced Disclosure Task Force, 2012). The task force claims that the 
composition of its member groups from users (investors, analysts, rating 
agencies), supervisors (international regulators, standard setters, auditors) and 
preparers (banks) leads to an integrated perspective on improvements of risk 
disclosures in the banking sector. In 2012, the task force published its final report 
“Enhancing the Risk Disclosures of Banks” with several recommendations 
(Enhanced Disclosure Task Force, 2012). The recommendations were published 
in seven fundamental principles. They address the main disclosure concerns of 
users in the area of understanding banks’ business models, the key risks and 
their measurement, the banks’ liquidity positions, the calculations of banks’ risk-
weighted assets (RWA) and the changes in both RWA’s and regulatory capital. 
Further concerns were the relationship between market risk and balance sheet 
measures, and loan forbearances with respect to impaired and non-performing 
loans. 
The practical recommendations of the EDTF were taken into consideration 
and followed-up by the leading international standard setter for the banking sector 
when work was started to improve Basel III pillar 3 disclosure requirements by 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). In January 2015 the BCBS 
published its final version on “Revised Pillar 3 disclosure requirements” (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2015). The paper includes five guiding 
principles that aim to make regulatory risk disclosures more effective. The 
overarching goal of the five principles is to “provide meaningful regulatory 
information to investors and other interested parties” (Basel Committee on 
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Banking Supervision, 2015) on a basis that is internally and externally consistent 
and comparable among banks. Investors and other market participants should be 
put in a position to better understand a bank’s business model and its inherent 
risks, and benefit from comparative studies in the banking sector. 
Tables Table 4 to Table 8 summarise the disclosure principles suggested 
by each of the three organisations (IASB, FSB and BCBS). Due to the importance 
of the regulatory standard setter BCBS for this thesis, the seven principles of the 
IASB and the FSB are then mapped to the five principles of the BCBS, before 




Table 4 compares principles from the IASB, the FSB and BCBS that can be consolidated into a quality criterion “readability”. 
 
Principles for “readability” 
IASB  FSB BCBS 
IASB Principle 2) Information should 
described as simply and directly as 
possible 
• no loss of material information 
• no unnecessary increase in length 
IASB Principle 5) No unnecessary 
duplication of information, material 
information only 
IASB Principle 7) Appropriate format of 
information, narrative text vs. tables for 
data-intensive information 
FSB Principle 1) Disclosures should be 
clear, balanced and understandable 
• Communication suitable to a range 
of users from sophisticated to less 
specialised  
• Appropriate balance between 
qualitative and quantitative 
disclosures 
• Explanations for more complex 
issues 
BCBS Principle 1) Disclosures should 
be clear 
• presented in an understandable 
form to key stakeholders 
• communicated through an 
accessible medium 
• highlighting important messages  
• explaining complex issues in 
simple language and definition of 
important terms  
• presenting related risk information 
in one place 
Table 4: Principles related to “readability”
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Table 5 compares principles from the IASB, the FSB and BCBS that can be consolidated into a quality criterion 
“comprehensiveness”. 
 
Principles for “comprehensiveness” 
IASB  FSB BCBS 
IASB Principle 1) 
Disclosure shall be entity-
specific  
• no "boilerplate" 
language 
 
IASB Principle 7) 
Appropriate format of 
information 
narrative text vs. tables for 
data-intensive information 
FSB Principle 2) Disclosures should be 
comprehensive and include all of the 
bank's key activities and risks. 
• Overview of the bank's activities and 
key risks 
• Informative explanations of important 
processes and procedures for a 
bank's business and risk management 
• Information about key underlying 
assumptions and sensitivity/scenario 
analysis 
BCBS Principle 2) Disclosures should be 
comprehensive 
• describe bank's main activities and risks 
• include sufficient information in both qualitative 
and quantitative terms on processes and 
procedures for identifying, measuring and 
managing risks 
• reflect on how senior management and the 
board of directors internally assess and 
manage risk and strategy (risk 
tolerance/appetite) 
Table 5: Principles related to “comprehensiveness”
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Table 6 compares principles from the IASB, the FSB and BCBS that can be consolidated into a quality criterion “meaningfulness”. 
 
Principles for “meaningfulness” 
IASB  FSB BCBS 
IASB Principle 3) Highlight and 
emphasise important matters  
• Based on disclosures that are used 
for internal decision-making and risk 
management 
• Explanation of the risk and rewards 
profile of a bank's activities 
• Balance of confidentiality and 
materiality 
 
IASB Principle 4) Links where and when 
relevant to other information and 
highlighting relationships 
FSB Principle 3) Disclosures should present 
relevant information 
• Only material information that reflects a 
bank's activities and risks and that can be 
prepared without unreasonable cost 
• Avoid generic or boilerplate disclosures 
• Information should be provided in the 
sufficient detail to enable users to 
understand the nature and extent of a 
bank's risks. 
• Explanation of the business model to 
provide the context for the business and 
risk disclosures. 
• FSB Principle 4) Disclosures should reflect 
how the bank manages its risks 
BCBS Principle 3) Disclosures 
should be meaningful 
• Highlight the most significant 
current and emerging risks 
• Include information that is 
likely to receive market 
attention 
• make references to financial 
statements where necessary 
• avoid information that does 
not add value 
• remove information that is 
no longer meaningful or 
relevant 
Table 6: Principles related to “meaningfulness”
 
139 
Table 7 compares principles from the IASB, the FSB and BCBS that can be consolidated into a quality criterion “time 
comparison”. 
Principles for “time comparison” 
IASB  FSB BCBS 
IASB Principle 6b) Optimised 
comparability across reporting 
periods without compromising 
usefulness 
FSB Principle 5) Disclosures should 
be consistent over time 
• Core disclosures should not 
change dramatically but should 
evolve over time 
• Changes should be clearly 
highlighted and explained. 
BCBS Principle 5) Disclosures should be 
comparable over time 
• identify trends in risk profiles 
• explain additions, deletions and changes 
from previous reports 
• highlight and explain changes from bank's 
specific, regulatory or market developments 
Table 7: Principles related to “time comparison” 
 
Table 8 compares principles from the IASB, the FSB and BCBS that can be consolidated into a quality criterion “sector 
comparison”. 
Principles for “sector comparison” 
IASB  FSB BCBS 
IASB Principle 6a) Optimised 
comparability among entities 
without compromising usefulness 
• FSB Principle 6) 
Disclosures should be 
comparable among 
banks 
BCBS Principle 4) Disclosures should be consistent 
across sector 
Comparisons across banks and jurisdictions for business 
activities, prudential metrics, risks and risk management 
Table 8: Principles related to “sector comparison” 
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For the sake of completeness, FSB Principle 7 “Disclosures should be provided 
on a timely and frequent basis in appropriate media” was not mapped in tables 
Table 4 to Table 8 as it is a technical principle that is implicitly taken into 
account in disclosure reporting through the implementation of Art. 433 CRR. 
The tabular comparisons of the principles of the three leading standard 
setters and policymakers in tables Table 4 to Table 8 show that the principles are 
of quite similar nature and can be consolidated into five overarching themes. 
Even though each organisation pursues different goals and addresses different 
stakeholder groups with their disclosure principles, they share a common 
understanding of the constituents of high-quality disclosures. 
 
 
Figure 22: Five criteria for high-quality disclosure 
 
The five criteria readability, comprehensiveness, meaningfulness, time 
comparability and sector comparability as summarised in Figure 22 are the result 
of the consolidation of principles, and build the basis for the evaluation of the 
quality of the regulatory risk disclosure reports in the proposed scoring model. It 
is argued that a bank that scores high in each of these five criteria is assumed to 
release high-quality disclosures to its stakeholders and benefit from lower agency 




4.4.3 Analysis of the Criteria for High-Quality Disclosure 
In this section, the five quality criteria identified in Figure 22 and the key 
findings from the comparison and integration from tables Table 4 to Table 8 are 
summarised. The focus is on the disclosure guidelines of the BCBS as this thesis 
is about regulatory risk disclosure (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
2015). The BCBS guidelines are enriched with findings from the IASB and FSB 
where appropriate. 
4.4.3.1 Quality Criterion 1: Readability - Disclosures Should be clear  
The quality criterion readability can be viewed from two perspectives. One 
perspective covers the reading skills of the users of a text. Regulatory risk 
disclosure reports are usually read by a rather small group of stakeholders who 
are familiar with the peculiarities of the financial and banking language. However, 
regulators are worried about an extensive use of “technical” financial language in 
the reports (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2015). The use of such 
language can easily blur the important messages in the report. Regulators require 
preparers of reports to use “clear” language. The term “clarity” in this context 
refers to the form of the disclosure. Disclosure should be understandable to the 
key stakeholders such as investors, analysts, and banking customers. Banking-
specific language should be avoided when explaining complex issues. In case 
technical language is required, then important terms should be clearly defined 
and explained. 
The other perspective is the presentation of the content itself. The 
disclosure report should be easily accessible through a bank’s website (EBA, 
2020). It should usually be located under the headings “investor relations” and/or 
“financial and regulatory reporting”20 (or similar). In the disclosure report, crucial 
information should be highlighted and not hidden throughout an exhaustive report 
(often, reports are about 100 to 200 pages). Disclosures should be compact and 
not unnecessarily long. A good balance between quantitative figures and 
qualitative explanations and comments should be aimed for, and related 
information should be presented together in one place (EBA, 2020). 
 







4.4.3.2 Quality Criterion 2: Comprehensiveness – Disclosures Should be 
Complete 
The criterion comprehensiveness covers the quantity of disclosed 
information. Regulators aim to ascertain that a bank provides a complete and 
comprehensive view of their risk profile. Disclosure should include all business 
areas and attached significant risks, and not omit any important information. 
Managerial judgement should be used for decision-making on the disclosure 
content. Risks should be supported by relevant data and management 
comments. Changes in activities and risk exposures over time should be made 
transparent and explained if of material nature (see also quality criterion 4). 
Disclosures should offer a sufficient level of quantitative and qualitative details 
that are linked to the complexity of a bank’s operations. Furthermore, users 
should be able to easily understand how risks are identified, measured and 
managed (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2015).  
In regulatory reporting and disclosure, the methods for risk assessment 
are prescribed externally by regulatory authorities. However, banks also have 
their internal risk management policies and regulations. A discussion on internal 
and external risk management approaches should therefore be included. It 
should also reflect the risk tolerance and appetite of the senior management as 
well as the internal strategies of how the bank plans to manage the risks. 
4.4.3.3 Quality Criterion 3: Meaningfulness - Disclosures Should be Useful to 
Users 
Meaningfulness refers to the content of the disclosure itself. Information is 
meaningful if it receives considerate market attention (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2015). Only information that is relevant and material for the 
decision-making of external users should be included. Information that is not 
deemed relevant or no longer relevant should be left out.  
Disclosure reports tend to become exhaustive. Therefore, users should be 
supported in their evaluation process by highlighting the most important current 
and future risks, and how they are managed by the bank. Information should not 
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be hidden throughout the report making it impossible for the user to gain a full 
understanding of the overall risk exposure. 
Regulatory risk disclosure is an important information source, but only one 
of several sources that convey risk information to stakeholders (see section 
2.3.4). Users would benefit from an integrated view so, where possible, regulatory 
information should be linked to information in other reports such as financial and 
non-financial statements. 
4.4.3.4 Quality Criterion 4: Time Comparability - Disclosures Should be 
Consistent  
Business areas and risks change over time. Therefore, disclosure reports 
should reflect these changes and be regularly adjusted for content and structure. 
Users should be able to trace the ongoing changes. Still, continuous structural 
changes in a disclosure report pose a problem to the users. It makes it nearly 
impossible for them to spot trends in banks’ risk profiles and risk appetite by 
continuously having to adjust to new formats of presentation.  
Banks should prepare disclosure reports that are consistent over time. 
Structural changes, and even more important changes in risk exposures, should 
be explained with quantitative period-by-period comparisons and qualitative 
comments. These comments should not only address the current situation but 
also the changes from the previous periods. Any further additions and deletions 
from one report to the next should be highlighted and explained.  
4.4.3.5 Quality Criterion 5: Sector Comparability - Disclosures Should be 
Comparable across Banks 
For a user it is important to understand the risk exposure of a certain bank. 
However, it is also useful to be able to evaluate a bank’s risk exposures with 
respect to that of other competing banks in the market. Business intelligence 
about a bank can be gained from individual reports but also from comparisons 
with other banks’ disclosure reports. Due to the fact that, so far, only 
recommendations were given on report structures and detail levels, disclosure 
reports tend to be formally very different21. A shared structure and the detail level 
 
21 As it is for instance the case in Germany with the Deutsche Bundesbank “Anwendungs-
beispiele” (best practice examples). 
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enable external users to compare and rank banks and ultimately help them in 
investment decision-making. A minimum of standardisation of reporting formats 






4.5 Development of the Disclosure Scoring Model 
In this section, the regulatory risk disclosure scoring model is developed. 
The section draws on the results from the previous sections. In particular, it takes 
the findings from section 4.3 on regulatory risk categories and combines it with 
the findings from section 4.4 on quality criteria.  
In the first part of this section, the structure and the processing workflow 
of the model is explained. The second part operationalises the quality criteria. For 
each quality criterion, one or more empirical indicators are suggested. Then,  
mathematical algorithms are developed that calculate a disclosure score for each 
criterion. In the final part, the calculation of the composite disclosure score 
representing the combined score on all quality criteria for a disclosure report is 
described.  
4.5.1 The Scoring Model Structure and Processing Workflow 
The risk disclosure scoring model is a two-dimensional model that 
measures the quality of banks’ regulatory risk disclosure reports (Figure 23).  
One dimension of the model is the risk dimension. This dimension 
comprises the financial and non-financial risks that are regularly communicated  
in the disclosure reports. The other dimension is the quality dimension. Quality 
makes a risk disclosure report effective in achieving its information purpose.  
The risk dimension (see section 4.3.3) is divided into five categories, 
namely risk management, credit risk, market risk, operational risk, and other risks 
(including leverage, liquidity, and non-financial risks). These categories follow the 
regulatory structure that can be found in the Basel III guidelines where calculation 
rules and methods are defined for each of the risks and reported separately 
(European Parliament, 2013b).  
The quality dimension (see section 4.4.3) is also split up into five 
categories, namely readability, comprehensiveness, meaningfulness, time 
comparability, and sector comparability. The quality categories are the result of 
the consolidation of recommendations and guidelines of the leading standard 
setters and policymakers (IASB, EDTF of the FSB, BCBS) in the finance and 
banking industry (see 4.4.3). 
Regulatory risk disclosure reports consist of quantitative and qualitative 
parts. In the quantitative part, regulatory figures are published in a standardised 
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format of tables and templates. There is little difference in their presentation from 
one bank to another, and banks find it difficult to distinguish them from each other. 
The qualitative part, on the other hand, makes the difference when evaluating the 
quality of a disclosure report. Within broad limits (see section 4.3.3), banks are 
free to choose the reporting quality level they deem appropriate for their risk 
profile. Some banks are reluctant, while others are more willing to disclose 
information. In current disclosure reports, the qualitative parts cover about two 
thirds of disclosures and differ substantially from bank to bank (EBA, 2020). The 
proposed scoring model, therefore, focuses on the evaluation of these qualitative 
parts.  
Figure 23 introduces the framework of the risk disclosure scoring model.  
 
 
Figure 23: The two-dimensional risk disclosure scoring model 
 
On the horizontal axis the risk dimension is plotted. The vertical axis shows 
the quality dimension. Each dimension consists of five categories.  
The basis of the model are banks’ regulatory risk disclosure reports. The 
model requires structured input from these reports. A report normally consists of 
all five risk categories as plotted on the horizontal axis, but not necessarily in an 
orderly manner. Therefore, the relevant qualitative text passages must be 
extracted from the reports and assigned to each risk category (see section 4.3.5). 
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The model then applies the five quality criteria on the vertical axis to the 
content of the risk categories on the horizontal axis. This is done by first 
operationalising each quality criterion. Empirical indicators are identified for this 
purpose which proxy each quality criterion well. The definition of these empirical 
indicators is an important task to ensure the validity and reliability of the model 
(see 4.5.2).  
In the existing literature (see section 2.4) it is discussed how to measure 
disclosure quality in a complete, valid, and reliable way (Miihkinen, 2011). Beretta 
& Bozzolan (2004) initiated a stream of academic research to develop empirical 
indicators that provide useful approximations of important quality aspects of risk 
disclosure. The proposed risk disclosure scoring model makes use of some of 
these indicators, develops some further, and suggests new indicators where 
important quality aspects are not covered by existing indicators. Table 9 
summarises the quality criteria, the assigned empirical indicators and provides 
additional information on the qualitative or quantitative research method applied. 
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The processing logic of the scoring model in Figure 23 calculates for each 
knot on the grid an individual score where a knot represents a “risk-quality” pair 
of a risk category and a quality criterion. For example, the second left point with 
the coordinates (2|5) measures the readability (quality criterion) for the disclosure 
on credit risk (risk category) with the Gunning-Fog index (empirical indicator). 
Once all individual scores for the risk-quality pairs are processed, they are 
condensed into scores for each risk category. Figure 24 explains this process. 
For each risk category (column “risk dimension”) five individual quality scores 
(column “quality dimension”) are calculated. The five quality scores per risk 
category are then weighted arithmetically to result in one quality score per risk 
category. An arithmetical weighting of the quality criteria is applied so that all 
quality criteria are treated equally (“quality criteria weighting”), and no quality 
criterion is superior to the others (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
2015). 
 
Figure 24: Process of composite score calculation 
 
The final composite disclosure score to the right in Figure 24 is calculated 
by taking each score per risk category and weighting it with the risk’s relative 
proportion to the total risk of the bank  (“risk category weighting”). This is 
necessary as not every risk category is of the same importance to each bank. 
Traditional banks, for instance, tend to be credit risk oriented, while investment 
banks experience higher levels of market risks (see section 4.3.1). This weighting 
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procedure expands the weighting process of other scoring models (e.g., Beretta 
& Bozzolan, 2004). Such models often settle on taking simple arithmetic means 
for weighting risk categories. In this model, each score per risk category is 
weighted with its proportion relative to the total RWA (risk weighted assets) of the 
bank (see section 2.4.2.1), therefore taking into account the risk factors as a 
control variable. The result of the model is the composite disclosure score that 
represents the quality of a specific bank regulatory risk disclosure report. 
 
4.5.2 Operationalisation of the Quality Criteria 
All five quality criteria (see section 4.4.3) must first be operationalised 
before they can be applied to the risk categories. In this section, at least one 
empirical indicator is suggested for each quality criterion. The equations for 
calculating indicator values are defined in a way that a higher value means higher 
quality (see below). All indicator results are scaled to a range between 0 and 1 
so that they become comparable to each other (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008).  
4.5.2.1 Operationalisation of Readability 
Loughran & McDonald (2016) define readability as a special aspect of 
textual analysis (see section 2.4.2.2) where “the ability of the reader to decipher 
the intended message” is measured. In the financial and accounting area, textual 
analysis is an emerging theme, especially with the rise in computer power, faster 
access to financial information, and an overall increase in financial 
communication. Still, Loughran and McDonald (2016) concede that more 
research is needed to overcome challenges of precision. They note that the 
traditional hallmarks of readability such as polysyllabic words and long sentences 
need to be complemented when financial texts are interpreted. 
The dominant method for measuring the readability of financial texts is the 
construction of the Gunning-Fog index (Gunning, 1952; Li, 2008). The Gunning-
Fog index assumes that a text is more difficult to comprehend if the average 
sentence length (counted in words) is high and if more complex words (counted 
in syllables) are used. These two variables are subsequently combined and 
weighted into an index that refers to the number of years of education needed to 
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understand the text in a first reading. The higher the Gunning-Fog index, the 
higher the difficulty to read the text is (Ajina et al., 2015, 2016).  
For the purpose of this thesis, and as suggested by Loughran & McDonald 
(2016), the Gunning-Fog index is complemented before the index for each 
disclosure report is calculated. In this case, a special list of complex financial 
words is compiled that are still widespread and easily understood in the financial 
community (“removal list”). Such words are excluded from the complex word 
calculation in the Gunning-Fog index. For example, there are several words such 
as “financial” that are complex (three syllables), but usually familiar to users of 
disclosure reports. Considering such words would distort the Gunning-Fog index 
calculation.  
For an English text, the Gunning-Fog index is calculated using the 
following equation (Gunning, 1952): 
 
𝐹𝑂𝐺𝑖  = 0.4 × (
 number of words𝑖 
number of sentences𝑖 
+ percentage of complex words𝑖)                          (1) 
 
where FOGi is the Gunning-Fog index for the readability of a report, number of 
wordsi is the count of all words in the report of bank i, number of sentencesi is the 
count of all sentences in the report of bank i, and percentage of complex wordsi 
is the percentage of words with three or more syllables in the report of bank i 
excluding words on the exclusion list (see Appendix 8.3). 
Mathematically, the Gunning-Fog index can vary between 0 and infinite. 
The literature does not define an optimal target value for the readability of 
regulatory risk disclosures. The standard setter BCBS says that the disclosure 
report should be understandable to key stakeholders (see section 4.4.3.1), but 
the BCBS does not state which educational level it expects from the readers. In 
practice, a too high readability difficulty of risk disclosure reports is equally less 
desirable than a too low readability difficulty. For the sake of the scoring model 
proposed in this thesis, an average educated person with a basic understanding 
of financial terminology is chosen as a reference. The standard reading skills of 
the average educated person reading regulatory risk disclosure reports is proxied 
by the mean of all Gunning-Fog index values calculated for the reports in the 
sample. A disclosure report that scores exactly the mean is assumed to match 
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the comprehension skills of the average reader best22. A difference to either side 
reduces the score. Equation 2 calculates the arithmetic mean of all Gunning-Fog 
index values in the sample by summing up all FOGi values and dividing the sum 
by the sample size. Then, for each report of bank i, the absolute difference (no 
matter whether positive or negative) from the sample mean is calculated 
individually.  
The following equation is used to calculate the absolute deviation from the 
mean of all reports: 





𝑘 − FOG𝑖)           (2) 
 
where FOGi is the Gunning-Fog index for report of bank i (from Equation 1), k is 
the total number of disclosure reports in the sample, sample_sizeik is the number 
of all banks’ disclosure reports in the sample, and FOG_DIFF_ABSi is the 
absolute difference between the average Gunning-Fog index for the sample and 
a bank’s Gunning-Fog index. 
The difference is then normalised to a value between 0 and 1 in order to 
make the scores for all quality criteria comparable (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008). A 
regulatory risk report scores the maximum value on readability of 1 if its Gunning-
Fog index matches the mean (i.e., the difference of the sample average Gunning-
Fog index and a bank’s FOGi is 0). Any positive or negative deviation reduces 
the individual report’s score.  
The normalisation is calculated with this equation: 
FOG_SCALED𝑖 = 1 −  (
FOG_DIFF_ABS𝑖
MEAN_FOG_INDEX
)             (3) 
 
where FOG_DIFF_ABSi is the result from Equation (2) and the 






FOG_DIFF_ABSi ≤ MEAN_FOG_INDEX. 
 
22 An adaptation should be made once future research identifies more precisely which reading 
skills can be expected from the recipients of disclosure reports. 
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4.5.2.2 Operationalisation of Comprehensiveness 
The comparative and integrative analysis in section 4.4.3 reveals that 
there are two issues to consider on comprehensiveness. For a risk disclosure 
report to be comprehensive it must cover an appropriate amount of risk related 
information (“quantity”) and it must cover all relevant risk areas of the bank in the 
appropriate detail (“coverage”).  
Deumes & Knechel (2008) and Elzahar & Hussainey (2012) find that the 
quantity of risk disclosure for all firms strongly depends on factors such as 
industry and size (see section 2.2.7). Certain industries tend to disclose more 
information than others, and larger firms also tend to disclose more information 
than smaller ones. In this thesis, the industry focus is only on the banking 
industry. Therefore, industry will not make a material difference on disclosure 
quantity, and no control variable for industry must be defined. The control variable 
size of bank is potentially more relevant. Bank sizes range from small regional 
banks offering basic banking services to large supranational banks with a full 
basket of high-level services. The scoring model developed in this thesis focuses 
on large banks, and the target sample for testing purposes is taken from a list of 
the largest European banks where the asset size is comparable (see section 
5.2.1). Nevertheless, in case that the disclosure scoring model is applied to 
smaller-sized banks in the future, an adjustment for size should be made. 
Beretta & Bozzolan (2004) suggest using the total number of risk 
disclosure words found in the reports as a proxy for quantity. They assume that 
a higher occurrence of these risk words means that a firm puts more effort in the 
overall quality of their risk disclosure. Similar word-based measurement 
approaches are suggested by Li (2008) and Miihkinen (2011). The quantity of risk 
disclosure is measured with this formula:  
 
QUANTITY𝑖 = 𝐼𝑛(∑ risk_disclosure_words𝑖
𝑛
𝑖 )           (4) 
 
where the sum of risk_disclosure_wordsi counts the occurrences of words 
from the pre-defined list of risk disclosure words in a bank’s regulatory risk 
disclosure report (see the word list in the appendix 8.3). The natural logarithm is 




The following equation is used to normalise QUANTITYi to a value 
between 0 and 1 in order to make the scores for all quality criteria comparable 





           (5) 
 
where QUANTITYi is the result of Equation 4, and ln(QUANTITYmax) is the natural 
logarithm of the maximum quantity of risk words observed in reports in the 
sample. 
For measuring the coverage of risk disclosure, Miihkinen (2011) suggests 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index HHI (Hirschman, 1964) that measures, in its 
original macroeconomic use, the concentration of firms in relation to their industry 
(see also Paper & Models, 2018; Turkmen & Yigit, 2012). In the context of the 
proposed disclosure scoring model, the index measures the concentration/ 
dilution of risk disclosure words per risk category (comparable to the “firms”) in 
relation to the risk disclosure report (comparable to the “industry”). Miihkinen 
(2011) assumes that a balanced description of the major risks increases the 
quality of risk disclosure.  
The Herfindahl-Hirschman index of concentration/dilution is calculated by 
the following equation (Hirschman, 1964): 
 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖 = ∑ pi²
n
i=1
              (6) 
 
where HHIi is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index for a report of bank i and pi 
is the proportion of risk disclosure words on a risk category divided by total count 
of risk disclosure words in the report. 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman index is designed in a way that a high 
disclosure concentration on one risk category and a neglect of other risk 
categories leads to a high index value where the maximum possible value is 1 
(comparable to a “monopoly”). Hence, a good disclosure balance among the risk 
categories (comparable to a “competitive market”) would result in a low value of 
the index. For consistency purposes within the scoring model, the general rule 
defined in section 4.5.2 requires all components of the composite disclosure 
score to show higher values for higher quality. In order to bring the resulting HHI 
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value in line with the general rule, Equation 7 reverses the HHI for calculation of 
COVERAGEi by deducting HHIi from 1 (i.e., a balanced disclosure means higher 
quality”). 
 
COVERAGE𝑖 = 1 −  𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖              (7) 
 
where HHIi is the result of Equation 6 and the deduction of HHIi from 1 
reverts the direction of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index. 
Finally, the value for comprehensiveness is calculated by taking the 
arithmetic mean of “quantity” and “coverage” with the following equation:  
  
COMPREHENSIVENESS𝑖 =  
QUANTITY_SCALED𝑖+𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖
2
         (8) 
 
where QUANTITY_SCALEDi and COVERAGEi are the results of 
Equations 6 and 7 respectively. 
 
4.5.2.3 Operationalisation of Meaningfulness 
The purpose of risk disclosure reports is to communicate the regulatory 
risk profile of a bank to its stakeholders. For readers, the meaningfulness 
increases if the reports focus on risk and do not include boilerplate comments 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2015). The information provided must 
be relevant, but also material in nature. Dobler (2008) and Linsley & Shrives 
(2005) find that risk disclosure reports that include forward-looking information 
offer a higher level of meaningfulness to users than others. Such reports enable 
users to better assess the future economic performance and risks of a firm, and 
potentially improve their investment decisions. 
Jia et al. (2016) and Beretta & Bozzolan (2004) suggest an empirical 
indicator that covers relevance and materiality, but also the element of forward 
orientation. The so-called depth of a risk disclosure report captures the “content 
of information disclosed regarding the expected economic impact of identified 
risks upon future performance” (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004). Depth is measured 
by selecting all words that contain a quantitative or qualitative statement on risk 
and the future impact (forward-looking words). The total number of forward-
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looking words is then set in relation to the total number of risk disclosure words 
in the report. A higher occurrence of forward-looking words suggests a higher 
meaningfulness of the disclosed information to the readers and results in a higher 
score on meaningfulness. Beretta & Bozzolan (2004) suggest the “sentence” as 
the unit of observation. In this thesis, the unit of observation is the “word”, 
therefore the equation proposed by Beretta & Bozzolan (2004) is adjusted 









𝑖         (9) 
 
where the sum of words_forwardi counts the occurrences of words from a 
pre-defined list of forward looking words in a report of bank i, and the sum of 
risk_disclosure_wordsi counts the occurrences of words from a pre-defined list of 
risk disclosure words in a report of bank i (both word lists are in Appendix 8.3). 
 
4.5.2.4 Operationalisation of Time Comparability 
Time comparison is a quality criterion that was not considered in any 
previous studies so far. This is surprising giving that it is suggested as one of five 
crucial quality criteria by policymakers such as IASB, EDTF of the FSB and the 
BCBS (see section 4.4.3).  
Time comparison means that the regulatory risk disclosures of a bank are 
easily comparable from one period to the other. It is beneficial to users who want 
to trace the developments in a bank over time to get comparative information that 
facilitates their analysis. Often, information changes over time are, regardless of 
positive or negative sign, more significant to users than information focusing on 
the status quo only. 
Time comparability is measured with the ratio of words that contain time 
comparisons quantitatively and qualitatively relative to the total number of risk 
disclosure words in a report. The formula is similar to the one suggested by 
Beretta & Bozzolan (2004) for measuring the forward orientation of disclosure. 
Although time comparability is backwards oriented, from a structural point of view 
both cases can be similarly measured. The difference lies in the words 
considered relevant to reflect the time orientation. In the case of time 
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comparability these are words that are backwards looking and reflecting historic 
developments.  










𝑖      (10) 
 
where the sum of words_t_comparisoni counts the occurrences of words 
from a pre-defined list of time comparison words in a report of bank i, and the 
sum of risk_disclosure_wordsi counts the occurrences of words from a pre-
defined list of risk disclosure words in a report of bank i (both word lists can be 
seen in Appendix 8.3). 
 
4.5.2.5 Operationalisation of Sector Comparability 
Similar to the time comparability criterion, sector comparability has not yet 
been examined in any study as an indicator for disclosure quality despite its 
importance for users (see section 4.4.3). Sector comparability means that 
regulatory risk disclosures of the same period can easily be compared from one 
bank to the other. However, there is an inherent problem in this task. Banks are 
responsible for the structure and content of their own risk reports. They have no 
possibility to influence the structure and content of competing banks (apart from 
some group pressure to report in a similar way as the leading group of banks 
does – the bandwagon effect (see section 2.2.7.8)).  
In regulatory risk disclosure, there is a slow but steady trend to establish a 
best practice (EBA, 2020; Enhanced Disclosure Task Force, 2012). Still, the 
banking sector is far away from reaching an industry norm for disclosure. 
Regulatory authorities (e.g., EBA) are aware of this situation and try to establish 
a common reporting approach. They introduce templates for a common reporting 
standard that partly restrict banks’ choice on structure and content (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2015).  
Still, banks have much freedom to disclose risk information in their 
preferred way. The risk disclosure reports primarily reflect the risk profile of a 
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specific bank and do not foster comparability among the peer group. This makes 
the reports per se individual documents at the cost of comparability. 
This thesis suggests a new empirical indicator that measures the structural 
similarities of the reports. The more similar the structures are, the easier it is for 
a reader to compare the reports. The proposed indicator builds on the analysis of 
the bandwagon effect in the financial industry by Khlif & Hussainey (2016). There 
is a group of top tier banks in the banking industry that take on a leading role in 
regulatory risk disclosure (EBA, 2020). This group has some formative power to 
define a best practice in disclosure which other banks may follow.  
The empirical indicator for sector comparability first requires analysing the 
disclosure reports of these leading banks with respect to the risk categories as 
listed in Table 2 and identifying the structural items of the content disclosed. 
Then, the risk categories and structural items are consolidated on the basis of 
maximum commonality among the leading group of banks. The result is an 
integrated risk disclosure template that can be used as an industry benchmark. 
All the report structures of the remaining banks are then compared and mapped 
against this industry benchmark. This procedure is in line with previous research 
that suggests that most of the smaller market participants “follow the herd” (see 
section 2.2.7.8).  
Disclosure reports score high on the criterion sector comparability if their 
structures closely match the industry benchmark, thereby making it easier for 
users to compare them to other reports. They score low if their structures deviate 
significantly from the industry benchmark. 







𝑖      (11) 
 
where the sum of structural_itemsi counts the occurrences of structural 
items of a disclosure report of bank i that match with the industry benchmark, and 
the sum of structure_benchmark represents the total number of structural items 
of the industry benchmark derived from the top tier group that can potentially be 
matched by individual reports. 
The equation results in a value of 1 if there is a perfect structural match of 
a single report’s structure with the industry benchmark, suggesting easy 
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comparability and therefore high quality in this quality criterion. Structural items 
that do not match reduce the score suggesting that comparison is made more 
difficult, thereby reducing disclosure quality.  
 
4.5.3 The Composite Disclosure Score  
The composite disclosure score is the summary statistic for all quality 
scores per risk category. It is obtained for each report with the following three-
step process. First, for each of the five risk categories of a bank’s disclosure 
report, the individual quality scores (the “risk-quality”-pairs) are weighted equally 
and an arithmetic average per risk category is calculated (see Figure 24).  





COMPREHENSIVENESS𝑖 + MEANINGFULNESS𝑖 +




where for each risk category SCORE_RISK_CATEGORYi of a report of bank i 
the scores per quality criterion (results from Equations 3, 8, 9, 10 and 11) are 
added and arithmetically weighted. 
 
Not every risk category is of the same importance to each bank. For some 
banks, credit risk is dominant over the other risks. For other banks, the most 
important risk category could be market risk or one of the other risk categories. 
Therefore, in step two of the process for calculating the composite disclosure 
score, the scores per risk categories are weighted according to their importance 
in the asset portfolio of the bank (except for the risk management category that 
does not relate to a specific risk category). Each risk category is weighted with its 
respective proportion of risk weighted assets (RWA) to total RWA to account for 
the relative importance to the bank. 
The RWA weighting is performed in Equation 13 that takes the results from 







× SCORE_RISK_CATEGORY𝑖     (13) 
 
where RWAi is the risk weighted asset value for each risk category (except risk 
management), Total_RWAi is the total risk weighted asset value for the bank i, 
and SCORE_RISK_CATEGORYi is the result from Equation 12.  
In a third and final step, the composite disclosure score is calculated as 
the arithmetic mean of the RWA-adjusted scores (see Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; 
Miihkinen, 2011). It is suggested that, at this stage of model development, the 
arithmetic mean is chosen. In future research, it would also be possible to apply 
weights to the quality criteria (not only to the risk categories as above). However, 
this would require establishing a relative importance ranking among the quality 
criteria that heavily depends on the priorities and perceptions of preparers and 
users of regulatory risk disclosure reports.  
The composite disclosure score is calculated as follows: 
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸_SCORE𝑖 = ∑ SCORE_RISK_CATEGORY_WT𝑖
𝑛
1   (14) 
 
where n is the number or risk categories in a report of bank i and 
SCORE_RISK_CATEGORY_WTi is the result from Equation 13.  
 
4.5.4 Subjectivity in Risk Disclosure 
Subjectivity is an overarching theme that is addressed in most disclosure 
studies (see Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008; Miihkinen, 2011). Measuring quality is a 
complex issue with many dimensions to consider. It lies in the eyes of the users 
of risk disclosure reports how relevant each dimension is and how its quality is 
assessed. Beretta & Bozzolan (2008) note in their seminal paper that quality is 
subjective because “it depends on the perspective through which the disclosure 
is observed and evaluated.” Users will rarely find a consensus as they all have 





Figure 25: Subjectivity in risk disclosure 
 
Subjectivity can have several causes (see Figure 25). First, the risk 
disclosure reports are prepared by employees of a bank. Despite their effort to 
present a true and fair view of the risks and despite them following regulatory 
regulations, it cannot be ruled out that they are not using some form of judgement 
while preparing the reports. Judgement per se is subjective and has an influence 
on how risk information is presented in disclosure reports. Verrecchia (1983) 
notes that firms have various monetary and non-monetary incentives to disclose 
or not to disclose information (see section 2.2.4.7). Besides regulatory and 
minimum legal disclosure requirements, it is at the discretion of banks what, how 
and how much their managers find useful to disclose. This decision is not 
necessarily a purely objective one. 
A second source of subjectivity lies on the users’ side. Every user 
perceives the meaning of a text differently. The comprehension of a text depends 
on the reading skills, the educational background and the professional 
experience (Loughran & Mcdonald, 2014). Also, readers might have different 
emotions while reading a text, as well as other psychological factors might be 
present that influence their text understanding (Pepper & Gore, 2015). Ultimately, 
a risk disclosure that is satisfactory for the needs of one reader might be useless 
for the other. This observation refers to the longstanding dispute between 
classical finance and behavioural finance theories. In classical finance theories 
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such as the widespread Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) investors are 
supposed to act rationally (Fama, 1970). Whereas in behavioural finance, 
investors can also act irrationally, meaning in a subjective manner (Malkiel, 
2003). Accordingly, their perceptions of disclosed quality will differ. 
Lastly, the researchers themselves bring subjectivity to the analysis. For 
instance, the decisions taken in section 4.4.3 on which quality criteria to select is 
ultimately a subjective one. Although it needs to be pointed out that the choice of 
the indicators is not necessarily an arbitrary one. Beretta & Bozzolan (2008) 
demand that a “good measure of disclosure quality should reach a sort of 
“consensus” among different classes of users … and should be validated in terms 
of reliability23 and validity24”. It is an advantage for this thesis that in terms of 
consensus building it can benefit from broad based studies from leading banking 
regulators, standard setters, and policymakers. The integration work on 
disclosure principles in section 4.4.3 reveals that the quality criteria are not 
congruent, but still overlapping to a large extent. A common and reconciled 
understanding of quality criteria is a step forward in defining a best practice of 
measuring risk disclosure quality. For the choice of empirical indicators needed 
to proxy the quality criteria, the current research status is more ambivalent. As 
discussed in the literature review (see section 2.4.1), the discussion of indicators 
that best approximate important aspects of the quality criteria is still ongoing and 
no broad consensus has been reached so far.  
In more technical terms, researchers face subjectivity issues not only in 
model development but also in applying and testing their models. A distinction 
can be made in ex ante coding procedures and ex post robustness checks. 
Semantic text analysis is subjective by its very own nature (Saunders, 2013). 
Researchers address this bias by either double checking the coding through other 
independent researchers (“four eyes principle”) or by using statistical techniques 
 
23 Reliability in this context means that the research results (e.g., the disclosure index) can be 
replicated by other researchers.  
24 Validity in this context means that the research result reflects what the researcher intended to 




such as calculating the Kappa coefficient25 (Cohen, 1960) or Krippendorf’s alpha. 
Once the test results are available, robustness checks help to understand how 
good the model estimates are. An issue often addressed is endogeneity 
(Elshandidy et al., 2015). So, for instance, omitted variables can often lead to 
false attributions of variations in risk factors due to endogenous factors such as 
firm, industry and country-specific issues (see a list of potential endogenous 
factors in section 2.2.7). 
In summary, subjectivity of preparers, users and researchers is an issue 
to be critically aware of when evaluating the quality of disclosure reports. Several 
measures can be taken to reduce the subjectivity problem but some bias in risk 
judgement will remain.  
4.6 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, the business and functional requirements analysis for the 
scoring model was done (step 1 of the research design) and the model framework 
developed.  
The requirements analysis started with an explanation of how agency 
theory views the benefits of disclosure (wealth gains through better information 
sharing between principals and agents), Further requirements were derived from 
the analysis of the risk profiles of banks and the legal environment of banking 
regulation in the EU. Key results were the identification of five risk categories 
(credit risks, market risks, operational risks, other risks, risk management) of the 
model). The additional analysis of quality principles from the IASB, the EDTF, 
and the BCBS lead to the definition of five quality criteria readability, 
comprehensiveness, meaningfulness, time comparability, and sector 
comparability. 
The scoring model was developed within a two-dimensional framework 
consisting of a risk and a quality dimension. The data requirements, the 
processing logic, and the algorithms for calculating the composite disclosure 
scores were defined, and the technical architecture for model implementation in 
Nvivo, python, SPSS, and MS Excel was developed.   
 
25 A more detailed explanation of the Kappa coefficient can be found in the model implementation 
chapter in section 5.4. 
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5 Chapter Five: Implementation and Test of the Scoring Model  
In this chapter, the technical and organisational implementation, and test 
of the regulatory risk disclosure scoring model is described. A well-designed 
implementation is crucial to the quality of the model results. So far, designs of 
similar models on the financial accounting side suffer from one major drawback. 
The implementation involves substantial human labour efforts for coding and 
analysis (see section 2.4.2.2.1 Manual Semantic Content Analysis). They are, 
therefore, time-consuming and costly to implement. This also limits any advanced 
research activities in the disclosure field, and alternative approaches must be 
considered. An ideal scoring model implementation is one that can be rerun 
frequently and automatically, without the need for a high level of human 
involvement to regularly perform these tasks. The implementation proposed in 
this chapter promotes an approach that can be semi-automated with 
computerised support wherever possible.  
The first section explains the technical architecture of the model 
implementation. The model makes use of the software tools Nvivo, SPSS, Excel, 
and the programming language Python. 
The second section of this chapter explains the criteria by which the 
sample of banks and regulatory risk disclosure reports are selected for testing the 
scoring model. The goal is to select a sample that represents the EU banking 
industry well but can also be handled with reasonable time and effort. 
The chapter then moves on to discussing how to ensure the quality of the 
model’s input data and coding. As discussed in section 4.5.4 (Subjectivity in Risk 
Disclosure), semantic content analysis tends to be partly subjective. Therefore, it 
is important to include safeguards in the implementation to ensure high reliability 
and validity of the model. The organisational safeguards for the data 
management and coding activities include the early definition of all procedural 
coding steps from the preparatory phase to the consolidation phase, and the 
implementation of a four-eye principle. All these organisational safeguards are 
explained in section 5.3. 
The chapter continues with section 5.4 where the technical safeguards are 
documented. Several statistical tests such as the Kappa coefficient test and the 
percentage agreement test are performed to measure and analyse coding 
reliability and validity. 
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In addition to the organisational and technical safeguards, the quality of 
the scoring model results is determined by providing clear instructions for coding 
the disclosure reports. Section 5.5 describes the coding instructions for both 
model dimensions (risk and quality) in a coding rulebook. This document can be 
easily recycled in further research projects or in a software programme for 
automation purposes.  
 
5.1 Technical Implementation of the Disclosure Scoring Model 
The technical implementation of the disclosure scoring model requires the 
programming of all functionalities as defined in section 4.5.2 on model 
development. For each of the five empirical indicators on the quality dimension, 
the predefined equations must be programmed either in Nvivo and SPSS or 
individually using Python programming language. In addition, the individual 
scores from each quality criterion must be technically consolidated in a composite 
disclosure score per bank. The overall objective of the technical implementation 
is to make use of as many existing functionalities in software systems as possible 
so that major parts of the processing can be later performed on a semi-automated 
basis.  
In this thesis, Nvivo is the core software system for both coding and model 
implementation (see Figure 26). The software offers extensive coding 
functionalities for preparing the input data from the reports to the model 
specifications (see section 5.5 on the coding rule book). Nvivo also provides 
several useful functionalities for grouping text snippets to nodes and querying the 
coded elements for shared textual properties. Whenever possible built-in 
functions such as word frequencies queries and word count queries across 
nodes, cases and sources are used. This approach works well for implementing 





Figure 26: Technical model implementation 
A major disadvantage of Nvivo is that the software does not allow direct 
access to its database via an Application Programming Interface (API). 
Furthermore, individual SQL querying possibilities are limited26. Nvivo 
functionalities are not sufficient to calculate disclosure scores for quality criterion 
one (readability) and five (sector comparability). Therefore, raw text extracts are 
exported from Nvivo to text files (in rtf-format) and further processed in other 
software systems (IBM SPSS, MS Excel) and software programs written in 
Python.  
The scoring model uses the Nvivo version 11.4.1.1064 (64-bit) for 
Windows, Pro edition by QSR International. Additional programming is done in 
Python version 3.8, the IDE (Integrated Development Environment) is the open 
source software PyCharm by Jetbrains version 2019.3.2, community edition. 
Additional functionalities from the external Python package Textstat27 are used to 
calculate statistics from text files to determine the readability, complexity, and 
grade level of the text corpus. The software package Textstat is highly rated in 
the open source software depository GitHub and additional quality checking on 
results is performed to ensure correctness of results. Further statistical analysis 
 
26 SQL Structured Query Language. With SQL, database records are queried to the needs of the 
user. 




is done in IBM SPSS Statistics software package version 24.0.0. Finally, 
consolidation of results, calculation of the composite disclosure score and 
graphical presentation is performed in Microsoft Excel (Microsoft Office 365).  
 The overview in Table 10 summarises the technical implementation of 











QC (1) Readability Export from Nvivo with data export functionality; 
conversion in .txt format; file import in Python IDE; 
analysis with Python program using module Textstat 
and additional programming. 
QC (2) 
Comprehensiveness 
Nvivo built-in functionality “word frequency count” ; 
manual import of “risk word list” in query; export of 
query results with Nvivo data export functionality; 
import in Excel for analysis. 
QC (3) 
Meaningfulness 
Nvivo built-in functionality “word frequency count” ; 
manual import of “forward-oriented word list” in query; 
export of query results with Nvivo data export 
functionality; import in Excel for analysis. 
QC (4) Time 
comparability 
Nvivo built-in functionality “word frequency count” ; 
manual import of “time comparative word list” in 
query; export of query results with Nvivo data export 
functionality; import in Excel for analysis. 
QC (5) Sector 
comparability 
Export of node content “table of contents” from Nvivo 
with data export functionality; import in Excel 




Export of disclosure scores per risk category from 
Excel to SPSS; analysis of scores with SPSS factor 
analysis functionality (Analyse – Dimension 
Reduction – Factor) ; export of SPSS results to Excel 
for analysis. 





5.2 Sample Selection Criteria 
The scoring model is applied to a sample consisting of the thirty largest 
banks primarily headquartered in the EU. The EU is chosen because the CRD 
IV/CRR framework is a legal package that is only applicable to EU banks. A small 
number of adjustments are made in order to get a consistent sample. The 
selection criteria for the sample and the adjustments made are described below.  
5.2.1 Selection of Sample Size and Components 
The sample is selected from the annually published Standard & Poor’s list 
of the largest banks in Europe (S&P Global Market Intelligence, 2018). This list 
ranks the banks according to their total asset value. For the purpose of this thesis, 
the list as per end of 2017 is chosen as a reference. Two banks from Russia are 
removed from the list as they are not headquartered in the EU and therefore not 
part of the EU common market and regulation. A similar elimination rule would 
have been applied to one Swiss bank on the list. However, an exception is made 
in this case as the bank is a global systemically important institution (G-SII) with 
major business operations in the EU. The bank also follows Basel III disclosure 
guidelines, making its risk disclosure widely comparable with that of its EU 
banking counterparts. Two further banks, one from the Netherlands and another 
from Switzerland are excluded from the sample because they do not publish 
separate regulatory risk disclosure reports. They rather spread their risk 
information throughout their annual reports and, therefore, are removed from the 
sample due to impracticability of analysing them. The open places are substituted 
with the runner-up banks on the S&P list. 
A closer look at the asset base of the thirty banks reveals the suitability of 
this sample choice for representation of the EU banking industry. For validity 
purposes of the model, it is important that the sample represents the European 
banking industry well in terms of total assets. The European Central Bank (2018) 




   
Figure 27: Total assets of EU headquartered banks  
 
By the end of 2017, the total assets of credit institutions headquartered in 
the EU stood at EUR 32.3 trillion (down by 3.3% from EUR 33.4 trillion in 
December 2016). The total assets of the chosen sample of thirty EU 
headquartered banks (including one Swiss bank) is €24,462 trillion. The assets 
in the sample account for approximately 76% of the total assets of EU banks in 
2017 (S&P Global Market Intelligence, 2018). The selected sample, therefore, 
can be considered representative of the EU banking industry. The remaining 
fourth quartile of total assets is made up of a large number of relatively small-
sized, often local banks.  
Table 11 summarizes the final list of banks in the sample. For ease of 
reference and clarity, the names of the banking groups, their unique legal entity 
identifier LEI, their FSB/EBA classification, and their total assets as per the end 




Table 11: The thirty banks in the sample  
 
Geographically, the sample includes banks from eleven EU member 
countries and Switzerland.28 The list of countries can be found in Table 12. The 
three largest economies in the EU (Germany, Great Britain, and France) 
contribute between five to six banks each. The remaining places in the sample 
go to nine other countries. 
  
 
28 Including Great Britain who left the EU at the end of January 2020. 





1 GB HSBC Holdings Plc MLU0ZO3ML4LN2LL2TL39 G-SII 2.234          
2 FR BNP Paribas R0MUWSFPU8MPRO8K5P83 G-SII 2.040          
3 FR Crédit Agricole Group FR969500TJ5KRTCJQWXH G-SII 1.854          
4 ES Banco Santander, S.A. 5493006QMFDDMYWIAM13 G-SII 1.459          
5 DE Deutsche Bank AG 7LTWFZYICNSX8D621K86 G-SII 1.348          
6 FR Group Société Générale O2RNE8IBXP4R0TD8PU41 G-SII 1.297          
7 FR BPCE Groupe FR9695005MSX1OYEMGDF O-SII 1.277          
8 GB Barclays Plc G5GSEF7VJP5I7OUK5573 G-SII 1.261          
9 GB Lloyds Banking Group Plc 549300PPXHEU2JF0AM85 O-SII 887              
10 NL ING Bank N.V. 3TK20IVIUJ8J3ZU0QE75 G-SII 887              
11 CH UBS 549300SZJ9VS8SGXAN81 G-SII 837              
12 IT Unicredit Group spa 549300TRUWO2CD2G5692 G-SII 831              
13 FR Credit Mutuel Groupe  9695000CG7B84NLR5984 O-SII 813              
14 IT Intesa Sanpaolo Gruppo 2W8N8UU78PMDQKZENC08 O-SII 787              
15 GB Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc 2138005O9XJIJN4JPN90 G-SII 772              
16 ES Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A. K8MS7FD7N5Z2WQ51AZ71 O-SII 676              
17 GB Standard Chartered Plc U4LOSYZ7YG4W3S5F2G91 G-SII 601              
18 NL RABO  U.A. DG3RU1DBUFHT4ZF9WN62 O-SII 590              
19 FI Nordea Bank AB 6SCPQ280AIY8EP3XFW53 G-SII 557              
20 DE DZ Bank AG 529900HNOAA1KXQJUQ27 O-SII 518              
21 DK Danske Bank MAES062Z21O4RZ2U7M96 O-SII 479              
22 DE Commerzbank AG 851WYGNLUQLFZBSYGB56 O-SII 461              
23 ES CaixaBank, S.A. 7CUNS533WID6K7DGFI87 O-SII 386              
24 SE Svenska Handelsbanken NHBDILHZTYCNBV5UYZ31 O-SII 292              
25 BE KBC Group 6B2PBRV1FCJDMR45RZ53 O-SII 283              
26 GB Nationwide Building Society 549300XFX12G42QIKN82 O-SII 267              
27 DE Landesbank Baden-Württemberg B81CK4ESI35472RHJ606 O-SII 241              
28 AT Erste Group PQOH26KWDF7CG10L6792 O-SII 237              
29 DE Bayerische Landesbank VDYMYTQGZZ6DU0912C88 O-SII 220              
30 DE HSH Nordbank AG TUKDD90GPC79G1KOE162 O-SII 70                
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Country Country identifier Number of banks in 
sample 
Great Britain (non-EU per 1/2020) GB 6 
Germany DE 6 
France FR 5 
Spain ES 3 
Italy IT 2 
The Netherlands NL 2 
Switzerland (non-EU) CH 1 
Belgium BE 1 
Denmark DK 1 
Sweden SE 1 
Finland FI 1 
Austria AT 1 
Total  30 
Table 12: Geographical distribution of banks in the sample 
 
5.2.2 Selection of the Banking Industry 
There are several reasons why the banking industry is chosen for this 
research. First, the CRD IV/CRR framework (see section 2.3.3.1) is a legal 
regulation package that is targeting the risks in the banking industry only. 
Regulatory risk disclosure in banking and its partial failure to provide timely 
information has been a major issue since the global financial crisis in 2008. 
Therefore, there is a considerable academic and professional interest in 
analysing and improving this research field (Enhanced Disclosure Task Force, 
2012; International Accounting Standards Board, 2017). 
Second, in previous research on general risk disclosure (e.g., Abraham & 
Cox, 2007; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008; Linsley & Shrives, 2005) banks are 
regularly eliminated from samples due to their different risk profiles and risk 
appetite compared to those of firms in the manufacturing and service sectors (see 
section 4.3.1). This thesis aims to close this gap by addressing the quality of 
regulatory risk disclosure of banks specifically. 
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A third reason for selecting the banking industry is the systemic importance 
of banks to the overall economy. The risk generated by them is perceived as 
substantial (International Accounting Standards Board, 2017). Therefore, 
banking regulation is put in place to address the challenges in this sector. 
Supervisory authorities evaluate banking risks on both global and domestic 
levels. Both levels are reflected in the chosen sample. 
On a global level, the international Financial Stability Board (FSB) 
compiles annually, in consultation with the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) and national authorities, a list of global systemically 
important institutions (G-SII’s) (Financial Stability Board, 2017). The FSB defines 
institutions in this category as “financial institutions whose distress or disorderly 
failure, because of their size, complexity and systemic interconnectedness, would 
cause significant disruption to the wider financial system and economic activity”. 
G-SII’s are expected to 
• have a higher Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) alongside the 
regulatory capital requirements set out in the CRD IV/CRR framework,  
• perform group-wide resolution planning regularly, and  
• meet higher capital buffers and supervisory expectations for their risk 
management functions.  
As of 2017 the G-SII list consists of thirty banks worldwide of which twelve are 
headquartered in the EU. Together with one Swiss bank (another G-SII bank), all 
thirteen G-SII-relevant European banks are included in the sample.  
On a domestic level, national supervisory authorities designate additional 
banks as being of high importance to national economies (Article 131(3) CRD). 
Such other systemically important institutions (O-SII) are selected by a predefined 
set of criteria relating to size, complexity, and interconnectedness of the institution 
with the national financial system. With regard to the chosen sample in this thesis, 
seventeen O-SII banks (as classified by their national regulators) are included.  
 
5.2.3 Selection of the Reporting Period 
For each bank in the sample, three end-of-year regulatory risk disclosure 
reports are collected, covering the period 2016 to 2018. The period is chosen 
deliberately. The legal package CRD IV/CRR, including the updated regulatory 
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risk disclosure regulation, passed the European Parliament in June 2013 and 
came into force on 1 January 2014. On this date, the first disclosure period 2014 
started based on the new legislation. With an annual disclosure reporting 
frequency, the first disclosure reports had to be prepared by the end of December 
2014. The publication of the reports took place in the first half of 2015.  
In the following years, the scope of banking regulation remained largely 
stable. This period of regulatory stability makes risk disclosure reports well 
comparable over this time frame. From an operational perspective, it takes the 
banks time to establish disclosure policies and standards for their risk disclosure 
reporting. In order to avoid problems associated with the introductory phase of 
the new risk disclosure regulation, the collection of reports for this thesis starts 
with the reporting period 2016. For each of the thirty banks in the sample, a report 
per year is gathered for the years 2016, 2017 and 2018. In total, the number of 
reports in the sample therefore comprises ninety reports (thirty banks and three 
reports each). 
 
5.3 Organisation of the Coding Process  
Coding is the process of assigning text from various sources (here: the 
regulatory risk disclosure reports) to predefined nodes and cases representing 
shared properties.29 The content assigned to nodes and cases can then be 
evaluated and processed through a model to give results such as the composite 
disclosure score. The coding process and its organisation is critical to the quality 
of the model results. It is widely agreed in semantic content analysis that the input 
data into a model must be of the highest quality possible, otherwise the model 
output will be questionable, even if the model itself is well designed (Krippendorff, 
2004).  
This section describes how the coding process is organised to ensure its 
quality. Human coding is prone to errors like every other task performed by 
humans. Lessons learnt from the coding work in this thesis shows that experience 
in regulatory risk reporting as well as in handling the coding tool is required from 
 
29 In the case of this research, text is the container of information. In general, a container can be 
any sort of audio, video, or text source. A node is a “collection of references about a specific 
theme”, a case is a “unit of observation” (Source: Nvivo 11 pro help function). 
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the coders. Skills in both areas are a prerequisite for a successful model 
implementation but cannot be easily acquired. Extensive training is necessary to 
reduce judgmental and handling errors. In addition, manual coding is a time-
consuming and burdensome task. The manual coding of one disclosure report 
takes on average one hour. Therefore, coders need to be well-instructed and 
supported to take on the coding tasks efficiently and effectively. 
There is also considerable subjectivity inherent in coding (see the detailed 
discussion in section 4.5.4). Several techniques exist to help reduce coders’ error 
rates and subjectivity. The organisational and technical methods applied in this 
research are (1) definition of a coding rulebook and process and (2) statistical 
tests for reliability and validity of the coding results. 
 
5.3.1 Coding Project Plan  
During the coding work the following steps, as outlined in Figure 28, were 
taken in order to ensure quality coding results. The project spans over a six-
month period from the end of 2019 to the beginning of 2020. 
 
Figure 28: Coding project plan  
 
• In the preparatory phase, the coding goals and processes were defined. 
The coding requirements of the disclosure scoring model were analysed 
and translated into the coding tasks (coding rulebook). The risk disclosure 
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reports were collected from the banks’ websites and initially screened for 
operationality. Finally, several software tools were evaluated for their 
feasibility to support the coding work. 
• In the kick-off phase, the coding team was assembled and instructed, the 
software tools Nvivo and SPSS were parameterised, and the Integrated 
Development Environment (IDE) for additional programming in Python 
was installed. 
• In the coding phase, the actual coding of the ninety reports was 
undertaken and the results were documented.  
• In the consolidation phase, individual coding results from coders were 
checked for quality and consistency, and finally integrated into one project 
document. The model functionalities were implemented in Nvivo, SPSS, 
Excel, and Python. Individual and composite disclosure scores were 
calculated and prepared for the analysis and evaluation stage.  
The above four stages are explained in detail below.  
 
5.3.1.1 Preparatory Phase 
One prominent technique for coding quality assurance is to explicitly define 
the coding goals upfront in the preparatory phase and to provide clear 
instructions, in form of a coding rulebook, on how and what to code (Jia et al., 
2016).  
The coding work for the scoring model pursues two goals. One goal is to 
guarantee that the coding captures all the data that is required by the model to 
calculate the composite disclosure score. The other goal is to develop an 
implementation architecture that facilitates semi-automated coding in the medium 
to long term.  
For achieving the first goal, the requirements from the theoretical 
framework of the model are analysed and the coding rules and parameters 
defined in a coding rulebook. The risk dimension of the model and each of the 
five quality criteria is broken down into their constituents. The functional coding 
requirements are documented in the coding rulebook (see section 5.5) and tested 
for feasibility and completeness. Figure 29 includes an overview of the coding 
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tasks given to the group of coders who were asked to perform these tasks (written 
in capital letters in the figure) on each of the ninety risk disclosure reports.  
 
 
Figure 29: Coding of risk and quality criteria 
 
For the second goal, coding rules are developed in a way that risk 
disclosure scores can be calculated and replicated regularly with reasonable 
effort and, where possible, with software support. Manual coding requires many 
resources and prohibits performing the coding task repetitiously. Many previous 
studies suffer from this problem (see section 2.4). By learning from past 
experiences, coding rules in this research are defined in a way that they can be 
parameterised in existing software tools such as Nvivo and SPSS or can be 
programmed in proprietary software applications written in the Python 
programming language. This approach guarantees that in later stages major 
parts of the manual coding work can be performed on a semi-automated basis. 
 
5.3.1.2 Kick-off Phase 
A team approach is necessary for a successful coding work due to the 
manual workload involved. In the case of this research, more than 13,000 report 
pages were coded. A coding team of three members was organised. The coding 
team consisted of the author and two business school students, one on a 
master’s degree and the other one on bachelor’s degree level. Students 
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demonstrated an initial general interest in the subject of risk management in 
banks. Before the actual coding started, a one-day workshop was held to 
introduce them to risk management and regulatory risk disclosure in the banking 
industry. By the end of the day, both were well instructed to code their first reports.  
Another good reason for the team approach lies in the coding process 
itself. In every coding performed by humans, subjectivity is inherent. A checks-
and-balances team approach, where one coder randomly evaluates the coding 
of the other (four-eye principle), can help to reduce a coder’s bias (see the 
discussion on reliability and validity later in section 5.4). 
In the project plan, several coding work packages were defined, and 
responsibilities evenly assigned among the coding team. Initially, a single coder 
was made responsible for coding the complete set of banks residing in one 
country. Baskets for UK banks, French banks, and German banks were compiled 
as these three country groups form the largest groups in the sample. The 
remaining banks from other countries were coded thereafter and assigned to 
coders as their time allowed. In the end, the workload ratio for the three coders 
was quite equally distributed. 
 
5.3.1.3 Implementation Phase 
In the implementation phase, the actual coding of the risk disclosure 
reports was performed in Nvivo. The implementation phase lasted for four weeks. 
Although this long timeframe was to be expected, it shows again that the coding 
process needs automatization if used in a professional context in the future. 
Throughout this phase, regular team meetings were held to ensure consistent 
coding. Coding results are recorded in a shared environment, accessible to all 
coders anytime. The protocol of all meetings can be found in Appendix 8.2.  
The first team meeting during the implementation phase was a kick-off 
meeting. The scientific background was again explained to all coders. Another 
focus was on time and project management, as well as documentation of coding 
work results. The coders were also familiarised with handling the Nvivo software 
and introduced to the predefined coding template (including all nodes and cases 
relevant for coding the model input data). Each coder reserved a workspace in 
Nvivo and set up the system on their own workstation. 
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The kick-off meeting was followed by two one-on-one coding meetings 
where each coder coded their first three reports together with the author (four-
eye principle). Coding questions and uncertainties arising from the first practical 
encounter with the reports were clarified immediately, and a common coding 
policy was agreed accordingly. Any coding decisions made were recorded in the 
coding rulebook and protocol. 
In the next step, reports were coded individually by the coders. Relevant 
information on predefined parameters e.g., risk disclosure words, forward-looking 
words, and comparative words (see section 5.5) were marked as required. A 
regular status update on the coding work performed was recorded in a separate 
project management document, keeping all coders well informed about the 
progress, and ensuring a common coding approach. On a weekly basis, online 
meetings were held to talk about the coding experience and clarify any open 
issues.  
Once all reports were coded, a final online meeting was held to discuss 
any remaining open issues and collect experiences from coding that may help to 
establish procedures for a future semi-automated coding in Nvivo or a similar 
software tool. 
 
5.3.1.4 Consolidation Phase 
In the consolidation phase, three main activities were performed. First, the 
coding results from all three coders were integrated and consolidated. As each 
coder was working with a separate Nvivo file, files were finally reconciled in one 
large project file. Backup copies of all files created during the implementation 
phase were stored for documentation purposes. Second, a technical analysis of 
the coding results on reliability and validity was performed. Statistical methods 
were applied to the coded data (see next section) to check the results for overall 
consistency. Third, all model functionalities as described in section 4.5.2 were 
programmed in Nvivo, SPSS, and Python. The technical implementation for each 
risk and quality criterion can be found in section 5.1. Once all programmes and 
queries were implemented, they were successfully executed and the output on 
individual and composite disclosure scores were calculated and stored for the 




5.4 Statistical Testing of Reliability and Validity  
Nvivo offers statistical tools for comparing the coding done by two or more 
coders. The coding comparison functionality checks to what degree their coding 
decisions are consistent and stable over time. In this research, the coding 
reliability and validity are measured through the calculation of the percentage 
agreement factor and the Kappa coefficient.  
A prerequisite to the statistical percentage agreement analysis is to 
double-code a sub-sample of reports originally coded by another coder. The 
double-coded reports are then loaded into a separate environment where Nvivo 
measures the inter-coder reliability with the percentage agreement factor. The 
percentage is defined as the number of units (in this research the “words”) on 
which coders agree to assign to the same nodes and cases, divided by the total 
units of measure (here: total number of words) within the data item (Source: 
NVivo help).30 The expectation of a high coding reliability is that the percentage 
agreement is above 90%  
The Kappa coefficient (K) is a statistical value that measures agreement 
among coders, but also takes into account the amount of agreement that could 
be expected to occur by chance (Cohen, 1960; NVivo Help). If coders are in 
complete agreement, then the Kappa coefficient equals 1. If there is no 
agreement among the coders (other than what would be expected by chance), 
then the Kappa coefficient is 0 or a little above. Cohen (1960) suggests that 
values for K should be interpreted within the following ranges (Table 13): 
 
Interpretation of the Kappa Coefficient 
Kappa (K) ranges Interpretation of agreement 
Below 0.40   Poor agreement 
0.40 – 0.75   Fair to good agreement 
Over 0.75 Excellent agreement 







The results of the inter-coder reliability and validity tests for the author of 
this thesis (JH) with the two coders (VT and BT) are shown in the following tables: 
 
 
Inter-coder reliability and validity test JH - VT 
Nvivo Node Agreement (%) Kappa coefficient 
1_non risk 96.86 0.9882 
2_risk management 98.09 0.9487 
3_credit risk 99.66 0.9785 
31_securitisation 99.96 0.9940 
4_counterparty risk 99.28 0.8654 
5_market risk 99.88 0.9846 
6_operational risk 99.96 0.9919 
7_liquidity risk 99.94 0.9925 
8_other risks 99.89 0.9911 
Table 14: Coding comparison coder JH - coder VT 
 
Inter-coder reliability and validity test JH - BT 
Nvivo Node Agreement (%) Kappa coefficient 
1_non risk 97.70 0.8658 
2_risk management 97.09 0.8308 
3_credit risk 98.85 0.8995 
31_securitisation 99.91 0.9816 
4_counterparty risk 99.76 0.9397 
5_market risk 99.90 0.9907 
6_operational risk 99.96 0.9889 
7_liquidity risk 98.32 0.9500 
8_other risks 98.31 0.7723 
Table 15: Coding comparison coder JH - coder BT 
 
In summary, the percentage agreement factor between coder VT and the 
author JH of this thesis (see Table 14) ranges from 96.86% to 99.96% on a risk 
category basis, and the Kappa coefficient from 0.87 to 0.99. The results are within 
acceptable limits. The percentage agreement factor between coder BT and the 
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author JH of this thesis (see Table 15) ranges from 97.70% to 99.96% on a risk 
category basis, and the Kappa coefficient from 0.77 to 0.99. The results are also 
within acceptable levels. 
Both statistical tests show that coding results are qualitatively acceptable. 
Therefore, the coded data can be used as input into the regulatory risk disclosure 
scoring model.  
 
5.5 The Coding Rulebook  
The purpose of a coding rulebook in semantic content analysis is to 
guarantee quality in coding (Saunders, 2013). Before coding can begin, coders 
must agree upon a coding scheme which they are required to follow strictly. 
Written documentation of the coding approach and precise rules to follow is the 
recommended method for achieving consistency. The coding rulebook consists 
of rules for coding the risk categories as well as the quality criteria of the scoring 
model. 
5.5.1 Coding Rules for Risk Categories 
The risk dimension of the model (see section 4.5.1) requires the 
identification of risk categories in the risk disclosure reports. The scoring model 
includes the following categories: risk management, credit risk, market risk, 
operational risks, and other risks. In the disclosure reports, disclosure on each of 
these risks can be found either grouped together or spread throughout the 
document. Experience from coding shows that the standard case is finding 
multiple occurrences of content for each risk category in different places of the 
reports. Coders were required to analyse each paragraph and code it to the 
respective risk category. Only bank-specific risk content is mapped to the risk 
categories. Text passages that do not address any risk-related content are 
mapped to the placeholder category “non-risk information”. For instance, a 
discussion of general economic risks and climate, an overview on the status of 
Basel III guidelines, or an overview of the business areas of a bank are deemed 




In Nvivo the following cases31 are parameterised: 
• Non-risk information 
• Risk management and capital 
• Credit risk 
• Counterparty risk 
• Market risk 
• Operational risks 
• Liquidity risk 
• Other risks 
The cases allow the analysis of each risk separately. The querying functionality 
in Nvivo collects all text passages that are coded to a case. A final consolidation 
of the cases into the risk categories of the scoring model was done after the 
coding was finished. 
 
5.5.2 Coding Rules for Quality Criterion 1 - Readability 
For measuring readability (see section 4.4.3.1) with the Gunning-Fog 
index, text must be separated from other elements in a document. The coding 
rulebook requires coders to read through the entire disclosure report and 
physically code the text-only content to Nvivo cases. Every 
word/sentence/paragraph must be assigned to a case. Other elements such as 
tables, figures, lists, or graphics are disregarded as readability focuses only on 
text and its ease of reading. The text presentation style adds to the complexity of 
coding as the reports are often laid out in a two or three column layout. For coding 
purposes, a single page layout is preferred as only one coding case can occur 
vertically.  
The identification and separation of relevant text from other elements is a 
challenging task for coders. Regulatory risk disclosure reports vary substantially 
in size, style, and design. The majority of reports are published in a single 
document that includes all regulatory risk disclosure information as required in 
 
31 In Nvivo cases are the 'units of observation' in a research study. They might represent people, 
places, events, organisations, or other entities that are analysed and compared (Source: Nvivo 
online help function). 
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the CRR and any further voluntary information provided by the bank. In general, 
such reports tend to be easier to read as all information can be found in one 
place. A number of banks do not publish separate reports but integrate their 
regulatory risk disclosure into various chapters of their annual report (for instance 
some of the French banks). The result is that coders must first find the relevant 
chapters in the annual report. That means that the coders have to work through 
500+ pages in total. Some other banks (partly German and Swiss banks) prepare 
separate disclosure reports but make use of excessive referencing in the 
disclosure text to other reports in order to avoid redundant information. This 
approach results in disclosure reports with fewer pages but again leaves it to the 
coder to collect all required information from a variety of different sources. The 
ease of readability is reduced due to the large number of references. Lastly, a 
small number of banks spread their regulatory risk disclosure throughout their 
annual report with no coherent focus on regulatory risk disclosure. Such reports 
are impractical to read and code as they are putting the full burden on the coder 
to search for all relevant risk disclosure content. In the case of this thesis, such 
reports were removed from the sample (see 5.2.1).  
 
5.5.3 Coding Rules for Quality Criterion 2 - Comprehensiveness 
The comprehensiveness of risk disclosure reports is measured with two 
empirical indicators, one for “quantity” and one for “coverage” (see section 
4.4.3.2). The indicator “quantity” measures the overall amount of risk information 
provided in a disclosure text. The coding goal is to identify all text passages that 
are related to risk and exclude all passages that discuss general, non-risk 
relevant issues. The indicator “coverage” measures how balanced the risk 
information provided is on the various risk categories. Here, the coding goal is to 
link risk relevant content to risk categories.  
In early studies on semantic content analysis (see section 2.4.2.2), a 
manual sentence-by-sentence analysis is performed. Each sentence is coded to 
be either risk relevant or not. Despite the coder’s subjectivity this method 
produces relatively precise results. However, this method comes with a major 
drawback. It works efficiently only for short text passages. For larger text 
passages, such as the ninety disclosure reports with about 100 to 200 pages 
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each (totalling approximately 13,000 pages), this method is impractical to apply. 
It also prohibits the calculation of disclosure scores on a regular basis due to the 
recurring high coding effort.  
In this coding rulebook, a different approach is followed. A list of relevant 
risk disclosure words is compiled that capture the content of sentences and 
paragraphs automatically when processed. Relevant risk disclosure words are 
defined as words that represent the properties of the empirical indicators used in 
the risk disclosure model.  
In a first step, a subset of reports was screened sentence-by-sentence and 
all words that represent the nature of the empirical indicators were collected in a 
list. In a second processing step, the list of relevant words was automatically 
applied to the remaining documents. Such automated functionality is offered by 
the coding software Nvivo. In its word frequency count tool, a list of words can be 
passed on to the software. It then runs a query on the text for counting the number 
of occurrences of words in the list.  
For capturing the quantity of risk information in the coding process, two 
prerequisites must be in place. First, a list or words that represent “risk disclosure” 
must be compiled, and second, there needs to be a sufficient large number of 
risk words in the list. So far, the readily available word lists for risk (see Elshandidy 
et al., 2015; Li, 2010) are often related to risk reporting in financial accounting 
only and include a rather limited number of words (approximately ten words only). 
This research requires the word list to include both, general risk words (e.g., “risk” 
or “exposure”) and also specifically regulatory risk words (e.g., “RWA” or “asset 
class”) in order to get a comprehensive result (see the word lists in the Appendix 
8.3).  
Some research papers (see section 2.4.2.2) suggest performing semantic 
content analysis on sentences only and not on words and paragraphs. Correctly 
identifying sentences is problematic if a computer, and not a human performs the 
task. There is a good reason why even widespread software packages such as 
Microsoft Word only report words and paragraphs in their statistical analysis, and 
not sentences. Sentences in the English language are most often separated by 
periods (besides exclamation and question marks). However, the use of periods 
is not limited to ending a sentence. Especially in financial texts, periods are widely 
used as decimal points in numbers or in web addresses. It takes much 
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programming logic to technically identify the meaning of a period correctly. As 
Nvivo does not offer such logic either, the coding of risk words in this research 
relates to the full text and not sub-sets (sentences) of it.  
During the coding work, coders were also advised to follow a 
comprehensive approach in compiling the list of risk disclosure words. The coding 
goal is to collect as many relevant risk words as possible. The advantage is that 
even if there are some few cases that might lead to possible misinterpretations 
of the meaning, in its entirety the automated text interpretation is a good 
representation of the overall risk content and the time-consuming sentence-by-
sentence coding can be avoided. 
In practice, the following coding procedures applied for collecting risk 
words. Each coder analysed the first three disclosure reports (each one from a 
different bank) in detail and screened them for risk-relevant words. Then, all 
identified words were collected in a separate spreadsheet. In a parallel work 
stream, already existing risk word lists of other research papers (Burks et al., 
2018; Elshandidy et al., 2015; Li, 2010) were analysed and used in case they add 
value to the risk content identification. In a subsequent team meeting, the word 
lists were consolidated into one list. The final version of the regulatory risk 
disclosure word list (see appendix 8.3, table “regulatory risk disclosure words”) 
consists of about 150 risk disclosure words that are specifically relevant to 
regulatory risk reporting. Such a comprehensive list did not exist so far and adds 
practical value to further endeavours in risk disclosure research. 
The second indicator of comprehensiveness is “coverage”. It refers to the 
relative amount of risk information provided in each risk category. The aim of this 
indicator is to find out whether the provision of risk information is proportionally 
distributed among the risk categories or not. Banks are expected to disclose more 
relevant information on their material risks. Disclosures on less important risks 
must not dominate the reports although there might be an incentive to do so in 
case of adverse risk events. For this empirical indicator, there are no additional 
coding instructions required. The risk categories were coded according to the 
rules in section 5.5.1, the risk content of each risk category was identified with 




5.5.4 Coding Rules for Quality Criterion 3 - Meaningfulness 
The regulatory risk disclosure scoring model measures “meaningfulness” 
with the extent to which the risk information provided is forward-looking (see 
section 4.4.3.3). It is assumed that a reader of a risk disclosure report finds 
information more helpful if future prospects and potential impacts are evaluated, 
rather than discussing historic events. The empirical indicator for meaningfulness 
counts how much forward-looking information is provided in the disclosure 
reports relative to the overall amount of disclosure. More forward-looking 
information is ranked higher in the disclosure score than less. 
Li (2010) provides a general list of words that were found in forward-
looking statements such as the MD&A in 10-K and 10-Q filings of US firms. The 
author suggests using the words “will, should, can, could, may, might, expect, 
anticipate, believe, plan, hope, intend, seek, project, forecast, objective, and 
goal”. Words such as “shall” were purposely excluded as they are deemed to 
indicate boilerplate and legal language. The author further excludes all matches 
in the word list if the verbs are preceded with “was, were, had, and had been”, as 
the combination changes forward-looking words into past-oriented words. 
The coding in this research makes use of previous research results. It uses 
Li (2010)’s word list as a basis for expanding it to the specific risk disclosure 
requirements. Similar to the coding rules in section 5.5.3, the coding rulebook in 
this section follows a two-step approach. By analysing the first three reports (each 
from a different bank) in detail, each coder screened the text for words that 
represent a forward-looking orientation with a particular focus on regulatory risk 
regulation in the banking industry. All identified words were compiled in a 
separate spreadsheet. In comparison to Li’s wordlist, the words in this word list 
include only a few modal words but mainly forward-looking active verbs (e.g., 
decline, grow) and adjectives (e.g., positive, onward).  
In a subsequent coding team meeting, the word list from Li and the newly 
generated word lists were consolidated into one list. The final list consists of about 
sixty forward-looking words that are specifically relevant to regulatory risk 
reporting (see appendix 8.3 table “forward-looking words”). This list of forward-
looking words is much more comprehensive than previous lists and a good basis 




5.5.5 Coding Rules for Quality Criterion 4 - Time Comparability 
The quality criterion “time comparability” measures the comparability of a 
bank’s risk disclosure from one reporting period to another. Banks in general are 
not required to provide comparative information. They do so at their own 
discretion depending on their disclosure strategy. The minimal strategy is that a 
bank decides to only provide a snapshot of their risk profile at the specific point 
in time of reporting. This simple and cost-saving strategy is pursued by many 
banks as the evaluation of model results in the next chapter will show. Banks can 
also decide to enrich current quantitative (numerical) information with past 
exposures and value changes. With banks including this comparative information 
in their disclosure reports, users save time for not having to search for 
comparative information in two or more reports. A good disclosure strategy from 
the perspective of the users is if a bank adds qualitative (descriptive and 
informative) explanations on value changes in their risk exposures. This strategy 
concurs with the goal of the regulatory risk disclosure model. The model assumes 
that readers benefit the most if comparative quantitative information is enriched 
with qualitative comments and explanations.  
The coding rulebook defines how information on time comparisons is 
collected. While coding, reports are screened for words that banks use in their 
disclosure reports to explain and comment on past changes over time. Words 
that fall in this category are words such as “change, compare, differ, 
increase/decrease”. This includes words that highlight a particular change in a 
risk number from one period to the other. The list of comparative words also 
includes words that explain changes and developments in underlying risk 
categories. A list of approximately forty words representing time comparisons was 
compiled in a spreadsheet by the coders. The complete list of words can be found 
in the appendix 8.3 table “time comparability words”. 
 
5.5.6 Coding Rules for Quality Criterion 5 - Sector Comparability 
The quality criterion “sector comparability” measures how easily readers 
can access and compare qualitative information on regulatory risk exposures in 
disclosure reports from different banks. There is no overall reporting standard 
available that makes reports easily comparable across banks. It is at the 
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discretion of the banks in which structure they disclose their risk profile and 
exposures. The structure of reports and the way risk information is presented 
varies substantially from bank to bank, making it difficult for the users to identify 
comparable information in different reports. Additionally, banks face the trade-off 
between customising their reports to their specific risk profile and standardizing 
them to make them more easily comparable to reports from other banks.  
The proposed regulatory risk disclosure model suggests an interbank 
structural comparison of reports. The model assumes that it benefits the users if 
the report structures are shared by different banks, and that matching risk 
information can be found easily in one common place. 
The coding rulebook defines how the information on sector comparability 
is collected from the reports. As all report structures are different, there first must 
be a standard structure established to which individual report structures can be 
mapped. This is done by comparing the table of contents from the reports of the 
top five banks in the sample ranked by asset size. The group of the top five banks 
consists of one UK, two French, one Spanish and one German bank. These 
banks are the industry leaders as the reports of this group can act as a 
benchmark. Other banks are likely to follow this best practice approach. From the 
report structures of the top five banks, a common template for an “optimal” report 
structure is consolidated and an “industry benchmark” is set. The final template 
consists of a list of 25 structural items that readers can expect and easily find in 
any report. The template with the industry benchmark can be found in appendix 
8.4. In a next processing step, the template is applied to the ninety disclosure 
reports in the sample, and scoring points are awarded for every structural match.  
As far as the coding work is concerned, the tables of contents of each 
report were the starting point for analysing the underlying structure of the reports. 
Coders were required to code the first three levels of the tables of contents to a 
predefined node in Nvivo. The tables of contents were then exported to a 
separate spreadsheet where coders compared each structure with the 
benchmark template. For each match, a point is awarded; a maximum number of 





5.5.7 Coding Rules for Supplementary Information  
The regulatory risk disclosure model requires the coding of supplementary 
information that is needed for processing the scoring model and calculating the 
composite disclosure scores. As the risk profile of every bank is different, not 
every risk category in the scoring model is of the same importance to each bank. 
Banks are expected to proportionally disclose more information on risk categories 
which are of greater importance to their business models than on others. In order 
to make individual scores on risk categories comparable across banks, they must 
be weighted with their relative importance in banks’ asset portfolios. 
In the coding rulebook, coders were required to identify the values for the 
risk-weighted assets (RWA) per risk category in the reports, and code them to 
the Nvivo node “RWA”. From 2017 onwards, RWA information can be found in a 
table labelled “EU OV1 (regulatory capital requirements)” in the disclosure 
reports. Before that date, information on RWA is spread throughout the reports. 
In a second step, the RWA values per risk category and bank are exported to a 
separate spreadsheet where they are further processed. 
5.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter covered the implementation of the scoring model and its 
application to a sample of regulatory risk disclosure reports. Following the 
technical architecture, the model was programmed in Nvivo, python, SPSS, and 
Excel. Then, for testing purposes, a sample of 90 reports was selected, and the 
model was applied to them. This task also required the writing of a coding rule 
book and performing several validity and reliability checks on the coding work.  
The overall coding project was time-consuming and lasted for about half a 
year. More than 10,000 pages were coded. The work consisted of  
• a preparatory phase where reports were collected from banks’ websites, 
categorised, and checked for suitability, 
• a kick-off phase where coders were instructed on their coding tasks, 
introduced to the software, and the coding work was structured in work 
packages, 
• a coding phase where the actual coding was done and the model was applied,  
• a consolidation phase where quality checks were performed and the individual 
results were consolidated into composite disclosure scores. 
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6 Chapter Six: Evaluation of Scoring Model Results 
6.1 Overview 
In this chapter, the scoring model results are presented and evaluated. 
This is first done on a single quality criterion basis for readability, 
comprehensiveness, meaningfulness, time comparability and sector 
comparability. Then, the composite disclosure scores for all ninety reports in the 
sample are analysed. Each section presents results followed by an in-depth 
analysis on selected issues offering insights into various aspects of the quality of 
regulatory risk disclosure reports. 
The basis for the evaluation in this chapter and the steps preceding this 
analysis are (1) the implementation of the functionalities as laid out in the model 
development in section 4.5.1, (2) the coding of disclosure reports as described in 
the coding rule book in section 5.5 and (3) the execution of all programmes on 
the coded reports as listed in the technical environment plan of section 5.1. The 
chapter then continues with a quantitative statistical analysis of the model results. 
Principal components analysis as one method of factor analysis is performed to 
retrieve underlying patterns in the disclosure reports and to check the statistical 
significance of the chosen quality criteria. Finally, the scoring model results are 
discussed in relation to agency theory.  
 
6.2 Evaluation of Quality Criteria Results 
6.2.1 Evaluation of Quality Criterion 1 Readability  
The Gunning-Fog index measures the reading difficulty of a text. The 
higher the index, the higher the education level needed to comprehend the text. 
As a general rule, a text that can be well understood by college students results 
in Gunning-Fog index values between 13 to 16, university graduates reach levels 
of above 17 (Gunning, 1952). For example, an index value of 17 means that 17 
years of formal education are needed for a good text comprehension (twelve 
years of primary and high school education, four years of college education and 
eventually a postgraduate degree).  
The difficulty level is expressed by a formula that considers two variables, 
the average word length of a sentence, and the count of words with three or more 
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syllables. The index assumes that a text is more difficult to comprehend if the 
average word count in sentences is higher and if the text includes more complex 
words. The sum of both variables is then weighted by a factor of 0.4 for the 
English language. 32 
Gunning-Fog readability indices are calculated for all ninety reports in the 
sample (see section 4.5.2.1). Table 16 shows the Gunning-Fog index values for 




Gunning-Fog Index Values 
Banks 2016 2017 2018 
 Bank from AT  18.22 17.67 18.21 
 Bank from BE  18.46 18.72 18.88 
 Bank from CH  16.40 17.31 17.99 
 Bank 1 from DE  17.18 18.77 20.37 
 Bank 2 from DE  18.63 20.24 18.25 
 Bank 3 from DE  12.11 11.88 12.15 
 Bank 4 from DE  16.13 16.12 16.13 
 Bank 5 from DE  17.38 17.13 17.10 
 Bank 6 from DE  16.90 16.77 13.11 
 Bank from DK  15.61 16.77 16.48 
 Bank 1 from ES  25.02 23.20 23.97 
 Bank 2 from ES  26.17 26.88 25.26 
 Bank 3 from ES  18.14 18.07 20.30 
 Bank from FI  13.91 13.81 13.61 
 Bank 1 from FR  19.27 19.54 19.75 
 Bank 2 from FR  19.22 19.40 18.10 
 Bank 3 from FR  16.30 25.37 24.88 
 Bank 4 from FR  21.29 20.38 20.97 
 Bank 5 from FR  15.71 22.17 20.46 
 Bank 1 from GB  18.79 18.60 18.30 
 Bank 2 from GB  20.77 20.33 20.43 
 Bank 3 from GB  20.45 22.11 21.74 
 Bank 4 from GB  16.30 15.40 15.40 
 
32 0.4 is the weight for texts in the English language (which is the case in this thesis). Other 
languages have different weights (Gunning, 1952). 
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 Bank 5 from GB  21.06 17.61 20.70 
 Bank 6 from GB  17.99 18.18 18.48 
 Bank 1 from IT  24.21 24.30 23.50 
 Bank 2 from IT  21.96 23.14 25.10 
 Bank 1 from NL  15.85 16.40 16.26 
 Bank 2 from NL  13.77 13.25 14.99 
 Bank from SE  12.94 13.04 15.07 
 Averages 18.20 18.75 18.86 
Table 16: Gunning-Fog index values per bank and year 
 
The consolidated results can be seen in Figure 30. The figure shows that 
the average Gunning-Fog index (the “mean”) for the thirty reports is 18.20 in 
2016. This figure increases to 18.75 and 18.86 in 2017 and 2018, respectively. 
The average index value for the entire three-year period is 18.61.  
 
 
Figure 30: Average Gunning-Fog indices for 2016 - 2018 
 
An average Gunning-Fog index value of about 18 to 19 means that it needs 
a university graduate degree to understand EU bank risk disclosure reports well. 
This implies that user groups with lower educational levels practically have less 
access to information in these reports. Moreover, the increasing index value over 
time suggests that reading difficulty continues to grow. The results confirm the 
concerns raised by leading policymakers and standard setters about the 
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readability of regulatory risk disclosures (see for instance Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (2015); EBA (2020); Enhanced Disclosure Task Force, 
(2012)). Financial institutions need to think how to make their risk reporting more 
easily accessible if they want to become attractive to a larger group of 
stakeholders, and not remain in their insiders’ echo chamber. 




  2016 2017 2018 
Total 
2016 - 2018 
Count 30 30 30 90 
Mean 18.20 18.75 18.86 18.61 
Standard Error 0.62 0.67 0.65 0.37 
Median 18.07 18.39 18.39 18.24 
Mode 16.30 16.77 16.70 16.30 
Standard Deviation 3.38 3.64 3.54 3.49 
Sample Variance 11.44 13.28 12.50 12.21 
Kurtosis 0.21 -0.13 -0.52 -0.31 
Skewness 0.53 0.28 0.13 0.30 
Minimum 12.11 11.88 12.15 11.88 
Maximum 26.17 26.88 25.26 26.88 
Table 17: Descriptive statistics on readability per year and total 
 
Columns two to four show the average statistics of the Gunning-Fog index 
values for the respective years (thirty reports per year), while column five includes 
statistics of the total average index value for the three-year period 2016 – 2018.  
The observed standard deviations (between 3.38 and 3.64) are about 
20 % of the annual means. This percentage indicates that about two-thirds of the 
disclosure reports fall in a group with Gunning-Fog indices between 
approximately 16 and 22 (18.61 +/- 20%). This is a relatively wide range and 
confirms that regulatory risk reports are by far not homogeneous in their writing 
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style. Also, the way the qualitative information is presented in the disclosure 
reports differs substantially from one report to another.  
Looking at the extreme outliers in the distribution of readability results, 
there are few reports with Gunning-Fog index values of 12 (see “Minimum” in 
Table 17). This suggests that such reports are written in a language style that is 
rather easy to understand. On the other extreme, some reports achieve index 
values up to 26 (see “Maximum” in Table 17). Such reports would include long 
and technical sentences, and a high number of complex words, making them 
extraordinarily difficult to understand.  
The distribution of the ninety Gunning-Fog indices is not a perfectly normal 
distribution. The values for “skewness” in Table 17 are positive for all years 
indicating negatively skewed results.33 This happens when a relatively larger 
number of Gunning-Fog indices is grouped close to the left of the mean but are 
offset by a smaller number of values far to the right of the mean. The graphical 
histogram in Figure 31 confirms this observation.  
 
 
Figure 31: Frequency distribution of Gunning-Fog indices 
 
The histogram also reveals a further practical issue. The numbers on top of the 
columns represent the total number of reports that fall in the respective Gunning-
 




Fog index ranges on the x-axis. Although it depends on where readers of reports 
draw a line of a maximum acceptable index value, it can be seen that exactly 
sixty reports are below a Gunning-Fog index of 20 (the three columns to the left, 
values 11, 22, and 27, in total 60). This indicates that about two-third of the 
sample reports are considered to have an acceptable reading difficulty. The other 
third of reports needs attention with respect to readability. If these banks want 
their reports to be comprehended well by average readers, they should attempt 
to use a much less sophisticated language.  
Although the average Gunning-Fog indices across all banks are widely 
distributed (see the standard deviation about 20 % of the mean), the Gunning-
Fog indices per bank over 2016 - 2018 do not change much. Table 18 
summarises the period changes per bank.  
 
Gunning-Fog Index Changes per Bank 
% changes for period 2016 to 2018 Number of banks 
< 1% 8 
1% - 5% 15 
> 5% 7 
Table 18: Changes of Gunning-Fog index changes per bank 
 
Only seven out of the thirty banks in the sample experience a change of more 
than 5% in the Gunning-Fog indices over 2016 - 2018. The main reason for such 
a change can be attributed to major changes in individual banks’ disclosure 
policies and practices. The seven banks stem from several countries and they all 
restructured their disclosure reports in this period. The reading difficulty of eight 
reports remains very stable (less than a 1% change for the three-year period). 
This stability might be explained by a copy-and-paste strategy where standard 
text modules are recycled in later reports. Fifteen reports changed by a factor 
between 1% to 5%. Such a change can be expected for reports that are annually 
adjusted for new events and developments happening within the reporting period.  
The average levels of Gunning-Fog indices are also not evenly distributed 
across EU countries. The columns in Figure 32 show average Gunning-Fog 





Figure 32: Average Gunning-Fog indices per country 
 
Banks from northern EU countries (Finland, Sweden) tend to prepare 
disclosure reports that are more easily accessible to their stakeholders (average 
Gunning-Fog indices below 15). Countries from the southern part of the EU (Italy, 
Spain) use much more difficult language with index values high above 20. There 
are several potential explanations for these observations. It can be either a 
cultural question (Hofstede, 1980), a statistical issue as the number of banks in 
the sample from the North is relatively smaller than that from the South (see Table 
12), or a question of language translation of the reports. It is unknown whether 
reports are written by native English speakers or were originally written in local 
languages by experienced bank employees and then translated by people with 
possibly less experience in translating financial texts.  
Firm size is often quoted as a reason for better disclosure quality (Deumes 
& Knechel, 2008; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012). Larger firms are viewed to have 
more financial resources available to spend on a more sophisticated disclosure 
policy. In this thesis, such an effect cannot be confirmed with respect to the 
readability of disclosure reports. Figure 33 shows the regression analysis of 
banks’ Gunning-Fog indices relative to their total asset size (represented by the 





Figure 33: Regression analysis on total assets vs. Gunning-Fog  
 
The regression line with an intercept at 16.69 (y-axis) and a positive but small 
positive slope of only 0.0024 indicates a slightly upward trend suggesting that 
larger banks prepare reports that are minimally more difficult to read. Despite this 
slight increase it is problematic to speak from a significant relationship. The 
reading difficulty of disclosure reports does not seem to strongly depend on the 
total asset base of a bank. Insofar, with respect to reading difficulty, the results 
from the studies of Deumes and Knechel (2008) and Elzahar and Hussainey 
(2012) cannot be confirmed for risk disclosure reports.  
Finally, regulators divide banks into institutions that are systemically 
important on a global (G-SII), national (O-SII) or only local basis. Regulatory 
authorities have a particular focus on the first two groups of banks as they could 
pose a threat to the broader economy and society; especially during economic 
downturn (Financial Stability Board, 2017). Banks in the global group also must 
communicate their risk profile in more detail to the public than those of the 
national group. The local group (usually small banks that are not part of this study) 
have a reduced disclosure burden. 






 Figure 34: Index comparison banks with global vs. national relevance 
 
The average Gunning-Fog index of banks from the G-SII global systemically 
important group is about one grade higher than that of the O-SII national 
systemically important group. This means that G-SII disclosure reports are, on 
average, more difficult to read than those of the national group. This observation 
can be attributed to the higher complexity of explaining the risk profile of globally 
active banks, compared to the lesser active national banks.  
 
6.2.2 Evaluation of Quality Criterion 2 Comprehensiveness  
6.2.2.1 Quantity 
The effect of the quantity of disclosed information is an area of major 
interest in disclosure research. A majority of studies find that more disclosure is 
better than less, and that the amount of disclosure is positively correlated with 
the size and complexity of a firm’s operations (see section 2.2.7). Table 19 shows 







Total number of risk words per bank and year 
Banks 2016 2017 2018 
 Bank from AT   5,032   5,849   6,321  
 Bank from BE   4,079   4,264   4,164  
 Bank from CH   1,982   2,600   2,685  
 Bank 1 from DE   6,013   7,461   7,450  
 Bank 2 from DE   3,932   4,928   6,608  
 Bank 3 from DE   4,181   4,773   5,206  
 Bank 4 from DE   2,384   4,222   4,261  
 Bank 5 from DE   4,282   4,354   4,961  
 Bank 6 from DE   2,819   4,188   3,623  
 Bank from DK   3,747   4,459   3,815  
 Bank 1 from ES   3,528   3,968   4,535  
 Bank 2 from ES   5,206   5,297   5,281  
 Bank 3 from ES   7,460   8,397   8,995  
 Bank from FI   4,154   4,014   4,388  
 Bank 1 from FR   6,501   6,748   7,029  
 Bank 2 from FR   5,097   5,217   7,453  
 Bank 3 from FR   6,977   7,570   8,107  
 Bank 4 from FR   3,992   5,130   6,561  
 Bank 5 from FR   908   1,818   2,377  
 Bank 1 from GB   3,316   3,492   3,180  
 Bank 2 from GB   8,833   8,482   8,291  
 Bank 3 from GB   4,051   5,850   5,612  
 Bank 4 from GB   3,494   4,667   4,483  
 Bank 5 from GB   2,047   2,436   2,449  
 Bank 6 from GB   2,750   2,826   3,108  
 Bank 1 from IT   11,451   12,576   11,215  
 Bank 2 from IT   9,533   9,171   10,072  
 Bank 1 from NL   2,719   2,124   2,235  
 Bank 2 from NL   3,913   4,638   4,780  
 Bank from SE   4,322   4,722   2,977  
 Averages per year  4,623   5,208   5,407  




Table 20 summarises the average quantities of risk information given in 
regulatory risk disclosure reports on the predefined risk categories for the sample 
banks. The numbers in the table are the counts of risk-relevant words in the 
reports (see Appendix 8.3). 















1,035 2,082 696 224 586 4,623 
Average 
2017 
1,174 2,281 755 241 756 5,208 
Average 
2018 
1,309 2,337 793 247 721 5,407 
Average 
TOTAL 
1,173 2,234 748 237 688 5,080 
Table 20: Quantities of risk-relevant information 
 
On average, a risk disclosure report consists of 5,080 risk relevant words 
for the period 2016 - 2018. A strong upward trend can be spotted from 4,623 
words on average in 2016 to 5,407 words in 2018. This is an increase in risk 
reporting of about 17% over two years. A similar increase can also be observed 
in the individual risk categories. Without exception, all risk disclosure quantities 
on risk management, credit risk, market risk, operational risk, and other risks grow 
over the research period. This upward trend can be explained by banks gaining 
experience in risk reporting, valuing the opportunities this channel of 
communication with stakeholders provides, and experiencing growing public 
pressure to explain their risk profile in more detail.  
In section 4.3, it is discussed that credit risk is the most important risk 
category for European banks. This statement can be confirmed by the results in 
Table 20 and Figure 35. Over the three-year period of analysis, disclosure on 





Figure 35: Percentages of disclosures on risk categories 
 
Figure 35 indicates that close to half (44%) of the total risk disclosure is dedicated 
to credit risk. About another quarter (23%) is on general explanations of risk 
management strategies, organisation, and processes. Market risk constitutes a 
rather meagre share of 15%, comparable to the amount of information given on 
other risks such as liquidity, encumbered assets, and insurance risks (“other 
risks”). It comes as a surprise that operational risks only cover a proportion of 5%. 
An explanation for this low share can be that banks focus on their internal 
operational risks in disclosure reports, while other reporting on environmental, 
social and governance (ESG) risks are outsourced to the newly introduced 
reporting standards on non-financial risks.  
Further managerial insights can be gained by looking at the results at bank 
level. The descriptive statistics in Table 21 show that there is not yet a common 
agreement on the optimal amount of disclosure quantity. There are banks that 
invest a large effort into very wordy disclosures, while others report close to 





















Mean 1,173 2,234 748 237 688 5,080 
Standard 
Error 
69.56 113.36 50.51 21.02 50.92 246.77 
Mode 1,077 2,118 1,121 n/a n/a 5,206 
Standard 
Deviation 
659.95 1.075.44 479.15 199.39 483.06 2.341.04 
Kurtosis 1.04 3.14 1.13 - 0.14 - 0.13 0.83 
Skewness 1.04 1.54 1.12 0.83 0.70 1.00 
Minimum 197 344 15 0 0 908 
Maximum 3,395 6,147 2,158 763 2,124 12,576 
Count 90 90 90 90 90 90 
Table 21: Descriptive statistics on quantities of risk disclosures 
 
Looking at the row “Minimum” in Table 21, it can be seen that there are 
banks that disclose very little in general and even nothing on operational and 
other risks. On the other hand, the row “Maximum” shows that, for instance, on 
credit risk there are banks that disclose three times more than the average value 
(6,147 risk words reported compared to the average of 2,234). This results in high 
standard deviations on all risk categories as can be seen in Table 21.  
Furthermore, the data distribution is skewed to the right as the positive 
skewness factors and Figure 36 show. This is expected as banks are not limited 
by a maximum amount of information sharing (right side of the distribution) but 






Figure 36: Histogram on quantitative disclosure 
 
Finally, the thirty banks in the sample are headquartered in various EU 
countries where disclosure strategies may differ despite the so-called level 
playing field in EU financial services. Often regulatory authorities of one country 
issue best practice guidelines that are followed by their supervised banks.34 Table 
22 shows average amounts disclosed by banks on a country by country basis; 
ranked from highest to lowest.  
  
 
34 As it is for instance the case in Germany with the Deutsche Bundesbank 
“Anwendungsbeispiele” (best practice examples). 
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IT 4,491 15,372 5,916 1,369 3,761 30,907 
ES 3,601 6,552 3,045 1,094 3,264 17,556 
AT 3,283 7,833 2,881 943 2,262 17,202 
FR 5,095 5,354 1,829 1,071 2,947 16,297 
DE 3,427 6,533 1,965 405 1,945 14,274 
GB 2,993 6,780 1,696 490 1,270 13,228 
FI 2,103 6,135 2,369 912 1,037 12,556 
BE 2,758 5,307 2,406 641 1,395 12,507 
DK 3,129 3,495 2,493 864 2,040 12,021 
SE 2,888 6,073 763 720 1,577 12,021 
NL 2,198 5,549 1,308 248 902 10,205 
CH 994 4,041 1,725 56 451 7,267 
Table 22: Quantity of disclosed information by country  
 
The data in Table 22 reveal that regarding the quantity of disclosed 
information, Italy ranks first (30,907 words on average per disclosure report), 
while Switzerland comes last (7,267 words on average per disclosure report). It 
is interesting to observe that Italy and also Spain rank high in the reading difficulty 
of criterion one. A too large number of words appears to also lead to a higher 
reading difficulty. Banks in the sample from other countries form a relatively 
homogeneous group where the quantity disclosed ranges between 12,000 to 
17,500 words.  
 
6.2.2.2 Coverage 
The quantity of disclosed information demonstrates the bank’s openness 
and effort to communicate its risk profile to its stakeholders. However, quantity 
alone is not sufficient to ensure that a bank covers all relevant risk categories. It 
is possible that a large number of words is spent on less relevant subjects, 
thereby distracting the reader from the more important, potentially critical risk 
areas. Therefore, the proposed scoring model also analyses the balanced 
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coverage of risk categories in disclosure reports measured by the Herfindahl 
index (see section 4.5.2.2). The index empirically measures the extent to which 
various risk categories are covered in a text relative to the total amount of 
disclosure. If the disclosure on one risk category dominates the other categories, 
then the index raises a warning signal of an imbalanced disclosure policy.  
The potential values for the Herfindahl Index (HHI) are between 1/n ≤ HHI 
≤ 1 (where n is the sample size). A high value of HHI means that the disclosure 
is concentrated on one subject, while a value to the lower end means that 
disclosure is more balanced across the risk categories. Consequently, the 
expected values for HHI on the disclosure reports would preferably be located in 
the lower region. 
Table 23 shows the descriptive statistics for the coverage criterion 
measured by the Herfindahl index for the sample of ninety reports with respect to 




Standard Error 0.01 
Median 0.30 
Standard Deviation 0.09 






Table 23: Descriptive statistics on coverage (Herfindahl index)  
 
The mean of all Herfindahl indices of the ninety disclosure reports is 0.33. 
Considering the lower border given by 1/n = 1/90 = 0.01 (periodic) and the upper 
border of 1, the average index lies within the lower half of the distribution. The 
value of 0.33 implies that banks on average do not concentrate their risk 
disclosures on one subject only. On the other hand, disclosures are also not 
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perfectly balanced as can be seen in Figure 37. This means that not all risk 
categories are of the same importance to the sample banks. For example, more 
disclosure is expected on credit risk than on other risks due to its relative 
importance to banks. In most cases, credit risk is the dominant risk category that 
requires a higher level of disclosure quantity (see 4.3.1).  
Table 23 also shows that the minimum and maximum values of Herfindahl 
indices range from 0.22 up to 0.71, respectively. The upper values are of concern 
because this means that risk disclosure is concentrated around one risk category 
only, potentially neglecting other categories. However, only a few reports need 




Figure 37: Histogram on the distribution of the Herfindahl index 
 
The histogram in Figure 37 highlights the fact that reports with high 
Herfindahl indices are rather extreme outliers. The large majority of reports show 
low HHI values in an acceptable range between 0.22 and 0.36. The first two 
columns (including reports with HHI values up to 0.36) make up a combined 75 
reports. There are only a few outliers on the right tail that dominantly focus on 
one risk subject. All these banks share a focus on credit risk which can be 
attributed to the particular situation of the bank during the reporting period. 
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Overall, the problem of too high HHI index values is not widespread in the sample. 
For the large majority of reports, Figure 37 confirms the findings from Miihkinen 
(2011) that disclosure is well spread across several risk categories.  
 
6.2.3 Evaluation of Quality Criterion 3 Meaningfulness  
This section presents results on the meaningfulness of disclosure reports 
which considers how useful disclosed information is to stakeholders. Prior 
research shows that often boilerplate language is used and a copy-and-paste 
approach from one report to the next is applied (International Accounting 
Standards Board, 2017; UNCTAD, 2017). For a report to be meaningful, the 
content must be relevant to the needs of the users. This is the case if the 
information summarises the current risk profile of a bank well. However, in risk 
management it is even more relevant for readers to get an outlook and guidance 
on the impact of potential future economic scenarios on the current risk profile 
(Enhanced Disclosure Task Force, 2012; IFRS, 2019).  
The meaningfulness criterion measures the extent to which disclosure 
reports include forward-looking information on risks and their impacts. Based on 
a list of forward-looking words (see Appendix 8.3), the empirical indicator for 
meaningfulness counts the amount of information provided on potential future 
developments (see section 4.5.2.3). The scoring model assumes that the more 
forward-looking the information given by a bank is, the higher the quality of the 
disclosure report becomes.  
Table 24 shows the total number of forward-looking words published per 




Number of Forward-looking Words per Bank and Year 
 Banks 2016 2017 2018 
 Bank from AT  1,085 1,148 1,208 
 Bank from BE  641 705 756 
 Bank from CH  278 339 337 
 Bank 1 from DE  931 1,090 1,055 
 Bank 2 from DE  460 555 844 
 Bank 3 from DE  903 971 1045 
 Bank 4 from DE  438 804 834 
 Bank 5 from DE  937 961 1115 
 Bank 6 from DE  352 703 564 
 Bank from DK  824 979 753 
 Bank 1 from ES  829 961 1099 
 Bank 2 from ES  1,166 1,220 1,182 
 Bank 3 from ES  1,991 2,238 2,572 
 Bank from FI  626 660 719 
 Bank 1 from FR  1,616 1,659 1,688 
 Bank 2 from FR  1,035 1,111 1,802 
 Bank 3 from FR  1,684 1,874 2,030 
 Bank 4 from FR  1,097 1,244 1,796 
 Bank 5 from FR  170 368 563 
 Bank 1 from GB  655 671 598 
 Bank 2 from GB  2,019 1,941 1,911 
 Bank 3 from GB  761 1,089 977 
 Bank 4 from GB  572 766 722 
 Bank 5 from GB  315 338 345 
 Bank 6 from GB  597 581 693 
 Bank 1 from IT  2,703 2,919 2,530 
 Bank 2 from IT  1,946 1,892 2,165 
 Bank 1 from NL  341 238 262 
 Bank 2 from NL  773 963 908 
 Bank from SE  626 716 390 
 Averages per year  946 1,057 1,115 
 Total average     1,039 




Figure 38 compares the average amount of information provided on 
current risk exposures (data is reused from quality criterion 2 on quantity) with 
the average information provided on potential future impacts of these exposures. 
 
 
Figure 38: Comparison of current versus forward risk disclosure  
 
At first sight, the figure shows that there is a huge difference in the raw 
amount of current and future risk disclosure. Much information is given on current 
risk exposures across all risk categories, but only about one fifth of the 
information is given on the future impacts. This discrepancy is a major concern 
as expectations from stakeholders are possibly not met by banks. There are 
several explanations for this mismatch. For banks, it appears to be easier to 
summarise their current risk profile only as a discussion on future uncertainties 
needs a lot more management discretion. Banks are often reluctant to forecast 
developments as the legal impact of potential misguidance can be devastating 
(Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000; Verrecchia, 1990). Another reason lies in the objective 
of regulatory risk reporting itself. Banks tend to view regulatory risk disclosure as 
 
211 
just another report to prepare in order to fulfil a legal requirement. and are not yet 
aware of the power of risk disclosure to differentiate themselves from others with 
higher quality reports (UNCTAD, 2017).  
Some further insights on meaningfulness of risk disclosure reports can be 




Standard Error 65.63 
Median 906 
Mode 626 






Table 25: Descriptive statistics on meaningfulness  
 
On average, disclosure reports in the sample include 1,039 forward-
looking words. Considering the minimum and maximum numbers of forward-
looking words, it can be seen that the disclosure policy pursued differs much 
across banks. There is a group of banks that basically refrains from giving 
forward-looking information at all (a meagre 170 words only per report) and settle 
on summarizing the current risk profile. Other banks are more proactive and 
discuss future economic impacts on their risk exposures with a maximum of about 
2,900 forward-looking words. Still, these overall low numbers on forward-looking 
information confirm the observation that for the research period, banks view 
disclosure reports mainly as a tool to convey their current risk profile.   
The trend of the meaningfulness criterion across individual risk categories 





Figure 39: Trend in forward-looking disclosure  
 
Figure 39 shows that in absolute amounts the most forward-looking 
information is provided on credit risks, followed by the risk management category. 
The least forward-looking information is given on operational risks (less than 
hundred words on average). These observations are in line with the findings from 
quality criteria quantity and coverage over the period of study where credit risk 
dominates the other risk categories (European Banking Authority, 2017). Table 
26 shows the total Risk-Weighted Asset (RWA) values for the banks in the 
sample for 2018. Credit risk is by far  the most important risk category (5,809.67 
bEUR) and banks must give priority to a discussion of this category. Considering 
that the RWA of operational risk is the second-largest value, it is a matter of 
concern why relatively little forward-looking disclosure is made on this risk 
category (see Figure 39 with the lowest number of forward-looking words on 
operational risks).  
 
Total RWA Values per 2018 (in bEUR) for the sample 
Credit risk Counterparty risk Market risk Operational risk Other risks 
5,809.67 331.02 336.35 920.17 105.69 




Figure 39 also reveals that there is not much progress made with regards 
to increasing the absolute amount of forward-looking information provided for the 
period 2016 to 2018. Professional bodies such as the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IFRS, 2019) and banking authorities (EBA, 2020) make such 
a recommendation to enhance the usefulness of disclosure reports. Although 
there is a slight increase from one year to the next the improvements in disclosing 
forward-looking information are small.  
 
6.2.4 Evaluation of Quality Criterion 4 Time comparability  
Banks are expected to disclose their current risks (quality criterion quantity 
and coverage) as well as discuss the potential future impacts on their risk 
exposures (quality criterion meaningfulness) (EBA, 2020; IFRS, 2019). This 
would increase stakeholders’ understanding of the bank management’s insights 
on current and future risks and how they will be managed. However, often it is 
not only the absolute values of risk exposures that concern stakeholders, but the 
relative changes in exposures from one reporting period to the other. 
Stakeholders can analyse such changes by comparing the figures from two 
consecutive disclosure reports themselves which, however, would be 
burdensome. Alternatively, this task can be done by the preparers of the risk 
reports. Often, banks have the data readily available, allowing them to directly 
provide comparative information in their disclosure reports. Quantitative 
comparisons in the form of adding the numerical changes from one period to the 
other are standard in many reports. The time comparability criterion captures the 
number of qualitative comments and explanations provided by banks on changes 
in risk exposures over time. It does so by counting the occurrences of words that 
indicate a qualitative time comparison (see Appendix 8.3). Table 27 shows the 
number of words on time comparisons published per bank and year in the 




Number of Words on Time Comparisons per Bank and Year  
 Banks 2016 2017 2018 
 Bank from AT  121 150 167 
 Bank from BE  225 233 213 
 Bank from CH  68 97 97 
 Bank 1 from DE  256 246 197 
 Bank 2 from DE  119 132 243 
 Bank 3 from DE  125 146 159 
 Bank 4 from DE  95 137 174 
 Bank 5 from DE  101 125 162 
 Bank 6 from DE  73 89 68 
 Bank from DK  141 172 147 
 Bank 1 from ES  148 185 207 
 Bank 2 from ES  232 226 239 
 Bank 3 from ES  283 329 387 
 Bank from FI  220 197 240 
 Bank 1 from FR  313 315 309 
 Bank 2 from FR  190 211 371 
 Bank 3 from FR  342 377 445 
 Bank 4 from FR  177 162 283 
 Bank 5 from FR  22 33 80 
 Bank 1 from GB  105 122 109 
 Bank 2 from GB  408 385 334 
 Bank 3 from GB  142 233 224 
 Bank 4 from GB  189 208 178 
 Bank 5 from GB  76 99 106 
 Bank 6 from GB  115 100 122 
 Bank 1 from IT  457 539 449 
 Bank 2 from IT  297 303 385 
 Bank 1 from NL  157 118 121 
 Bank 2 from NL  163 191 170 
 Bank from SE  262 279 160 
 Averages per year 187 205 218 
Total average      203 




Results in the next Table 28 show that qualitative comments on time 
comparisons per risk category are not very common in regulatory risk disclosures 
of the sample banks.  













2016 39 77 36 7 28 187 
2017 43 79 38 9 36 205 
2018 51 85 40 8 34 218 
Table 28: Averages on time comparisons per risk category  
 
The total average of time comparison words (far right column) shows very low 
absolute values of around 200 words per disclosure report. This figure is low 
compared to the much higher values found in section 6.2.2.1 on the total quantity 
of disclosed risk information and in section 6.2.3 on the amount of forward-looking 
information. Commenting on changes over time is not very common in disclosure 
reports yet, despite the identified need of stakeholders for such information 
(Enhanced Disclosure Task Force, 2012; International Accounting Standards 
Board, 2017; UNCTAD, 2017). 
The descriptive statistics on time comparisons for the whole sample are 
presented in Table 29. They suggest that besides a rather low level of time 
comparison disclosure in general, individual disclosure reports in the sample are 






Standard Error 11.17 
Median 178 
Mode 68 







Table 29: Descriptive statistics on time comparisons  
 
There are some reports that basically do not comment on exposure changes over 
time at all (minimum value of 22 time comparison words only), while others that 
are more proactive include 539 occurrences of time comparison words. The table 
also shows that the distribution for time comparison data is skewed to the left 
(indicated by a positive skewness factor of 0.90). This means that the disclosure 
reports with the maximum values of time comparison words are rather large 
outliers with only a low number of reports. Still, these outliers move the average 
number of time comparison words up to 203, otherwise the average would be 
even lower. The problem with low time comparison comments in disclosure 




Grouped Time Comparisons per Report 
Number of words with time 
comparisons Number of reports 
less than 100 occurrences 12 
100 - 250 occurrences 52 
more than 250 occurrences 26 
Table 30: Grouped time comparisons per report 
 
There are twelve out of ninety disclosure reports that include one hundred or less 
time comparison words. These reports do not give stakeholders many 
explanations for periodic changes and, therefore, need management attention 
and potential improvements. About half of the reports provide between 100 and 
250 time comparison words, while 26 reports include more than 250 words. 
However, the maximum amount is limited by 539 words. Despite these low 
values, Table 31 shows a slight positive trend in time comparisons disclosures 
over 2016 - 2018.  
 
Trend in time comparison disclosures (2016 – 2018) 
% changes in the number of 




Table 31: Trend time comparison disclosures  
 
About half of the thirty banks in the sample increased their time comparison 
disclosures by more than 20% over the three-year period, and another thirteen 
banks remained on a stable disclosure level. Only a small minority of three banks 
reduced their disclosures on time comparisons. Considering that stakeholders 
appreciate support when making time comparisons of banks’ disclosure reports 
(EBA, 2020), the positive trend seen in Table 31 is encouraging but starting from 
a rather low level (see Table 28). 
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Finally, a closer look at a comparison of time comparability across all risk 
categories in Figure 40 shows that the highest effort for explaining the changes 
in risk profiles is put into the credit risk category.  
 
 
Figure 40: Frequency distributions on time comparability  
 
The number of time comparison words is nearly double for credit risk 
compared to those of risk management and market risk. On the other hand, it is 
a matter of concern to stakeholders that time comparisons for operational risk are 
almost non-existent. An explanation of this could be that changes in operational 
risks tend to occur more slowly than in other more volatile risk categories such 
as market risks. However, management needs to be aware that, in the rare event 
of an operational risk becoming imminent, the damage can be threatening for the 
entire bank. In such cases, stakeholders would demand sufficient information to 




6.2.5 Evaluation of Quality Criterion 5 Sector Comparability 
Readers of regulatory risk disclosure reports benefit from comparing 
reports of one bank over a number of periods. They also benefit from comparing 
reports of different banks across the banking industry. Peer group comparisons 
help the readers to evaluate how one bank ranks in risk profile and management 
compared to its competitors.  
Comparing reports of different banks, however, is a burdensome task for 
the readers. Experience from the coding process (see section 5.5.6) shows that 
banks make much use of their freedom of how they disclose their risk profile. No 
report structure of one bank is identical to the other. Although there are a number 
of tables with quantitative content that are standardised, the presentation of 
qualitative information is not. Banks customise their comments and explanations 
so that they fit their disclosure needs. In addition, there is no industry standard 
yet established for the structure of disclosure reports. Every bank can prepare its 
disclosure report in whatever way it deems most efficient and effective to 
communicate its risk profile.  
The proposed model uses a disclosure benchmark template which is 
derived from the report structures of the largest five banks in the sample and 
applies it to all other banks (see Appendix 8.4). Table 32 shows the number of 




Matched Items on Sector Comparisons per Bank and Year 
 Banks 2016 2017 2018 
 Bank from AT  16 17 17 
 Bank from BE  15 15 13 
 Bank from CH  12 12 12 
 Bank 1 from DE  14 19 19 
 Bank 2 from DE  13 13 13 
 Bank 3 from DE  11 14 14 
 Bank 4  from DE  15 15 15 
 Bank 5 from DE  17 18 18 
 Bank 6 from DE  15 18 18 
 Bank from DK  13 13 14 
 Bank 1 from ES  11 11 13 
 Bank 2 from ES  13 13 13 
 Bank 3 from ES  17 15 15 
 Bank from FI  14 14 14 
 Bank 1 from FR  15 15 15 
 Bank 2 from FR  13 12 12 
 Bank 3 from FR  15 15 15 
 Bank 4 from FR  17 16 16 
 Bank 5 from FR  14 14 13 
 Bank 1 from GB  15 15 15 
 Bank 2 from GB  13 13 13 
 Bank 3 from GB  13 15 16 
 Bank 4 from GB  7 6 6 
 Bank 5 from GB  16 17 17 
 Bank 6 from GB  18 18 18 
 Bank 1 from IT  12 12 12 
 Bank 2 from IT  15 17 17 
 Bank 1 from NL  4 4 4 
 Bank 2 from NL  9 9 9 
 Bank from SE  14 13 12 






The variations from the benchmark structure can be found in Table 33 




Standard Error 0.34 
Median 14 
Mode 15 
Standard Deviation 3.20 







Table 33: Descriptive statistics on sector comparisons  
 
The mean (average) number of structural items that individual reports 
share with the benchmark template is 14. This number means that on average 
14 out of 25 items of the benchmark template are easy to find in the disclosure 
reports and easy to compare with other reports. The figure shows that disclosure 
reports remain rather individual reports, although they share some common 
properties. If the goal of improving comparison is to be pursued by regulatory 
authorities (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2015; EBA, 2020), they 
must introduce more standardisation on reporting structures.  
The standard deviation of the distribution of sector comparability scores is 3.2. 
By applying the standard deviation to the mean of 14, the range within which two 
thirds of the scoring results on this quality criterion lie is between 11 and 17 items. 
It is interesting to note that no bank comes close to the full score of 25 items. A 
closer look at the table of contents of the sample reports reveals that most banks’ 
share some items with the benchmark template. However, banks also often add 
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individual items to their report structures and neglect other items that appear to 
be of lesser importance to them compared to other banks. 
The analysis of the minimum/maximum values shows that there are not 
many extreme outliers to the upper side of the distribution. The maximum number 
of matched items between one report structure and the benchmark is 19 out of 
25 items. On the lower end, there are few reports that score only 4 matched items. 
Reports in this group pose an unwanted challenge to the users as the structures 
of such reports are very individual. They are difficult to compare with other 
reports, thereby reducing the information gains (relative performance versus 
absolute performance of a bank) that can be derived from such a peer group 
review.  
Figure 41 highlights the number of matched items that occur most of the 
period of study. 
 
 
Figure 41: Frequency distributions on sector comparability  
 
Thirty-six reports have item matches between 11.5 and 14. An additional twenty-
four reports have slightly more item matches of 14 to 16.5, and finally a further 
group of eighteen reports has up to 19 item matches. In total, reports in these 
three groups cover a large majority of 78 out of 90 reports. The remaining twelve 
reports are in the two groups with the lowest number of matched items of 4 to 
11.5. These reports share only few structural similarities with other reports and 
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need management attention in case it is interested in facilitating comparisons with 
competing banks.  
The analysis of individual disclosure scores on this quality criterion reveals 
another interesting fact. Banks appear to be very reluctant to make changes to 
their report structures once they have established a structure that fits their needs. 
Table 34 summarises the item changes per bank over the research period. There 
are thirteen banks that do not make any material structural changes in their 
disclosure reports. There are eight banks that change one item, and nine banks 
make more than one item change.  
 
Structural changes on disclosed items per bank 
Items changed Number of banks 
no change 13 
+/- 1 item change 8 
>1 item change 9 
Table 34: Structural changes on disclosed items per bank  
 
6.2.6 Evaluation of the Composite Risk Disclosure Score 
In a final step, the regulatory risk disclosure scoring model requires the 
consolidation of the five quality criteria scores into one composite disclosure 
score per report. Such a composite disclosure score represents the total quality 
score for a report. It can be used for comparing one report to another, but also 
for analysing a particular report in detail in an effort to improve its overall quality.  
The results from the scoring model are listed in appendix 8.5. This list 
includes individual scores on each of the quality criteria, as well as the composite 
disclosure scores per report and year. The frequency distribution in Figure 42 
shows the composite disclosure scores for all ninety reports in the sample 





Figure 42: Frequency distribution of the composite disclosure scores  
 
About a third of the ninety reports have disclosure scores between 3.93 
and 4.15 (second column to the right). Thirteen reports come closer to the 
maximum possible score of 5 with scores that range between 4.15 and 4.37 (first 
column to the right). About another third of the reports ends up in two groups 
covering the upper half of scores in the range of 3 (between 3.49 and 3.93). Only 
a few reports score below 3.49 (in total ten reports, first and second column to 
the left). 
The descriptive statistics in Table 35 reveal additional insights on the 






Standard Error 0.03 
Median 3.92 
Standard Deviation 0.2863 
Sample Variance 0.08 
Kurtosis 0.14 





Table 35: Descriptive statistics on the composite disclosure scores  
 
The mean (average) composite disclosure score of all ninety reports is 
3.86. Considering the potential maximum value of five, it can be seen that there 
is room for further quality improvements for a large number of reports. The 
highest disclosure score achieved is 4.34 by a bank from Spain. This bank 
prepared a disclosure report where quantitative and qualitative elements were 
well-balanced. The lowest score is 3.05 from a bank from the Netherlands. The 
disclosure report of this bank consisted of mostly quantitative figures with rather 
little qualitative explanatory text. In percentage terms, the difference between the 
highest and lowest quality disclosure score is about 42%. This rather high value 
suggests that the quality among the reports differs substantially. This is insofar 
interesting as all reports share the same legal basis (the CRD IV/CRR framework, 
see section 2.3.3.2). Despite this fact, actual reports are implemented rather 
differently as the analysis on the quality criteria below shows.  
The negative skewness of -0.66 implies that the distribution is left skewed 
(also see the histogram in Figure 42). A majority of reports convene around the 
mean with few outliers can be found on the tail of the distribution to the left. These 
outliers represent reports with low composite disclosure scores and require 
management attention for the reasons of this low quality. Again, the analysis of 
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individual results on the quality criteria will point the management to the areas for 
improvement. 
Finally, the standard deviation of the distribution of 0.2863 confirms the findings 
from the frequency histogram in Figure 42. Two thirds of the reports lie in a 
composite disclosure score range of 3.58 to 4.14.  
The year-by-year comparison in Figure 43 shows the trend in composite 
disclosure scores over the years 2016 to 2018. A slight upward trend can be 
observed (2016: 3,81; 2017: 3,87; 2018: 3,89) that is promising for the 
development over the next years.  
 
 
Figure 43: Composite disclosure scores year-by-year 
 
The breakdown of the composite disclosure scores in Figure 44 shows the 
impact of each quality criterion on the overall disclosure scores.35  
 
 
35 The reason for the six columns in the figure is that the model splits quality criterion 2 on 





Figure 44: Average disclosure scores per quality criterion  
 
On average, banks are doing best on the quantity criterion where they 
score a high 0.89 (a maximum value of 1 being the best for each criterion). This 
value suggests that the pure quantity of information disclosed is well received by 
the readers of regulatory risk disclosure reports. As the literature review shows 
(see section 2.2.7), quantity is often found to be an indicator for disclosure quality. 
The results on this quality criterion confirm this observation. 
The average scores on the readability and meaningfulness criteria are 
both 0.85. This value is in the upper range of disclosure scores and again shows 
a good performance. However, the critical comments in the previous evaluation 
on these two quality criteria (see sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.3) need to be considered 
about overall low absolute values and rather large standard deviations in the 
sample. 
The score on time comparison comes in fourth place with an average score 
of 0.82, already about 10 % less than the top score on quantity. This shows that 
at this stage, disclosure reports largely focus on disclosing the current risk 
situation of a bank than comparing it to previous risk exposures. 
 
228 
The disclosure scores on the coverage and sector comparability criteria 
are of concern. The low score on coverage (0.67) means that banks are focusing 
too much on a limited number of subjects in their disclosure reports. For achieving 
a higher score on this criterion, they would have to prepare more balanced reports 
covering all subjects proportionate to their importance in risk-weighted assets 
(RWA) terms. The very low disclosure score on sector comparability (0.55) is due 
to the fact that report structures are very different from bank to bank. On average 
they share only 14 out of 25 potential structural items and are therefore very 
difficult to compare for the readers. Improvements on this quality criterion are not 
only the responsibility of banks alone. Banking supervisory authorities are called 
upon to coordinate a common reporting structure benchmark which banks can 
follow in the interests of their stakeholders. 
The evaluation of the scoring model results presented in this section 
provides banks with insights into the quality of their risk disclosure reporting which 
form a basis that they can use to improve each quality criterion separately as well 
as overall disclosure quality. 
From an academic point of view, there remains an important question. So 
far, many research papers (e.g., Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008; Miihkinen, 2011) treat 
the quality criteria independently of each other. For ease of calculation, these 
papers assume that there exist no interdependencies among the variables. 
However, this assumption is critically challenged in the next section. With the help 
of statistical factor analysis, the relationships between the five quality criteria are 
analysed and screened for underlying patterns that consolidate the 





6.3 Factor Analysis of the Scoring Model Indicators 
In quantitative factor analysis, the structure of a data sample is analysed 
in order to identify underlying factors that cannot be observed directly with the 
defined variables (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 2011). Factor analysis assumes that 
variables are related, and the reason for this correlation is the effect of (hidden) 
underlying factors. Factor analysis attempts to find these underlying factors with 
statistical means. The result is a reduced number of previously latent variables 
that represent major underlying themes in the data set. 
Translated into the regulatory risk disclosure setting in this thesis, factor 
analysis helps to (1) understand the relationships among the quality criteria and 
(2) map the quality criteria to a smaller number of major themes in the regulatory 
risk disclosure area. The factor analysis in this section is performed on the 
composite disclosure scores data that can be seen in Appendix 8.5. The set 
covers the disclosure scores on the quality criteria of all ninety disclosure reports 
for the period 2016 – 2018.  
Technically, the factor analysis is run in the statistical software package 
IBM SPSS. The extraction method applied is principal components analysis. The 
Kaiser stopping rule criterion with factors’ eigenvalues greater than 1 is used 
when deciding on how many underlying factors are extracted from the quality 
criteria. The rotation method applied is varimax. Here, factors are selected in a 
way that they are as different from each other as possible. Such a strong 
difference is the case in an orthogonal solution where variables show low 
correlations. 
 
6.3.1 Analysis of the Correlation Matrix 
The correlation matrix in Table 36 shows how the disclosure scores on all 
quality criteria (QC) are related to each other. A high correlation between 
variables indicates that they tend to move together, meaning that the behaviour 
of one variable may predict the behaviour of the other. The matrix below shows 
which quality criteria show a similar behaviour and which are rather independent 






































































Readability 1.000 -0.165 0.034 -0.189 -0.212 0.231 
Quantity  1.000 0.355 0.942 0.893 0.181 
Coverage   1.000 0.494 0.211 0.583 
Meaningfulness    1.000 0.831 0.245 
Time comparability     1.000 -0.039 
Sector comparability      1.000 
Determinant = ,007 
Table 36: Correlation matrix for disclosure scores per quality criterion  
 
As can be seen in the table, readability is negatively correlated with 
quantity, meaningfulness, and time comparability, although the negative 
correlation is rather weak (between -0.165 and -0.212). The correlation analysis 
suggests that scoring high on these three quality criteria comes at the expense 
of readability, and vice versa. It can be argued that disclosure reports are more 
difficult to read the more voluminous they are (quantity), the more detailed they 
are (meaningfulness), and the more comparative information over time they 
include.  
Quantity (part of quality criterion 2) is very highly correlated with 
meaningfulness and time comparability (0.94 and 0.89 respectively). This high 
correlation can be explained with the observation that more voluminous reports 
(quantity) often include, as a consequence, more detailed disclosure 
(meaningfulness) and also more comparative information (time comparability).  
Coverage (also part of quality criterion 2) is positively correlated with all 
other quality criteria, although the correlation with readability is very weak (0.034). 
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Meaningfulness is highly correlated with time comparability implying that both 
quality criteria share a similar behaviour.  
Time comparability is very weakly correlated with sector comparability 
(correlation of -0.039). A reason for this low correlation is possibly that disclosure 
on time comparability information can be decided upon by the bank, while sector 
comparability depends on a structural benchmark which has not yet been agreed 
upon in the banking industry.  
Sector comparability is also weakly correlated with most of the other quality 
criteria apart from coverage.  
 
6.3.2 Results from Factor Analysis 
Before factor analysis can be performed, the variables in the underlying 
datasets have to be analysed for their suitability for factor analysis (Kaiser, 1974). 
The variables are considered suitable only if they share a low common variance. 
Kaiser (1974) suggests using the KMO Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin statistic to measure 
sampling adequacy. The statistic is expected to return values between 0 and 1 
and results can be seen in Table 37.  
 
Suitability Tests for Factor Analysis 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of 
Sampling Adequacy 
 0.668 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 430.657 
df 15 
Sig. 0.000 
Table 37: Suitability tests for factor analysis 
 
Kaiser (1974) recommends accepting values higher than 0.5, while values below 
0.5 are deemed unacceptable for factor analysis. A value of 0.668 (as seen in 
Table 37) is considered “mediocre” but still sufficiently above 0.5.  
In factor analysis, the underlying patterns of variables are statistically 
analysed. The goal is to identify underlying factors that are at this stage of the 
analysis unknown to the observer (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 2011). Principal 
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components analysis therefore analyses the structure in the data to find 
uncorrelated components that capture the variation in the data (Hutcheson & 
Sofroniou, 2011). At the start of the analysis, it is also not known how many 
relevant underlying factors there are in the dataset.  
Table 38 shows the eigenvalues and variances from the principal 
component analysis. SPSS extracts as many components as there are variables 
(in this research these are six variables). From the table, it can be seen that only 
the first two components meet the extraction criterion of having eigenvalues 
greater than one. Therefore, only the first two components are considered for 
further analysis.  
 























1 3.080 51.330 51.330 2.964 49.400 49.400 
2 1.565 26.079 77.409 1.681 28.009 77.409 
3 .828 13.807 91.216    
4 .372 6.204 97.420    
5 .115 1.924 99.344    
6 .039 .656 100.000    
Table 38: Eigenvalues of components and total variance explained  
 
The last three columns in the table under the label “Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings” include essential information on the components and their explanatory 
power. The (so far unknown) component 1 with a high eigenvalue of 3.08 explains 
49.4% of the total variance of the distribution. This component alone has an 
explanatory power of about 50% of the composite disclosure score. The second 
component with an eigenvalue of 1.565 explains a further 28.009% of the total 
variance of the distribution. The individual percentages of variances are 
cumulative. Therefore, component 1 and component 2 together already explain 
77.049% of the total variance of the distribution. The other four components do 
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not pass the test of an eigenvalue greater than 1 and are therefore not considered 
further in the principal component analysis. 




Figure 45: Factor analysis: scree plot on eigenvalues  
 
The scree plot maps the components on the horizontal axis to their eigenvalues 
on the vertical axis. Of particular interest are the components that come close to 
the cut-off line. This line is drawn parallel to the horizontal axis at an eigenvalue 
of 1. Component 2 lies above the line, while component 3 lies below the line. The 
more negative the slope of these two points is, the better the cut-off decision is 
justified (Kaiser, 1974). With an eigenvalue of 0.828 component 3 is well below 
the line at eigenvalue = 1 and is therefore excluded from further analysis. 
So far, the factor analysis has resulted in the identification of two principal 
components in the dataset that explain about 77% of the total variability. The next 
step is to relate these two components to the quality criteria of the proposed 
disclosure scoring model in the attempt to find out what themes these two 
components represent. The rotated component matrix in Table 39 shows the links 
between the quality criteria of the disclosure scoring model and the two 








Readability -.358 .493 
Quantity .959 .119 
Coverage .372 .758 
Meaningfulness .948 .219 
Time comparability .934 -.098 
Sector comparability .074 .890 
Table 39: Factor analysis: rotated component matrix  
 
The values in the table show the factor loadings for each quality criterion 
on the two components. The higher the values, the stronger the quality criterion 
impacts on the component. The bold characters in the table denote which of the 
quality criteria loads more strongly on each of the two components. Figure 46 
shows the mapping of overarching themes constructed by assigning quality 
criteria to the components on which they most strongly load on. 
 
 




Component 1 is most strongly impacted by quantity, meaningfulness and 
time comparability (all values in Table 39 are above 0.9). Component 2 is most 
strongly impacted by coverage and sector comparability (all values in Table 39 
are above 0.75).and to some degree by readability (0.49).  
Analysis of the quality criteria loading on component 1 reveals that these 
criteria are all related to the information disclosed. Consequently, the quantity, 
meaningfulness and time comparability criteria are grouped together to the 
summary statistic “Content”. This suggests that the information provided in 
regulatory risk disclosure reports is truly of high importance to the quality level of 
the composite disclosure score.  
The quality criteria readability, coverage and sector comparability all load 
highly into component 2. These criteria can be grouped together under the 
heading “Presentation”. They relate to the ease of reading and to the structure of 
the disclosure reports. Although these variables do not load as strongly into 
component 2 as the other variables load into component 1, they still show the 





6.4 Empirical Model Results and Agency Theory  
Section 4.2.1 discusses optimisation strategies for the agency cost and 
benefit relationship. It shows that it is in the interest of investors (“principals”) that 
a rather small investment in monitoring in form of disclosure reports should make 
a rather large impact on the disclosure quality achieved and on the behaviour of 
managers (“agents”). This section therefore evaluates the scores on the quality 
criteria with respect to agency theory and highlights their impact on banks and 
their investors.  
6.4.1 Agency Theory and Readability  
The evaluation in 6.2.1 on the readability of disclosure reports based on 
the Gunning-Fog index poses a major implication for the agent-principal 
relationship. The average Gunning-Fog index for the disclosure reports is about 
18 to 19. This rather high value suggests that a university level education is 
needed to comprehend the disclosure reports well. In agency theory, 
shareholders are not differentiated by their educational level. This thesis 
suggests that, in practice, the group of less educated shareholders would be 
practically excluded from the information sharing. Reports are written in a style 
that makes it hard for this group to comprehend the risk profile of their bank 
investments. The assumption in agency theory that all shareholders act rationally 
in an informed way does not hold in this case. There is a certain group of 
shareholders that cannot act as rationally as others because the information is 
not adequately accessible to them. One way to improve the situation is to prepare 
reports that use less technical language and a writing style that is more user 
friendly (i.e., less long and complicated sentences).  
 
6.4.2 Agency Theory and Comprehensiveness  
Agency theory is very specific in its recommendation that information-
sharing is one important method for reducing the information asymmetry between 
agents and principals. However, the theory is rather vague in suggesting how 
much information should be given to principals. Receiving no information is not 
in the interest of principals, while receiving an overload of boilerplate information 
also does not serve the purpose. The analysis in section 6.2.2.1 on the quantity 
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of disclosed risk information provides a first insight into what banks actually 
assume to be a sufficient level of information-sharing on their regulatory risk 
profile. It is interesting to observe that this assumed level differs substantially from 
bank to bank. Considering the identified trend in the amount of information 
provided, it appears that the banking industry has not yet settled on the optimal 
amount. However, it can be noted that regulatory risk disclosure is consistently 
gaining importance over time as the overall disclosure amount increased by about 
20% even in the rather short period of three years in this research (see section 
6.2.2.1).  
Looking at the distribution of the quantity of disclosed information on a 
country-by-country basis, it can be concluded that agency theory is not 
interpreted in the same way by banks across different countries (see section 5.5.3 
on quantity). The amount of disclosed risk information differs substantially from 
one country to another. Agency theory so far does not differentiate the information 
needs of principals according to their location. At this stage of disclosure 
research, it is not clear who is the driving force behind the demanded quantity of 
risk information. It can be the agent (in this study: the bank) headquartered in a 
particular country who makes assumptions about the optimal level of disclosure 
to its principals (here: the stakeholders). It can also be the principals residing in 
a particular country themselves who expect more or less information compared 
to principals residing in other countries. A link to the discussion on cultural 
backgrounds may provide some explanation for the different information needs 
across cultures (Hofstede, 1980).  
The analysis of the results from the Herfindahl index (see section 6.2.2.2) 
further challenges agency theory. The risk information disclosed by banks is not 
proportionally allocated across risk categories. There are a few reports that 
heavily concentrate their risk disclosure on one risk category only, while some 
others (the majority) attempt a more balanced approach. At this point in agency 
theory, it is not yet determined what the desired provision of information actually 
should be. In the case of obvious problems of a specific bank in one particular 
risk area, principals potentially require over-proportionate information on this risk 
category. On the other hand, disclosure on other risk categories cannot be 
neglected. The discussion on the Herfindahl index also shows that the risk 
information content can be very different in nature with many different 
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consequences. Agency theory does not divide the term “information” into different 
categories. It takes information as a placeholder for “information about a firm in 
general”. This thesis shows that the question boils down to the discussion of 
which kind and quality of information shall be communicated, and in what kind of 
medium. In urgent cases, principals expect short-term information and remedies 
from agents supporting the case of focusing disclosure on one risk category. 
Principals interested in the longer-term prospect and sustainability of a bank may 
require a more balanced disclosure approach on all risk categories.  
 
6.4.3 Agency Theory and Meaningfulness 
The analysis of the model results on meaningfulness (see section 6.2.3) 
shows that there is a large gap between the information content principals expect 
and what agents actually disclose. Several research papers stress that investors 
appreciate forward-looking information (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008; Miihkinen, 
2011). This is a kind of information that supports investors in evaluating the risk 
profile of a bank with respect to planned developments in the future. However, a 
large majority of banks prepare disclosure reports that are very descriptive in 
nature. These reports summarise the current risk profile without providing much 
guidance on the future. This lack in transparency poses a problem for the 
principals who need to evaluate the performance of their investments regularly 
and require relevant forward-looking information. On the other hand, agents are 
reluctant to disclose forward-looking information. They must bear the high 
(agency) costs of preparing the information. They also fear the high litigation risk 
of misleading principals with forward-looking statements. Both cases restrict 
agents’ incentives to disclose forward-looking information. The data analysis in 
this thesis shows that this discrepancy between expected and actual disclosure 
is probably the single most important factor that creates an additional conflict of 
interest.  
 
6.4.4 Agency Theory and Time Comparability 
Agency theory finds three different kinds of costs that are incurred due to 
the separation of management and ownership of a firm (see section 2.2.6.1). The 
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theory divides the agency cost for closing the information gap into the categories 
monitoring, bonding, and residual loss costs. The analysis performed on the time 
comparability criterion (see section 6.2.4) provides a good field for studying the 
trade-off between monitoring and bonding costs.  
Principals benefit from quantitative and qualitative time comparability on 
the risk profile over consecutive periods. Banks and their management (the 
“agents”) are generous in providing quantitative data comparisons in their 
disclosure reports as such data are regularly available at low cost in their software 
systems. On the other hand, providing qualitative comments on time comparisons 
are much more costly for a bank. It takes additional research to analyse the 
reasons for changes and their impact on future exposures. There is also the 
potentially high cost of litigation involved if forecasts turn out to be unreliable. The 
observed very low number of cases of qualitative time comparability (see section 
6.2.4) in disclosure reports shows that banks are reluctant to bear these costs in 
the form of bonding costs. They often leave the effort and cost to compare to the 
principals who, in this case, incur higher monitoring costs.  
Agency theory says that in the end it does not matter who initially bears 
the cost. An agent’s bonding cost reduces the firm value that ultimately belongs 
to the principals. Principals monitoring cost reduces their wealth directly. There 
remains the question who of the involved parties can perform the time 
comparison task more efficiently at lower cost. It makes a cost difference whether 
each principal makes the time comparisons individually, or whether it can be done 
centrally at the agent’s site. 
 
6.4.5 Agency Theory and Sector Comparability 
Investors in the equity of a firm face two information problems. Before they 
make an investment they need company information for selecting the right 
investment, while after the investment they need to monitor its performance. 
Beyer, Cohen, Lys, & Walther (2010a) describe this information demand as the 
valuation and stewardship problem (see section 2.2.4.3). Particularly for valuation 
purposes, reports that can easily be compared to each other are helpful for the 
decision-making process. The mediocre results on sector comparability of only 
14 out of 25 structural items match on average (see section 6.2.5) demonstrates 
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that agents do not promote comparability with their competitors. Investors need 
to analyse disclosure reports of various investment targets themselves, thereby 
raising their “pre-investment” monitoring costs substantially. The same applies to 
situations after the investment is made. Even at this privileged stage, it is costly 
for the principals to compare the performance of their investment to alternatives. 
With respect to agency theory, it is interesting to note that in the case of sector 
comparability, monitoring costs are mostly incurred by the principal as opposed 
to bonding costs by the agents. 
6.5 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, the scoring model results from the sample of 90 regulatory 
risk disclosure reports were evaluated. Scores were analysed in the context of 
disclosure quality as well as agency theory. This was first done on an individual 
bases for each quality criterion (readability, comprehensiveness, 
meaningfulness, time comparability and sector comparability). Then the scores 
were consolidated and analysed on a composite basis.  Each analysis consisted 
of a time-series analysis (years 2016 – 2018), a risk category analysis, and an 
EU regional analysis (where applicable). Further analysis was performed where 
it was deemed useful for understanding results. Results were explained and 
reasons and explanations for specific conclusions given. Furthermore, much 
could be learned from the scoring results. Often, recommendations were given to 
banks but also supervisors on how to improve disclosure quality in the reports on 
individual quality criteria. 
Finally, a statistical factor analysis was performed to gain a better 
understanding of the underlying patterns of the quality criteria. The analysis 
resulted in the confirmation that the quality of disclosure reports depends on 
quantitative and qualitative elements which cover presentation but also the 






7 Chapter Seven: Conclusion  
7.1 Research Activities and Results 
This thesis examines how the quality of bank regulatory risk disclosure 
reports can be measured with a scoring model. The proposed model supports 
banks in preparing these reports, facilitates the investors’ evaluation of the 
reports, and informs policymakers and supervisory authorities on the successful 
implementation of their policies and regulations.  
Banking regulation in the European Union offers the setting for this thesis. 
The Basel III guidelines were implemented in 2014 with the EU CRD IV/CRR 
framework. Regulation has since been largely stable which provided a suitable 
basis for the analysis. All banks in the EU are required to publish disclosure 
reports covering their risk exposures, the measurement and the management. 
Banks, but also policymakers (e.g., Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
Financial Stability Board, International Accounting Standards Board) and 
supervisory authorities (e.g., European Central Bank, Bank of England), view 
these reports as an important tool for investors’ decision making and for overall 
financial markets’ resilience (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2015). 
The proposed scoring model is the first model developed specifically for 
the requirements of regulatory risk disclosure of banks. It complements research 
on general disclosure based on the work of Abraham & Cox (2007), Beretta & 
Bozzolan (2008), Jia et al. (2016), Miihkinen (2011), and Verrecchia & Clinch 
(2015) by adding the regulatory risk perspective to the dominant accounting 
perspective, and by focusing on the banking industry in the EU. 
Banks are “learning organisations” when it comes to disclosing risk 
information. So far, no regulatory disclosure standard is agreed among banks 
(UNCTAD, 2017). As learning by experience forms an important constituent of 
disclosure, this thesis is guided by a pragmatic research philosophy. 
Furthermore, prior research shows that research methodologies focusing only on 
quantitative methods do not sufficiently capture the qualitative elements of 
disclosure (e.g., Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004). Therefore, a multi-methods research 
approach is applied covering semantic content analysis, but also statistical 
analysis such as factor analysis. 
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A key result of this thesis is the development of the regulatory risk 
disclosure scoring model. The main research activities performed comprise the 
analysis of the disclosure environment, the conceptual development of the model, 
and the implementation of the model. Furthermore, the model is applied to a 
sample of disclosure reports, and the model results are empirically evaluated with 
respect to disclosure quality and agency theory. Figure 47 summarises the main 
research activities performed. 
 
 
Figure 47: Core research results  
 
This thesis proposes a scoring model built on a two-dimensional 
framework namely “risk” and “quality”. The risk dimension structures the financial 
risks into the risk categories credit risk, market risk, operational risk, other risks 
including liquidity risk, and risk management. These risk categories are in line 
with the EU banking regulation requirements (European Parliament, 2013b). The 
quality dimension takes input on potential quality indicators from the three leading 
institutions and policymakers in the regulatory field (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2015; Enhanced Disclosure Task Force, 2012; International 
Accounting Standards Board, 2017) and consolidates them into five quality 
criteria namely readability, comprehensiveness (quantity and coverage), 
meaningfulness, time comparability, and sector comparability. 
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Before the quality criteria are applied to the risk categories, the quality 
criteria are operationalised through the identification of empirical indicators. This 
process benefits conceptually from prior research (Ajina et al., 2016; Beretta & 
Bozzolan, 2004, 2008; Miihkinen, 2011), although several adjustments, 
amendments and new developments are made for addressing the specific 
requirements of regulatory risk disclosure. In particular, new indicators for time 
and sector comparability are developed, and comprehensive word lists for 
regulatory risk reporting purposes are compiled. 
The implementation of the scoring model results in a composite disclosure 
score that summarises the disclosure quality of individual banks’ regulatory risk 
disclosure reports. For that, the detailed data requirements are defined and the 
processing logic described. Furthermore, the model introduces a new, risk 
weighted (RWA) method that takes the relative importance of each risk category 
for disclosure into account.  
In technical terms, the prototype of the model is implemented in Nvivo 
(coding, data extraction and functionalities) and SPSS (statistical analysis) with 
additional functionalities programmed in Python (e.g., Gunning-Fog index 
calculation) and MS Excel (consolidation of results). 
The scoring model is successfully applied to ninety disclosure reports of 
European banks for the period 2016 to 2018 and tested for its suitability to 
measure disclosure quality. Composite disclosure scores and scores per quality 
criterion are calculated to support the empirical analysis of disclosure quality and 
its impact on agency theory. 
The empirical results summarised in Figure 48 show that regulatory risk 
disclosures are very heterogeneous making it difficult to speak about integrated 
regulatory risk disclosure policies of banks. By analysing banks’ individual 
disclosure reports, the thesis finds that although there are some good examples 
of reports with high scores on all quality criteria, there is room for quality 
improvements in many other reports. The empirical scoring results support banks 
in identifying deficiencies in their own reports and guides them to areas where 





Figure 48: Empirical results on composite disclosures scores 
 
The thesis finds that the average composite disclosure score of the ninety 
disclosure reports for the period 2016 – 2018 is 3.86 out of a maximum of 5. The 
scores range from the lowest value of 3.05 to the highest value of 4.34. Scores 
are strongly impacted by the way banks use the opportunities of disclosure. 
Reports on the lower end publish only minimal information on each risk category, 
whereas reports on the upper end extensively provide risk information and 
explanations on their exposures in a structured way.  
The evaluation of the results on the readability quality criterion shows that 
a large number of banks fail to address the needs of broader stakeholder groups. 
The average Gunning-Fog index for the entire three-year period is a high 18.61. 
This value means that it takes more than eighteen years of formal education to 
comprehend current disclosure reports well. As a result, banks exclude a large 
group of potential investors by writing reports in a very technical style. 
Furthermore, the thesis demonstrates that the pure quantity of disclosed 
information varies substantially from bank to bank. The average report consists 
of 5,080 risk words with a promising upward trend over the three-year period. The 
model results show that banks put different efforts into the preparation of their 
disclosure reports. Some banks extensively disclose information (about 12,000 
risk words), while others manage to write reports with about 1,000 risk words 
only, thereby missing out on the opportunities of effective communication with 
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their external stakeholders. With respect to agency theory, no optimal quantity of 
information necessary to reduce the information gap is defined. This thesis 
follows prior research results (Abraham & Cox, 2007; Jia et al., 2016) suggesting 
that more information leads to better disclosure quality. Consequently, banks 
score higher if they disclose a higher quantity of risk information. The thesis also 
finds that the quantity disclosed depends strongly on the country of origin of a 
bank. Banks located in the southern countries of the European Union tend to 
communicate much more risk information compared to their peers in the central 
and northern countries of Europe. The analysis shows that agency theory is not 
interpreted in the same way in every country and also Hofstede’s cultural 
elements such as different national levels of uncertainty avoidance make an 
impact on the quantity of information disclosed.  
On the meaningfulness quality criterion, the thesis finds that there is a 
large expectation gap between banks and stakeholders. The empirical model 
results reveal that banks disclose much current and past information but are 
reluctant to disclose forward-looking material. However, prior research shows 
that external stakeholders benefit most from forward-looking disclosure (Beretta 
& Bozzolan, 2008; Beyer et al., 2010; Li, 2010). Also, agency theory does not 
comment on the kind of information it considers relevant for reducing information 
asymmetry, so the theory can be supplemented with the empirical research 
results of this thesis. The average number of forward-looking words in reports is 
about 1,000 words per report, with a minimum of only 200 and a maximum of 
3,000 forward-looking words. These figures are low compared to the total number 
of risk words disclosed. In result, current disclosure reports do not provide enough 
forward-looking information that external stakeholders may expect for their 
investment decision-making.  
Results on time comparability show that banks are very hesitant to support 
the users of their disclosure reports with comments and explanations on changes 
of their risk profile over time. The model reveals that there are several banks that 
basically do not comment on exposure changes at all. Some other banks assume 
a more active role, but still achieve only low maximum values of about 500 time-
comparison words. Banks can learn from this analysis that they have to adjust 
their disclosure policies in order to meet stakeholders’ needs on time 
comparability as highlighted by the BCBS.  
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Finally, the empirical results on sector comparability send a clear signal to 
supervisory authorities showing that banks prepare disclosure reports in a format 
that reflects their individual risk profiles. As banks’ risk profiles differ substantially 
from each other, comparisons of disclosure reports are difficult to make for 
stakeholders across the banking industry. The scoring model supports this finding 
that on average only 15 out of 25 structural items in disclosure reports match with 
an industry benchmark structure. For supervisory authorities aiming to promote 
comparability across the banking industry, they must develop common and 
mandatory templates each bank shall use for their disclosures. Such an initiative 
which is already considered by current consultative documents on the future of 
disclosure, also has an impact on agency theory. In agency theory, an important 
question is who should bear the cost for reducing the information asymmetry. The 
results of the scoring model suggest that the costs for sector comparisons are 
currently borne by investors, thereby falling into the category of “monitoring 
costs”. The establishment of disclosure standards would shift the costs to the 
firms in the form of “bonding costs”. Still, it has to be noted that in agency theory 
terms, both kinds of costs ultimately reduce shareholders’ wealth.  
The scoring model provides additional insights into the nature of disclosure 
quality by applying statistical factor analysis to the composite disclosure scores. 
The analysis reveals that there are two main themes underlying the five quality 
criteria which banks are advised to consider when preparing their risk disclosure 
reports. The themes are content and presentation, where the first refers to 
qualitative elements, and the second to quantitative elements. The results on 
factor analysis also provide a strong argument for applying a multi-methods 
approach in this and further research. Both themes contribute to the overall 
quality of risk disclosure. Therefore, a good disclosure policy must consider both, 





7.2 Academic and Professional Contributions 
Pragmatism, the research philosophy of this thesis, contends that topics 
such as the nature of knowledge, language and concepts are all best viewed in 
terms of their theoretical and practical uses and successes. A model built on this 
foundation must therefore offer academic and professional contributions to justify 
its use. 
For long, academic research on disclosure focused on defining the content 
of disclosure and its theoretical impact on the wealth of the firm and its 
stakeholders (Berger, 2011; Beyer et al., 2010). Berger (2011) identifies a 
research gap on practical methods for measuring disclosure quality and calls for 
the development of practice-based models that complement the academic 
discussion. The main contribution of this thesis is proposing a practice-based 
scoring model to measure disclosure quality based on the guidelines of Basel III 
and their EU implementation. Therefore, it contributes to academic knowledge by 
developing a framework for reliably measuring the quality of bank regulatory risk 
disclosure that can be applied widely in practice.  
Furthermore, the model complements the academic research on general 
disclosure. Disclosure is done through various communication channels of which 
regulatory risk reporting is an important one. One strand of disclosure research 
studies how the quality of an entire firm’s communication can be captured in order 
to get a statistic for overall disclosure quality. A building block of such an 
overarching disclosure model is risk communication in the way it is covered by 
the proposed scoring model in this thesis. Another stream of disclosure research 
focuses on analysing the relationship between the level of disclosure quality and 
factors such as cost of capital, stock price liquidity and credit rating. All such 
studies require as input the measurement of disclosure quality before any 
relationships to other factors can be analysed. The proposed scoring model 
supports these studies by measuring the disclosure quality with a composite 
score that can then be related to performance indicators.  
This thesis also adds the regulatory risk perspective to the so far dominant 
financial accounting perspective in disclosure research. Many prior studies have 
their roots in analysing disclosures of financial and performance indicators, often 
found in annual reports or ad hoc messages. The banking industry is a highly 
regulated industry that makes regulatory disclosure an additional source of 
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information on banks’ risks. This scoring model is the first that evaluates the 
quality of regulatory risk reports, and therefore advances in this respect the 
academic discussion on disclosure (UNCTAD, 2017).  
Furthermore, this thesis focuses explicitly on the banking industry. Banks 
are often excluded in prior disclosure studies due to the specific nature of banks 
as risk-taking enterprises (Elshandidy et al., 2013; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012). 
The thesis, therefore, complements the range of industries for which disclosure 
quality can be measured.  
As far as the contribution to the discussion on methodologies is concerned, 
the thesis pursues a multi-method approach rather than a single-method 
approach as often applied in a more traditional positivist setting. The justification 
lies in the nature and content of regulatory risk disclosure itself. For gaining a 
comprehensive quality score of disclosure, quantitative (how much is disclosed?) 
and qualitative (how meaningful is the content?) aspects must be evaluated. Prior 
research (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008; Elshandidy et al., 2018) regularly suggest 
studies that use more than one method to capture the richness of disclosure. This 
thesis suggests quantitative and qualitative criteria for calculating the composite 
disclosure scores. It, therefore, applies quantitative statistical as well as 
qualitative semantic content analysis methods.  
The research also contributes to semantic content analysis. Analysing the 
meaning of financial texts requires understanding the properties of the financial 
and regulatory language. For the development of the scoring model, the thesis 
collects extensive word lists on regulatory risk, forward orientation and time 
comparability in risk reports that facilitates the coding and analysis of financial 
texts. 
The disclosure quality measurement and the evaluation of results in this 
thesis advances the discussion in agency theory on information and agency 
costs. The results on the scoring model highlight the heterogeneous nature of 
information and show that the level of disclosure quantity, report readability and 
forward-looking information are among the factors that are interpreted differently 
across banks in Europe. The analysis of agency costs benefits from the model 
twofold: first, it distinguishes the costs for preparing disclosure reports into 
bonding and monitoring costs and therefore sheds light on the question who 
actually has to bear the costs of disclosure; and second, the costs incurred for 
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preparing the reports can now be compared to the quality of reports for finding an 
optimal balance. 
As far as professional contributions are concerned, the proposed 
disclosure scoring model supports banks in defining, structuring, and preparing 
their regulatory risk disclosure reports. Banks must decide on the - optimal – 
content and presentation of their risk disclosure reports with respect to the 
benefits received and the costs incurred. The detailed analysis of the scores on 
the quality criteria gives banks guidance on which areas they need to improve in 
order to achieve higher scores and provide better risk disclosure. By considering 
the expectations on risk disclosure content of their external stakeholders, banks 
can use the scoring model as a tool to tailor their reports to the needs of their 
stakeholders. Furthermore, the scoring model also helps to analyse disclosure 
reports of competitors, so that the own competitive position can be evaluated. 
Moreover, the scoring model supports supervisory authorities such as the 
European Banking Authority (EBA) or the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) 
at the Bank of England in performing their regulatory duties. These institutions 
are key players in setting disclosure policies, rules, and regulations. Once 
established, they must monitor the implementation and the impact on financial 
markets and banks’ business operations. The scoring model facilitates the 
analysis of a large number of disclosure reports and therefore makes banking 
supervision more efficient and effective.  
Lastly, another group of users of the disclosure scoring model are 
consultancies, analyst houses and software developers. For consultancies, the 
scoring model opens many opportunities for consulting banks on improving their 
risk communication. The work of analyst houses is facilitated by providing them 
with a tool that makes the analysis of disclosure reports easier and faster. 
Software houses can implement the scoring model prototype in their business 
software, integrate it in their enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems, and 
market it to banking customers. 
 
7.3 Limitations of the Research 
Measuring the quality of text and specifically that of regulatory risk 
disclosure reports is a complex task that cannot be performed in a 100% objective 
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way. Despite the efforts taken by the preparers and users of the disclosure 
reports to objectively report and interpret the content, there remains a certain 
degree of subjectivity in the process of semantic content analysis (Saunders, 
2013). Banks as the authors of the reports use their discretion when compiling 
the content of these reports. Investors as the users of the reports also selectively 
decide what content they deem relevant for their investment decision making. In 
a similar way, researchers themselves bring further subjectivity to the content 
interpretation when assessing the quality of a report through their own 
perceptions.  
Furthermore, the coding of reports is a central task in applying the scoring 
model to disclosure reports. It requires decision-making on assigning text to 
content nodes and cases, and thereby is a potential source of coding bias. 
Although in this thesis several measures are taken to ensure reliability and 
validity, and avoid coders’ bias (e.g., four-eye principle, double-coding, 
percentage agreement analysis in Nvivo, statistical tests with the analysis of the 
Kappa coefficient), it cannot be ruled out that some subjectivity remains. When 
evaluating the composite disclosure scores, a potential coding bias must be taken 
into account. 
The regulatory risk disclosure scoring model is a two-dimensional model 
with both risk and quality dimensions. For the quality dimension, five quality 
criteria are suggested which define the quality of a report. These criteria are 
selected based on the recommendations of leading policymakers and standard 
setters that are familiar with the information needs of the banking industry (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2015; Enhanced Disclosure Task Force, 
2012; International Accounting Standards Board, 2017). The model assumes that 
the selected criteria represent the quality of a disclosure report well. However, 
other quality criteria may exist that have a significant impact on the quality of a 
disclosure report. Furthermore, based on the five quality criteria, the model 
suggests several proxies that operationalise each criterion. The model makes 
use of previous research findings (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008), develops some 
proxies further (Miihkinen, 2011) and suggests new proxies where no previous 
research is available. Although each proxy was selected deliberately and its use 
is justified, there remains the possibility that the selected proxies do not fully 
capture the content of the respective quality criteria.  
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Finally, the literature stresses several factors that influence disclosure 
levels and quality. Although prior research findings are mixed on most of these 
factors, ”industry” and “size” are often found to have a significant impact on 
disclosure (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Jia et al., 2016). The scoring model, 
therefore, takes both factors into account, although with some limitations. The 
factor “industry” is largely neutralised by limiting the model to the banking 
industry. The impact of the factor “size” is mitigated by selecting a homogeneous 
sample of the thirty largest banks in Europe. In case the scoring model is applied 
to other industries, or within the banking industry to smaller capitalised banks, the 
model parameters must be adjusted for industry and size effects.  
A final matter of concern is language. In international settings, English is 
the working language of choice for many people with other native languages. In 
this research, it was a requirement that all risk disclosure reports are available in 
English. Otherwise, the scoring model could not have been applied to the sample 
of disclosure reports. It must be noted that only the reports from banks with UK 
headquarters were originally written in the English language. All other reports 
were first written in local languages before they were translated into English. This 
fact leaves room for potentially missing out on some of the original meaning of 
the disclosure report, and reference should be made to the original text before a 






7.4 Recommendations for Further Research 
Regulatory risk disclosure is an important, but only one part of the external 
communication of a firm. Disclosure research on the information content of 
financial statements is well advanced. This research adds to the full picture of 
disclosure by developing a scoring model that captures the quality of regulatory 
risk disclosure. Research on the disclosure quality of non-financial reports such 
as reports on environmental, social and governance issues (ESG) is still 
outstanding. Once all disclosure areas are researched, and models developed 
and accepted, an overarching disclosure model could be defined that can be used 
for measuring and improving firm-wide communication.  
The scoring model results in composite disclosure scores for the 
regulatory risk disclosure of banks. In a next research step, these scores could 
be used to analyse the relationship of disclosure quality with other key 
performance indicators (KPI) such as cost of capital, stock price liquidity and 
credit rating. Theoretical research papers (e.g., Cheynel, 2013) suggest that 
there is an inverse relationship between disclosure quality and cost of capital. 
With this scoring model, such relationships can be further analysed and tested 
by making use of empirical information. 
Agency theory puts much emphasis on studying the nature of agency costs 
and their impact on the wealth of investors. Once an overarching model for 
disclosure is agreed, many new routes for empirical research on agency 
relationships and costs appear. An interesting research path forward is linking 
disclosure quality to the (often substantial) cost incurred for preparing disclosure 
reports. It is an open question whether more spending on disclosure results in 
better quality reports and other measurable benefits. Furthermore, validation is 
needed for the so-called agency cost constraint (see Figure 14) implying that an 
initially small investment in disclosure results in higher wealth gains before the 
curve flattens and finally incremental wealth gains turn negative.  
Many research papers on general disclosure focus their work on the 
development of proprietary theoretical models and the evaluation of their results. 
The papers do not publish the data used in their models nor the algorithms/the 
coding rules applied. These black box approaches leave much room for 
interpretation of research findings. Without a transparent and open-access 
documentation of the data and the processing logic underlying the models, it is 
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impossible to replicate the research findings of such studies in other research 
settings. This research makes all data used in this thesis accessible to the 
research community so that other disclosure models can be applied to the data 
basis of this thesis and results can be checked for consistency for the benefit of 




8 Chapter Eight: Appendix 
8.1 List of the Largest Banks in Europe (2017)  
 
Note: This table shows the largest banks in Europe as of 2017 ranked by total 
asset size. The list includes non-EU banks to which the CRD IV/CRR legal 
package is not applicable, e.g. banks from Russia or Norway.  
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• Kick-off Meeting Jan 2nd, 2020, 14 – 16 h, Johannes, Veronica, Bernhard 
Introduction to subject, organisation, handling of Nvivo, distribution of coding work 
Johannes: German banks 
Veronica: French banks 
Bernhard: English banks 
Other banks will be assigned on progress. 
• 1 to 1 coding Jan 3rd, 2020, 20 – 21 h, Veronika – Johannes  
Team coding of reports from BNP Paribas (4-eyes approach) 
• 1 to 1 coding Jan 4th, 2020, 20 – 21 h, Bernhard – Johannes  
Team coding of reports from HSBC (4-eyes approach) 
• Status meeting Jan 11th, 2020, 10h, online Telco, Johannes, Veronika, Bernhard 
• Veronica: done with 4 reports of 2 banks 
• Bernhard: done with 3 reports from 2 banks 
• Johannes: done with German and Austrian banks, currently working on Belgian bank, 
then Spanish banks 
Mapping rules:  
• Capital -> risk management 
• Encumbered assets -> other risks 
• Remuneration -> other risks 
• Leverage -> other risks 
• Equities, interest rate NOT in trading book -> market risk 
The list of words with risk, forward orientation and comparability already consists of 
about 250, 40 and 50 items respectively. 
Deadline for coding: Jan 26th, 2020 
• Status meeting Jan 18th, 2020, 10h, online Telco, Johannes, Veronika, Bernhard 
Regularly update coding status in dropbox 
Coding of 19 out of 30 banks is completed 
• Veronica: done with 8 reports of 3 banks 
• Bernhard: done with 7 reports from 3 banks 
• Johannes: done with Spanish, Swiss and Scandinavian banks, currently working on 
Dutch bank, then on all other remaining banks. 
• Status meeting Jan 21st, 2020, 10h, online Telco, Johannes, Veronika, Bernhard 
• All 90 disclosure reports are coded 
• Coding complete. 
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8.3 Word Lists  
 
Note: Word lists are used to capture the relevant content in disclosure reports. 
For each regulatory risk disclosure word identified, the source is given to the right.  
 
word source* word source* word source* word source* word source*
active 1 country 1 gain 1 nominal 1 settle 1
activity 1 covenent 1 gain 2 non-performing 1 settlement 1
actual 1 coverage 1 general 1 notional 1 severity 1
add-on 1 CRD 1 geographic 1 NSFR 1 shareholder 1
adequacy 1 credit 1 government 1 obligation 1 short 1
adequate 1 crisis 1 guarantee 1 officer 1 shortage 2
adjustment 1 CRR 1 guideline 1 operational 1 significant 2
advance 1 customer 1 hedge 1 organisation 1 simulation 1
advisory 1 danger 1 holding 1 originate 1 solvency 1
against 2 debt 1 ICAAP 1 outstanding 1 specific 1
allowance 1 decline 2 ILAAP 1 parameter 1 sponsor 1
amount 1 decrease 2 impair 1 partial 1 spread 1
approach 1 deduct 1 increase 2 party 1 stable 1
appropriate 1 default 1 incremental 1 passive 1 standard 1
approve 1 de-risking 1 inform 1 past 1 strategy 1
assess 1 derivative 1 insitution 1 PD 1 stress 1
asset 1 differ 2 instruction 1 peak 2 subordinate 1
AT 1 difficult 1 instrument 1 period 1 supervisory 1
audit 1 disclose 1 insurance 1 pillar 1 swap 1
average 1 disclosure 1 intensive 1 plan 1 sythetic 1
avoidance 1 discretion 1 intermediary 1 policy 1 tax 1
backtesting 1 distribution 1 internal 1 portfolio 1 term 1
bank 1 diversification 1 invest 1 probability 1 test 1
bear 1 diversify 2 investigation 1 probable 2 threat 2
behaviour 1 due 1 investor 1 procedure 1 threshold 1
business 1 EAD 1 IRB 1 process 1 tier 1
calibration 1 economic 1 issue 1 profile 1 tolerance 1
capacity 1 economy 1 LCR 1 protection 1 trading 1
capital 1 effective 1 lend 1 prudent 1 traditional 1
care 1 encumbered 1 less 2 prudential 1 transaction 1
carry 1 encumbrance 1 leverage 1 quality 1 transfer 1
cash 1 endanger 1 LGD 1 rating 1 type 1
catastrophe 2 enforcement 1 liability 1 ratio 1 unable 2
central 1 equity 1 limit 1 refinance 1 uncertain 2
CET 1 estimate 1 liquid 1 regulate 3 underlying 1
challenge 2 event 1 liquidity 1 regulation 3 undertaking 1
chance 2 expect 1 litigation 1 regulatory 3 unencumbered 1
charge 1 exposure 1 loan 1 report 1 use 1
class 1 fail 2 location 1 reputation 1 valuation 1
collateral 1 fair 1 long 1 requirement 1 value 1
commitment 1 finance 1 loss 2 resilience 1 value-at-risk 1
commodity 1 financial 1 low 2 responsible 1 viable 2
compliance 1 floor 1 mark 1 retail 1 volatility 1
concentration 1 flow 1 market 1 reverse 2 waive 1
conduct 1 fluctuate 2 material 1 risk 2 warning 1
confidence 1 forego 1 maturity 1 rule 1 weight 1
consolidate 1 foundation 1 medium 1 RWA 1
contingent 1 framework 1 mitigation 1 save 1
control 1 fraud 1 model 1 scenario 1
corporate 1 frequency 1 monitor 1 score 1
correlation 1 fund 1 net 1 secure 1
counterparty 1 future 1 netting 1 security 1
Sources: 
1: Own analysis of disclosure reports; 2: Elshandidy, Fraser  & Hussainey (2015)




Note: Word lists are used to capture the relevant content in disclosure reports. 
For each forward-looking word identified, the source is given to the right.  
 
 
Note: Word lists are used to capture the relevant content in disclosure reports. 




Note: This table includes words that are excluded from the readability analysis 
with the Gunning-Fog index. Although they are three-syllables words, they are 
assumed to not pose a problem for understanding in the financial context. 
  
word source* word source* word source* word source* word source*
active 1 feasible 1 intend 3, 4 outlook 1 success 1
amend 1 forecast 3, 4 manage 1 pending 1 take place 1
analyse 1 foresee 1 may 4 plan 4 transition 1
anticipate 3, 4 forward 3 might 4 positive 1 trend 1
believe 3, 4 fourthcoming 1 monitor 1 potential 3 unexpect 1
can 4 future 3 negative 1 predict 1 unfeasible 1
continue 1 goal 3, 4 new 1 project 4 update 1
could 4 grow 1 next 1 propose 1 will 4
decline 1 guidance 3 notification 1 recommend 1
deteriorate 1 hope 4 objective 3, 4 result 1
develop 1 impact 1 ongoing 1 revise 1
estimate 3 impediment 1 onwards 1 schedule 1
exit 1 initiate 1 optimise 1 seek 4
expect 3, 4 initiative 1 outcome 1 should 4
Sources: 
1: Own analysis of disclosure reports; 3: Burks & Cuny (2018); 4: Li (2010)
Forward-looking Words
word source* word source* word source* word source* word source*
above 1 deter 1 experience 1 major 1 shift 1
below 1 develop 1 fall 1 minor 1 stable 1
cease 1 differ 1 high 1 move 1 trigger 1
change 1 downward 1 historical 1 previous 1 unchange 1
compare 1 drive 1 impose 1 reduce 1 upward 1
contribute 1 equal 1 increase 1 reflect 1 year-end 1
decline 1 exceed 1 last 1 result 1 year-on-year 1
decrease 1 excess 1 low 1 rise 1 year-to-year 1
Sources: 
1: Own analysis of disclosure reports
Time Comparability Words
word source* word source* word source*
financial 1 disclosure 1 organisation 1
corporate 1 government 1
Sources: 




8.4 Benchmark Report Structure Template 
Benchmark Report Structure 
Structural Item Match in Report 
Executive summary   
Key risk factors   
Regulatory framework   
Accounting framework   
Scope of consolidation   
Regulatory capital management   
Economic capital management (ICAAP)   
Leverage ratio   
Capital requirements (RWA)   
Risk management   
Recovery and resolution plans   
Credit risk management   
credit risk mitigation   
Credit risk standard approach   
Equities in banking book   
Interest rate in banking book   
Credit risk IRB approach   
Counterparty risk   
Securitisation   
Market risk   
Operational risks   
Liquidity   
Remuneration   
Asset encumbrance   
Other risks   
 
Note: This benchmark table is used to evaluate the structures of disclosure 
reports for quality criterion 5 sector comparability. It includes in the left column 
the structural items that are shared by the industry leaders. In the right column, 




























Bank_01_2016 0,99                0,86                0,71                0,81                 0,74                 0,60                  3,93             
Bank_01_2017 1,00                0,86                0,71                0,82                 0,76                 0,60                  3,96             
Bank_01_2018 0,98                0,85                0,75                0,80                 0,75                 0,60                  3,93             
Bank_02_2016 0,96                0,93                0,76                0,93                 0,91                 0,60                  4,25             
Bank_02_2017 0,95                0,93                0,76                0,93                 0,91                 0,60                  4,24             
Bank_02_2018 0,94                0,94                0,76                0,93                 0,91                 0,60                  4,23             
Bank_03_2016 0,97                0,90                0,72                0,87                 0,83                 0,52                  4,00             
Bank_03_2017 0,96                0,91                0,71                0,88                 0,85                 0,48                  3,97             
Bank_03_2018 0,97                0,94                0,73                0,94                 0,94                 0,48                  4,17             
Bank_04_2016 0,66                0,87                0,65                0,84                 0,79                 0,44                  3,49             
Bank_04_2017 0,75                0,88                0,67                0,86                 0,83                 0,44                  3,66             
Bank_04_2018 0,71                0,89                0,69                0,88                 0,85                 0,52                  3,75             
Bank_05_2016 0,92                0,92                0,70                0,86                 0,88                 0,56                  4,03             
Bank_05_2017 0,99                0,94                0,70                0,88                 0,88                 0,76                  4,33             
Bank_05_2018 0,91                0,94                0,68                0,87                 0,84                 0,76                  4,19             
Bank_06_2016 0,88                0,94                0,73                0,93                 0,93                 0,60                  4,17             
Bank_06_2017 0,64                0,95                0,71                0,94                 0,94                 0,60                  3,95             
Bank_06_2018 0,66                0,95                0,72                0,95                 0,97                 0,60                  4,02             
Bank_07_2016 0,86                0,88                0,70                0,88                 0,82                 0,68                  4,02             
Bank_07_2017 0,90                0,91                0,76                0,89                 0,81                 0,64                  4,08             
Bank_07_2018 0,87                0,93                0,73                0,94                 0,90                 0,64                  4,18             
Bank_08_2016 0,88                0,96                0,70                0,95                 0,96                 0,52                  4,15             
Bank_08_2017 0,91                0,96                0,70                0,95                 0,95                 0,52                  4,15             
Bank_08_2018 0,90                0,96                0,68                0,95                 0,92                 0,52                  4,11             
Bank_09_2016 0,90                0,88                0,61                0,83                 0,79                 0,52                  3,79             
Bank_09_2017 0,81                0,92                0,58                0,88                 0,87                 0,60                  3,91             
Bank_09_2018 0,83                0,91                0,59                0,86                 0,86                 0,64                  3,95             
Bank_10_2016 0,85                0,84                0,35                0,73                 0,80                 0,16                  3,14             
Bank_10_2017 0,88                0,81                0,41                0,69                 0,76                 0,16                  3,10             
Bank_10_2018 0,87                0,82                0,29                0,70                 0,76                 0,16                  3,05             
Bank_11_2016 0,88                0,80                0,66                0,71                 0,67                 0,48                  3,47             
Bank_11_2017 0,93                0,83                0,57                0,73                 0,73                 0,48                  3,57             
Bank_11_2018 0,97                0,84                0,60                0,73                 0,73                 0,48                  3,62             
Bank_12_2016 0,70                0,99                0,69                0,99                 0,97                 0,48                  3,98             
Bank_12_2017 0,69                1,00                0,70                1,00                 1,00                 0,48                  4,02             
Bank_12_2018 0,74                0,99                0,64                0,98                 0,97                 0,48                  3,98             
Bank_13_2016 0,84                0,72                0,68                0,64                 0,49                 0,56                  3,24             
Bank_13_2017 0,81                0,80                0,73                0,74                 0,56                 0,56                  3,43             
Bank_13_2018 0,90                0,82                0,77                0,79                 0,70                 0,52                  3,71             
Bank_14_2016 0,82                0,97                0,70                0,95                 0,91                 0,60                  4,11             
Bank_14_2017 0,76                0,97                0,68                0,95                 0,91                 0,68                  4,11             
Bank_14_2018 0,65                0,98                0,68                0,96                 0,95                 0,68                  4,07             
Bank_15_2016 0,88                0,86                0,36                0,80                 0,83                 0,28                  3,40             
Bank_15_2017 0,83                0,89                0,50                0,83                 0,85                 0,24                  3,44             
Bank_15_2018 0,83                0,89                0,52                0,82                 0,82                 0,24                  3,42             
Bank_16_2016 0,59                0,91                0,75                0,88                 0,87                 0,52                  3,69             
Bank_16_2017 0,56                0,91                0,77                0,89                 0,86                 0,52                  3,67             
Bank_16_2018 0,64                0,91                0,77                0,89                 0,87                 0,52                  3,76             
Bank_17_2016 0,87                0,81                0,57                0,72                 0,69                 0,64                  3,61             
Bank_17_2017 0,95                0,83                0,67                0,73                 0,73                 0,68                  3,83             
Bank_17_2018 0,89                0,83                0,68                0,73                 0,74                 0,68                  3,79             
Bank_18_2016 0,74                0,88                0,73                0,83                 0,81                 0,36                  3,54             
Bank_18_2017 0,71                0,89                0,72                0,86                 0,84                 0,36                  3,57             
Bank_18_2018 0,81                0,90                0,71                0,85                 0,82                 0,36                  3,64             
Bank_19_2016 0,75                0,88                0,65                0,81                 0,86                 0,56                  3,74             
Bank_19_2017 0,74                0,88                0,67                0,81                 0,84                 0,56                  3,73             
Bank_19_2018 0,73                0,89                0,72                0,82                 0,87                 0,56                  3,79             
Bank_20_2016 1,00                0,88                0,68                0,77                 0,76                 0,52                  3,83             
Bank_20_2017 0,91                0,90                0,70                0,79                 0,78                 0,52                  3,80             
Bank_20_2018 0,98                0,93                0,73                0,84                 0,87                 0,52                  4,05             
Bank_21_2016 0,84                0,87                0,77                0,84                 0,79                 0,52                  3,81             
Bank_21_2017 0,90                0,89                0,78                0,86                 0,82                 0,52                  3,94             
Bank_21_2018 0,89                0,87                0,75                0,83                 0,79                 0,56                  3,88             
Disclosure Scoring Model Results 
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Note: This table includes the results from the disclosure scoring model. The 
column to the left shows the anonymized banks (30 banks in total with annual 
disclosure reports for 2016, 2017 and 2018). The column to the very right includes 
the Composite Disclosure Scores, the columns in between show the scores on 

























Bank_22_2016 0,65                0,88                0,66                0,85                 0,77                 0,44                  3,48             
Bank_22_2017 0,64                0,90                0,66                0,86                 0,79                 0,56                  3,63             
Bank_22_2018 0,65                0,91                0,65                0,87                 0,81                 0,56                  3,67             
Bank_23_2016 0,97                0,94                0,73                0,95                 0,90                 0,68                  4,34             
Bank_23_2017 0,97                0,96                0,77                0,97                 0,92                 0,60                  4,32             
Bank_23_2018 0,91                0,96                0,76                0,98                 0,95                 0,60                  4,30             
Bank_24_2016 0,70                0,89                0,71                0,81                 0,89                 0,56                  3,74             
Bank_24_2017 0,70                0,90                0,70                0,82                 0,90                 0,52                  3,74             
Bank_24_2018 0,81                0,85                0,47                0,75                 0,81                 0,48                  3,50             
Bank_25_2016 0,99                0,88                0,73                0,81                 0,86                 0,60                  4,07             
Bank_25_2017 0,99                0,89                0,70                0,82                 0,87                 0,60                  4,07             
Bank_25_2018 0,99                0,88                0,72                0,83                 0,85                 0,52                  3,99             
Bank_26_2016 0,97                0,84                0,70                0,80                 0,75                 0,72                  4,01             
Bank_26_2017 0,98                0,84                0,68                0,80                 0,73                 0,72                  3,99             
Bank_26_2018 0,99                0,85                0,68                0,82                 0,76                 0,72                  4,06             
Bank_27_2016 0,87                0,82                0,66                0,76                 0,72                 0,60                  3,69             
Bank_27_2017 0,87                0,88                0,67                0,84                 0,78                 0,60                  3,86             
Bank_27_2018 0,87                0,89                0,67                0,84                 0,82                 0,60                  3,91             
Bank_28_2016 0,98                0,90                0,71                0,88                 0,76                 0,64                  4,06             
Bank_28_2017 0,95                0,92                0,71                0,88                 0,80                 0,68                  4,12             
Bank_28_2018 0,98                0,93                0,71                0,89                 0,81                 0,68                  4,18             
Bank_29_2016 0,93                0,89                0,71                0,86                 0,73                 0,68                  4,00             
Bank_29_2017 0,92                0,89                0,72                0,86                 0,77                 0,72                  4,07             
Bank_29_2018 0,92                0,90                0,72                0,88                 0,81                 0,72                  4,14             
Bank_30_2016 0,91                0,84                0,57                0,73                 0,68                 0,60                  3,63             
Bank_30_2017 0,90                0,88                0,64                0,82                 0,71                 0,72                  3,92             
Bank_30_2018 0,70                0,87                0,61                0,79                 0,67                 0,72                  3,63             
Disclosure Scoring Model Results 
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